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Abstract
A wireless sensor network (WSN) usually consists of a large number of small, low-
cost devices that have limited energy supply, computation, memory, and communication
capacities. Recently, WSNs have drawn a lot of attention due to their broad applications in
both military and civilian domains. Communication security is essential to the success of
WSN applications, especially for those mission-critical applications working in unattended
and even hostile environments. However, providing satisfactory security protection in WSNs
has ever been a challenging task due to various network & resource constraints and malicious
attacks. This motivates the research on communication security for WSNs.
This dissertation studies communication security in WSNs with respect to three impor-
tant aspects. The ¯rst study addresses broadcast/multicast security in WSNs. We propose
a multi-user broadcast authentication technique, which overcomes the security vulnerability
of existing solutions. The proposed scheme guarantees immediate broadcast authentication
by employing public key cryptography, and achieves its e±ciency through integrating vari-
ous techniques from di®erent domains. We also address multicast encryption to solve data
con¯dentiality concern for secure multicast. Utilizing the fact that sensors are both routers
and end-receivers, we propose a lightweight multicast key management scheme that supports
a broad range of multicast semantics.
The second study addresses data report security in WSNs. A location-aware end-to-end
security framework for WSNs is proposed, in which secret keys are bound to geographic
locations so that the impact of sensor compromise are limited only to their vicinity. The
proposed scheme e®ectively defeats both bogus data injection attacks and various denial of
service (DoS) attacks. In addition, we address event boundary detection as a speci¯c case of
secure data aggregation in WSNs. We propose a secure and fault-tolerant event boundary
detection scheme, which is a localized statistic approach that detects the boundaries of large
spatial events.
The third study addresses key management security in WSNs. We propose a keyed-hash-
chain-based key pool generation technique for random key pre-distribution, which leads to
a higher scheme e±ciency and better security resilience against sensor compromise.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a wireless network consisting of a large number
of spatially distributed sensor nodes. These sensor nodes can be easily deployed
at strategic regions at a low cost. Equipped with various types of sensors, sensor
nodes cooperate with each other to monitor physical or environmental conditions,
such as temperature, sound, image, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants. Each
sensor node is also equipped with a radio transceiver or other wireless communication
device, a microprocessor, and an energy source (e.g., a battery). Due to cost and size
constraints, sensor nodes are usually resource limited with respect to their energy,
memory, computational, and communication capacities. Table 1.1 shows the system
parameters for several typical types of sensors [43].
The development of WSNs was originally motivated by military and homeland
security applications such as battle¯eld surveillance. However, WSNs are now also
widely applied in civilian application areas, including industrial sensing, environ-
ment and habitat monitoring, health-care applications, home automation, and tra±c
control. In the context of ubiquitous computing, WSNs can be used to perform ubiq-
uitous information sensing, storing, and provide content delivering services. Due to
their broad applications in both military and civilian domains, WSNs have drawn a
1
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Memory Processor Radio
Example Processor ROM RAM Active Sleep Send Receive
[KB] [KB] [mW] [¹W] [mW] [¹W]
Spec Custom 8-bit 0 3 1.5 1 900
Mica2 ATmega128L 128 512 24 <45 42 29
Telos TI MSP430 48 1024 6 <15 35 38
Imote ARM7TDMI 512 64 195 300 incl. in Power
BTnode ATmega128L 128 244 39.6 9.9 66 50
Stargate Intel PXA255 32,000 64,000 < 2,500
Table 1.1: System parameters for di®erent types of sensors
lot of attention recently [12, 107, 20, 6, 13, 29, 63, 33, 5].
Communication security is essential to the success of WSN applications, especially
for those mission-critical applications working in unattended and even hostile envi-
ronments. To ensure that the network functions correctly and safely as purposed, the
following are four major security requirements for WSNs [119, 75].
² Authenticity: Authenticity enables a sensor to make sure the identities of its
communicating entities so that no adversary could masquerade another entity,
and disseminate forged messages.
² Integrity: Integrity ensures that a message being transferred is never corrupted
or modi¯ed by an adversary without being detected.
² Con¯dentiality: Con¯dentiality ensures that the content of the message being
transferred is never disclosed to unauthorized entities. Network transmission of
sensitive information, such as military information, requires con¯dentiality.
² Availability: Availability ensures the survivability of network services despite
denial of service (DoS) attacks [119]. An DoS attack could be launched at
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any layer of sensor networks and could be of various forms. At the physical and
MAC layers, an adversary could employ jamming attacks. At the network layer,
an adversary could disrupt the routing protocol and disconnect the network. At
the application layer, an adversary may bring down high-level services such as
network broadcast, multicast, data report, key management services, and so on.
Despite the importance, providing satisfactory security protection in WSNs has
never been an easy task. This is because sensor networks not only su®er from various
malicious attacks; but also are subject to many resource and network constraints as
compared to traditional wireless networks. This motivates the research on communi-
cation security for WSNs [59, 12, 75, 17, 55, 56, 26, 25, 123, 35, 111, 120, 109, 11, 53,
94, 103, 81, 118, 117].
1.1 Motivation
The following unique features of WSNs make it particularly challenging to protect
communication security in WSNs.
² Resource Constraints: As shown in Table 1.1, small sensors only have lim-
ited communication and computation capabilities, which makes it di±cult to
implement expensive security operations for WSNs. This precludes the direct
transplantation of the existing security designs aimed for traditional wireless
networks, where network nodes are much more powerful devices. Sensor nodes
are battery-powered, having only limited energy supply. This again requires the
security design to be e±cient regarding both communication and computation
overheads. In most cases, sensors only have very limited memory spaces, which
further narrows down the security design choices. All these resource constraints
require that the security design can only be e±cient and lightweight; otherwise
it will not be practical for WSNs.
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² Network Constraints: WSNs use wireless open channel, therefore an adversary
can easily eavesdrop all the network communications, as well as arbitrarily
injecting messages and launching jamming attacks at di®erent network layers.
This means that the security design has to take into account both passive and
active attacks. WSNs are distributed in nature, therefore centralized security
solutions cannot be an option for WSNs. This also means that WSNs are
vulnerable to various DoS attacks. WSNs are often very large in scale, which
in turn imposes scalability requirement on the security design.
² Malicious Attacks: Give the large scale of the WSNs, it is impractical to protect
or monitor each individual sensor node physically. In addition, sensors are also
not tamper resistant1. Therefore, the adversary may capture and compromise
a certain number of sensor nodes without being noticed and obtain all the
secrets stored on these sensors. The adversary is thus able to launch a variety
of malicious insider attacks against the network through these compromised
nodes in addition to outsider attacks. For example, the compromised nodes
may report bogus observations in order to mislead the network owner or users;
they may also discard important messages such as data reports in order to hide
some critical events from being noticed. All these attacks could cause severe
results that may disable network functionality at least temporarily. Hence, it is
highly important for the security design to be robust against sensor compromise
and against both outsider and insider attacks.
All these malicious attacks, resource and network constraints, interleaved together,
impose many challenging requirements for the security design in WSNs. Sophisticated
techniques and careful design are demanded to balance among all these competing and
sometimes even con°icting requirements as desired by the underlying applications. In
1Though using tamper-resistance hardware may help to protect security sensitive data on sensor
nodes, this solution generally increases the cost of an individual sensor node dramatically [].
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this thesis, we study communication security in WSNs with respect to three important
aspects: broadcast/multicast2 security, data report security, and random key pre-
distribution.
1.1.1 Multicast Security
Multicast communication from a sink or network users to sensors is the most com-
mon communication paradigm in WSNs and of great importance, as it enables the
sink/network users to disseminate query and control messages to the sensors and thus
e±ciently operate the WSN. Multicast security is hence one of the most important
security services in WSNs [6, 75, 92, 15].
Recently, many schemes have been proposed to address the problem of broadcast
authentication in WSNs [75, 92]. These schemes aim to provide e±cient authenti-
cation solutions for the broadcast tra±c, and hence ensure the message authenticity
and prevent message fabrication and alteration attacks. Broadcast authentication in
WSNs was ¯rst addressed by ¹TESLA [75]. In ¹TESLA, users of WSNs are assumed
to be one or a few ¯xed sinks, which are always trustworthy. The scheme adopts a
one-way hash function h() and uses the hash preimages as keys in a message authenti-
cation code (MAC) algorithm. Initially, sensor nodes are preloaded with K0 = h
n(x),
where x is the secret held by the sink. Then, K1 = h
n¡1(x) is used to generate MACs
for all the broadcast messages sent within time interval I1. During time interval I2,
the sink broadcasts K1, and sensor nodes verify h(K1) = K0. The authenticity of
messages received during time interval I1 are then veri¯ed using K1. This delayed
disclosure technique is used for the entire hash chain and thus demands loosely syn-
chronized clocks between the sink and sensor nodes. ¹TESLA is later enhanced in
[57] to overcome the length limit of the hash chain. Most recently, ¹TESLA is also
2In the following, we do not distinguish broadcast from multicast for the purpose of this thesis
unless necessary.
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extended in [58] to support the multiuser scenario but the scheme assumes that each
sensor node only interacts with a very limited number of users.
It is generally held that ¹TESLA-like schemes have the following shortcomings
even in the single-user scenario: 1) all the receivers have to bu®er all the messages
received within one time interval; 2) they are subject to Wormhole attacks [34], where
messages could be forged due to the propagation delay of the disclosed keys. How-
ever, here we point out a much more serious vulnerability of ¹TESLA-like schemes
when they are applied in multi-hop WSNs. Since sensor nodes bu®er all the messages
received within one time interval, an adversary can hence °ood the whole network
arbitrarily. All he has to do is to claim that the °ooding messages belong to the
current time interval which should be bu®ered for authentication until the next time
interval. Since wireless transmission is very expensive in WSNs, and WSNs are ex-
tremely energy constrained, the ability to °ood the network arbitrarily could cause
devastating DoS attacks. Moreover, this type of energy-depletion DoS attacks become
more devastating in multiuser scenario as the adversary now can have more targets
and hence more chances to generate bogus messages without being detected. Obvi-
ously, all these attacks are due to delayed authentication of the broadcast messages.
In [34], TIK is proposed to achieve immediate key disclosure and hence immediate
message authentication based on precise time synchronization between the sink and
receiving nodes. However, this technique is not applicable in WSNs as pointed out
by the authors. Therefore, multiuser broadcast authentication still remains a wide
open problem in WSNs.
While multicast authentication has been extensively studied, there has been very
little work addressing the problem of multicast encryption in the context of WSNs.
Multicast encryption is orthogonal to multicast authentication; it provides message
con¯dentiality and ensures that the message content can only be recovered by the
intended receivers. The demand of multicast encryption is two-fold. First, it en-
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sures message con¯dentiality and privacy. For example, the query message regarding
the health status of patients should always be kept con¯dential from people other
than the responsible doctors/nurses in the case of a health-oriented WSN such as
CodeBlue [60]. Second, it minimizes the security risk (i.e., information leakage, key
compromise) resulted from sensor compromise, which is unavoidable when the WSN
is deployed in hostile environments. Hence, the problem of multicast encryption has
to be addressed before multicast services can be deployed in practice. Designing an
applicable multicast encryption scheme for WSNs is challenging. On the one hand,
multicast services in WSNs have various semantics and are inherently multigroup
oriented. On the other hand, WSNs usually have a large network size and sensors are
resource-constrained and subject to potential compromise when deployed in hostile
environments. These factors pose drastic e±ciency and security requirements on the
design of multicast encryption schemes.
1.1.2 Data Report Security
One of the most severe security threats in WSNs is security compromise of sensor
nodes due to their lack of tamper resistance [17]. In WSNs, the attacker could com-
promise multiple nodes to obtain their carried keying materials and control them,
and thus is able to intercept data transmitted through these nodes thereafter. As
the number of compromised nodes grows, communication links between uncompro-
mised nodes might also be compromised through malicious cryptanalysis. Hence,
this type of attacks could lead to severe data con¯dentiality compromise in WSNs.
Furthermore, the attacker may use compromised nodes to inject bogus data tra±c
in WSNs. In such attacks, compromised nodes pretend to have detected an event
of interest within their vicinity, or simply fabricate a bogus event report claiming a
non-existing event at an arbitrary location. Such insider attacks can severely dam-
age network function and result in the failure of mission-critical applications. Such
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attacks also induce network congestion and wireless contention, and waste the scarce
network resources such as energy and bandwidth, hence, severely a®ecting both data
authenticity and availability. Lastly, the attacker could also use compromised nodes
to launch selective forwarding attack [44], in which case compromised nodes selec-
tively drop the going-through data tra±c and thus data availability can be severely
damaged. The existence of aforementioned attacks, together with the inherent con-
straints of sensor nodes, makes it rather challenging to provide satisfying data security
in WSNs with respect to all its three aspects, i.e., con¯dentiality, authenticity and
availability [12, 107, 44, 75, 97].
Recent research has seen a growing body of work on security designs for WSNs
[28, 17, 55, 56, 26, 25, 123, 35, 16, 120, 111, 109]. Due to the resource constraint,
most of the proposals are based on symmetric cryptography and only provide data
authenticity and/or con¯dentiality in a hop-by-hop manner. End-to-end encryp-
tion/authentication is considered less feasible, particular in a WSN consisting of a
large number of nodes [17]. However, lack of the end-to-end security guarantee could
make WSNs particularly vulnerable to the aforementioned attacks in many applica-
tions, where node-to-sink communication is the dominant communication pattern.
This could give the attacker the advantage to obtain/manupulate its desired data at
a much less e®ort without having to compromise a large number of nodes. To make
things worse, existing security designs are highly vulnerable to many types of DoS
attacks, such as report disruption attacks and selective forwarding attacks.
The fundamental application of WSNs is to monitor, detect, and report the oc-
currences of events of interest. In many applications [5, 63, 48, 23], this includes the
detection of a large-scale spatial phenomenon such as the transportation front line
of a contamination or the diagnosis of network health. Due to the strict resource
limitations (e.g., battery power, bandwidth, etc.) of sensor nodes and the nature
of some events, it is not feasible to collect all sensor measurements and compute
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event boundaries in a centralized manner [23, 62]. A localized approach that allows
in-network processing is therefore demanded. Sensor nodes are expected to collabo-
rate with each other based on each own local view and provide a global picture for
spatially distributed phenomena with greatly improved e±ciency. Recently, several
localized boundary detection schemes have been proposed [19, 48, 23, 71, 47]. All
these schemes assume a trustworthy environment, and would fail in adversarial envi-
ronments. Their resilience to node random measurement error is also very limited.
However, for WSNs deployed in security-sensitive environments, it is critical for an
event boundary detection scheme to be highly resilient against both node compromise
and random faults.
1.1.3 Random Key Pre-distribution
In many applications, it is important to protect communications among sensor nodes
to maintain message con¯dentiality and integrity. Recent research suggests that sym-
metric secret key pre-distribution is possibly the only practical approach for estab-
lishing secure channels among sensor nodes since the low-power sensor nodes have
very limited computational capacity which excludes the applicability of computation-
intensive public key cryptographic algorithms.
Recently, many random key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed [28, 17,
55, 56, 26, 25, 123, 35]. Random key pre-distribution was ¯rst proposed by Eschenauer
et al. [28]. The basic idea behind this scheme is to have a large pool of keys, from
which a set of keys is randomly chosen and stored in each sensor node. Any two
nodes which are able to ¯nd common keys within their key subsets can use those
shared keys for secure communication. Chan et al. extended the above scheme to
enhance the security and resilience of the network using q-compositeness [17]. In
the q-composite scheme, at least q common keys are required to establish the secure
channel between two nodes instead of using only one key. This method achieves
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higher security strength when a network is prone to small scale attacks (less than
100 captured nodes) but not large-scale attacks. However a higher value of q makes
the network less scalable - it requires a larger number of keys stored at each node
in order to maintain the necessary probability of ¯nding q keys. Du et al. [26] and
Liu et al. [55] further extended random key pre-distribution approach to pairwise key
pre-distribution in which the shared key between any two sensor nodes is uniquely
computed so that the resilience against node capture is signi¯cantly improved. All
above mentioned schemes assume no network pre-deployment knowledge. In the case
that certain pre-deployment knowledge is available, the performance of the key pre-
distribution can be improved by exploiting such knowledge [25, 56].
The drawback of the above mentioned random key pre-distribution schemes [28,
17] is that they are not suitable for large scale sensor networks as they require each
node to load a large number of keys, although they do not rely on any pre-deployment
knowledge. For instance, implementation of random key distribution schemes in
[28, 17] results in a storage overhead of at least 200 keys at each sensor node for a
WSN of size 10,000, which is almost half of the available memory space at a low-
end sensor node (assume 64-bit keys and less than 4KB of data memory [75]). The
problem becomes even worse when the network size is larger. This fact makes the
previously proposed random key distribution schemes less practical for large-scale
WSNs.
1.2 Main Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
² Multicast Security: We identify the problem of multiuser broadcast authenti-
cation in WSNs and point out a serious security vulnerability inherent to the
symmetric-key based ¹TESLA-like schemes. We then propose several PKC-
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based schemes to address the proposed problem with minimized computational
and communication costs. We achieve our goal by integrating several crypto-
graphic building blocks, such as the Bloom ¯lter, the partial message recovery
signature scheme, and the Merkle hash tree, in an innovative manner. We also
analyze both the performance and security resilience of the proposed schemes.
A quantitative energy consumption analysis is given in detail and demonstrates
the e®ectiveness and e±ciency of the proposed schemes.
To address multicast encryption problem, we ¯rst analyze and classify the multi-
cast group semantics that are inherently demanded by WSNs. We then propose
the GPLD scheme which, to our best knowledge, is the ¯rst multicast encryp-
tion scheme of its kind that supports various multicast group semantics and
is tailored for WSNs. GPLD advances the current state-of-the-art by enabling
dynamic changing and simultaneous formation of multiple multicast groups.
We develop a novel multicast encryption technique called global-partition, local-
di®usion. This technique e®ectively minimizes global (sink-to-sensor) group
key distribution and re-keying tra±c, while maintaining its support to various
multicast group semantics. The e±ciency and security properties of GPLD are
justi¯ed through both analysis and simulations.
² Data Report Security: To address data report security, we propose a novel
location-aware multi-functional key management framework. LEDS e±ciently
embeds the location (cell) information of each sensor into all types of symmetric
secret keys owned by that node, and thus provides end-to-end security guar-
antee. Each legitimate event report in LEDS is endorsed by multiple sensing
nodes and is encrypted with a unique secret key shared between the event sens-
ing nodes and the sink. Furthermore, the authenticity of the corresponding
event sensing nodes can be individually veri¯ed by the sink. This novel set-
ting successfully eliminates the possibility that the compromise of nodes other
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than the sensing nodes of an event report may result in security compromise of
that event report. LEDS possesses e±cient en-route false data ¯ltering capa-
bility to deal with the infamous bogus data injection attack, which at the same
time signi¯cantly reduces energy cost as unnecessary forwarding is eliminated.
LEDS also provides high level assurance on data availability by dealing with
both report disruption attack and selective forwarding attack, simultaneously.
For applications related to large-scale spatial phenomena monitoring, we further
introduce the problem of securing event boundary detection in WSNs and show
how existing boundary detection schemes would fail in adversarial environments.
We present a Secure Event Boundary Detection (SEBD) scheme, which is to
the best of our knowledge the ¯rst protocol of its kind to secure event boundary
detection in WSNs. SEBD withstands many types of attacks. We propose an
enhanced statistic model for localized event boundary detection with proactive
faulty measurements correction. Our model is more accurate and robust against
node compromise and random fault as compared to existing schemes [19, 48,
23]. Moreover, it is nonparametric without relying on any prior knowledge of
node compromise and fault probability, which, however, is required by existing
schemes to achieve optimal results [19, 23]. We use extensive simulations to
evaluate SEBD and show a very good performance and security strength.
² Random Key Pre-distribution: We propose a highly e±cient random key pre-
distribution scheme, which combines the random key pre-distribution technique
and the hash chain technique. The novelty of our scheme lies in that, instead
of requiring each sensor node to store all the chosen keys, the majority of the
keys a node possesses are represented and stored in the form of a small number
of key-generation keys by carefully designing the key pool, and therefore, the
storage overhead is signi¯cantly reduced while the same security strength holds.
Compared with the existing schemes, the proposed scheme is more scalable and
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more secure in the sense that 1) Under the given resilience requirement against
node capture, the proposed scheme requires a much smaller key ring size than
the previous schemes; 2) Under the given maximum allowed key ring size, the
proposed scheme has a much better resilience property against node capture
than the previous schemes.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The organization of this dissertation is as follows.
Chapter 2 presents multi-user broadcast authentication schemes. In Section 2.1,
we introduce the background of the cryptographic mechanisms to be used. Section 2.2
presents the system assumption, adversary model, and security objectives. In Section
2.3, we introduce two basic schemes. We further propose two advanced schemes and
detail the underlying design logic in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 analyzes the performance
of the proposed schemes. In Section 2.6, we summarize the chapter.
In Chapter 3, we propose a secure and e±cient multicast encryption scheme which
allows Ad-hoc Group Formations. In Section 3.1, we discuss multicast group seman-
tics in WSNs. Section 3.2 is related work. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we introduce our
proposed scheme in detail. Sections 3.5 and 3.6 are the security and performance
analysis of the proposed scheme, respectively. We summarize the chapter in Section
3.7.
Chapter 4 discusses data report security. Section 4.1 articulates the data security
goals in WSNs and evaluates related work with respect to these goals. Section 4.2
details the proposed LEDS design. Section 4.3 presents the detailed security analysis
of the proposed LEDS, followed by the performance analysis in Section 4.4. In Section
4.5, we summarize the chapter.
Chapter 5 presents secure and fault-tolerant event boundary detection techniques.
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Section 5.1 details the proposed event boundary detection scheme, called SEBD.
Section 5.2 gives the security analysis of SEBD. Section 5.3 reports the simulation
results of SEBD regarding both performance and security strength. We give the
summarization in Section 2.6.
Chapter 6 presents a new approach for random key pre-distribution for large scale
WSNs. We describe the background and related work in Section 6.1. Then we de¯ne
the terms and notation and describe the proposed scheme in Section 6.2. We further
discuss the performance and security strength of the proposed scheme in Sections 6.3
and 6.4. Finally, the summarization is given in Section 6.5.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and o®ers some directions for future work.
Chapter 2
Multi-user Broadcast
Authentication
In this chapter, we address multiuser broadcast authentication problem in WSNs by
designing PKC-based solutions with minimized computational and communication
costs. We focus on providing multi-user broadcast authentication in WSNs, where
the broadcast messages are initiated by a number of network users. Please note that
the network users refer to personnel or devices that use the WSN; they are not sensor
nodes. On the one hand, we aim to achieve immediate message authentication and
resist DoS attacks in the presence of both user revocation and node compromise. On
the other hand, we want to optimize both computational and communication costs.
We propose four di®erent public-key-based approaches and provide in-depth anal-
ysis of their advantages and disadvantages. In all the four approaches, the users are
always authenticated through their public keys. We ¯rst propose a straightforward
certi¯cate-based approach and point out its high energy ine±ciency with respect to
both communication and computation costs. We then propose a direct storage based
scheme, which has high e±ciency but su®ers from the scalability problem. A Bloom
¯lter based scheme is further proposed to improve the memory e±ciency over the
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direct storage based scheme. Further techniques are also developed to increase the
security strength of the proposed scheme. Lastly, we propose a hybrid scheme to sup-
port a larger number of network users by employing the Merkle hash tree technique.
We give an in-depth quantitative analysis of the proposed schemes and demonstrate
their e®ectiveness and e±ciency in WSNs in terms of energy consumption.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Digital Signature and Its Application in WSNs
A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for generating non-repudiation
evidence, authenticating the integrity as well as the origin of a signed message. In
a digital signature algorithm, a signer keeps a private key secret and publishes the
corresponding public key. The private key is used by the signer to generate digital
signatures on messages and the public key is used by anyone to verify signatures on
messages. The digital signature algorithms mostly used are RSA [93] and DSA [68].
ECDSA is referred to Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm [32]. While RSA
with 1024-bit keys (RSA-1024) provides the currently accepted security level, it is
equivalent in security strength to ECC with 160-bit keys (ECC-160). Hence, for the
same level of security strength, ECDSA uses a much short key size and hence has a
short signature size (320-bit).
When ¹TESLA was proposed, sensor nodes were assumed to be extremely resource-
constrained, especially with respect to computation capability, bandwidth availability,
and energy supply [75]. Therefore, public key cryptography (PKC) was thought to be
too computationally expensive for WSNs, though it could provide much simpler solu-
tions with much stronger security resilience. At the same time, the computationally
e±cient one-time signature schemes are also considered unsuitable for WSNs, as they
usually involve intense communications [75]. However, recent studies [104, 27, 92]
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showed that, contrary to widely held beliefs, PKC with even software implementa-
tions only is very viable on sensor nodes. For example [104], Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) signature veri¯cation takes 1:61s with 160-bit keys on ATmega128
8MHz, a processor used in current Crossbow motes platform [1]. Furthermore, the
computational cost is expected to fall faster than the cost to transmit and receive.
For example, ultra-low-power microcontrollers such as the 16-bit Texas Instruments
MSP430 [3] can execute the same number of instructions at less than half the power
required by the 8-bit ATmega128L. The bene¯ts of transmitting shorter ECC keys
and hence shorter messages/signatures will in turn be more signi¯cant. Moreover,
next generation sensor nodes are expected to combine ultra-low power circuitry with
so-called power scavengers such as Heliomote [41], which allow continuous energy sup-
ply to the nodes. At least 8 ¡ 20¹W of power can be generated using MEMS-based
power scavengers [77]. Other solar-based systems are even able to deliver power up to
100mW for the MICA Motes [41, 42]. These results indicate that, with the advance
of fast growing technology, PKC is no longer impractical for WSNs, though still ex-
pensive for the current generation sensor nodes, and its wide acceptance is expected
in the near future [27].
2.1.2 The Bloom Filter and Counting Bloom Filter
A Bloom ¯lter is a simple space-e±cient randomized data structure for representing
a set in order to support membership queries [65]. A Bloom ¯lter for representing
a set S = s1; s2; :::; sn of n elements is described by a vector V of m bits, initially
all set to 0. A Bloom ¯lter uses k independent hash functions h1; :::; hk with range
0; :::;m¡ 1, which map each item in the universe to a random number uniform over
[0; :::;m¡ 1]. For each element s 2 S, the bits hi(s) are set to 1 for 1 · i · k. Note
that a bit of V can be set to 1 multiple times. To check if an item x is in S, we
check whether all bits hi(x) are set to 1. If not, x is not a member of S for certain,
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that is, no false negative error. If yes, x is assumed to be in S. A Bloom ¯lter may
yield a false positive. It may suggest that an element x is in S even though it is not.
The probability of a false positive for an element not in the set can be calculated as
follows. After all the elements of S are hashed into the Bloom ¯lter, the probability
that a speci¯c bit is still 0 is (1¡ 1
m
)kn ¼ e¡kn=m: The probability of a false positive
f is then
f = (1¡ (1¡ 1
m
)kn)k ¼ (1¡ e¡kn=m)k:
We let f = (1 ¡ p)k: From now on, for convenience, we use the asymptotic approx-
imations p and f to represent, respectively, the probability that a bit in the Bloom
¯lter is 0 and the probability of a false positive. Let p = e¡kn=m.
The counting Bloom ¯lter is a variation of the Bloom ¯lter, which allows mem-
ber deletion. In the counting Bloom ¯lter, each entry in the Bloom ¯lter is not a
single bit but a small counter that tracks the number of elements that have hashed
to that location [49]. When an element is deleted, the corresponding counters are
decremented. To avoid over°ow, counters must be chosen large enough [49].
2.1.3 The Merkle Hash Tree
A Merkle Tree is a construction introduced by Merkle in 1979 to build secure au-
thentication schemes from hash functions [64]. It is a tree of hashes where the leaves
in the tree are hashes of the authentic data values n1; n2; :::; nw. Nodes further up
in the tree are the hashes of their respective children. For instance, assuming that
w = 4 in Fig. 2.1, the values of the four leaf nodes are the hashes of the data val-
ues, h(ni); i = 1; 2; 3; 4, respectively, under a one-way hash function h() (e.g., SHA-1
[69]). The value of an internal node A is ha = h(h(n1)jjh(n2)), and the value of
the root node is hr = h(hajjhb). hr is used to commit to the entire tree to authen-
ticate any subset of the data values n1; n2; n3, and n4 in conjunction with a small
amount of auxiliary authentication information AAI (i.e., log2N hash values where
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Figure 2.1: An example of Merkle hash tree
N is the number of leaf nodes). For example, a receiver with the authentic hr re-
quests for n3 and requires the authentication of the received n3. The source sends the
AAI :< ha; h(n4) > to the receiver. The receiver can then verify n3 by ¯rst computing
h(n3), hb = h(h(n3)jjh(n4)) and hr = h(hajjhb), and then checking if the calculated
hr is the same as the authentic root value hr. Only if this check is positive, the user
accepts n3. The Merkle hash tree can prevent an adversary from sending bogus data
to deceive the client. In the earlier example, an adversary impersonating can not send
a bogus n3 to the client without being detected. This is because he can not ¯nd ha
and h(n4) such that h(hajjh(h(n3)jjh(n4))) = hr, as h() is one-way.
2.2 System Model, Adversary Model, and Design
Goals
System Model : We consider a large spatially distributed WSN, consisting of a ¯xed
sink(s) and a large number of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are usually resource-
constrained with respect to memory space, computation capability, bandwidth, and
power supply. The WSN is aimed to o®er information services to many network
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users that roam in the network, in addition to the ¯xed sink(s) [9]. The network
users may include mobile sinks, vehicles, and people with mobile clients, and they
are assumed to be more powerful than sensor nodes in terms of computation and
communication abilities. For example, the network users could consist of a number
of doctors, nurses, medical equipment (acting as actuators) and so on, in the case
of CodeBlue [60], where the WSN is used for emergency medical response. These
network users broadcast queries/commands through sensor nodes in the vicinity, and
expect the replies that re°ect the latest network information. The network users
can also communicate with the sink or the backend server directly without going
through the WSN if necessary. We assume that the sink is always trustworthy but
the sensor nodes are subject to compromise. At the same time, the users of the WSN
may be dynamically revoked due to either membership changes or compromise, and
the revocation pattern is not restricted. We also assume that the WSN is loosely
synchronized.
Adversary Model : We assume that the adversary's goal is to inject bogus messages
into the network, attempt to deceive sensor nodes, and obtain the information of
his interest. Additionally, DoS attacks such as bogus message °ooding, aiming at
exhausting constrained network resources, is another important focus of the paper.
We assume that the adversary is able to compromise both network users and the
sensor nodes. The adversary hence could exploit the compromised users/nodes for
such attacks. However, we do assume that adversary cannot compromise an unlimited
number of sensor nodes. Neither can they break any cryptographic primitive, on which
we base our design. Otherwise, it is unlikely for any feasible security solution to be
designed.
Design Goals : Our security goal is straightforward: all messages broadcasted
by the network users of the WSN should be authenticated so that the bogus ones
inserted by the illegitimate users and/or compromised sensor nodes can be e±ciently
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rejected/¯ltered. We also focus on minimizing the overheads of the security design.
Especially, energy e±ciency (with respect to both communication and computation)
and storage overhead are given priority to cope with the resource-constrained nature
of WSNs.
2.3 The Basic Schemes
We explore the PKC domain for the possible solutions to multiuser broadcast au-
thentication in WSNs. The PKC-based solutions realize immediate message authen-
tication and thus can overcome the delayed message authentication problem present
in ¹TESLA-like schemes. However, the design of PKC-based solutions is not triv-
ial. Simple solutions such as the certi¯cate-based approach are not very useful in
the resource-constrained WSNs due to their high scheme overhead. Sophisticated ap-
proaches are required to balance di®erent competing factors and achieve a desirable
performance tradeo®.
2.3.1 The Certi¯cate-Based Authentication Scheme (CAS)
CAS works as follows. Each user (not a sensor) of the WSN is equipped with a
public/private key pair (PK/SK), and signs every message he broadcasts with his
SK using a digital signature scheme such as ECDSA [32]. Note that in all our de-
signs, we do not require sensors to have public/private key pairs for themselves. To
prove the user's ownership over his public key, the sink1 is also equipped with a pub-
lic/private key pair and serves as the certi¯cation authority (CA). The sink issues
each user a public key certi¯cate, which, to its simplest form, consists of the following
contents: CertUID = UID;PKUID ; ExpT; SIGSKSinkfh(UIDjjExpTjjPKUID)g; where UID
denotes the user's ID, PKUID denotes its public key, ExpT denotes certi¯cate expiration
1We assume that the sink represents the network planner.
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time, and SIGSKSinkfh(UIDjjExpTjjPKUID)g is a signature over h(UIDjjExpTjjPKUID)
with SKSink. Hence, a broadcast message is now of the form as follows:
< M; tt; SIGSKUIDfh(UIDjjttjjM)g; CertUID > (I)
Here, M denotes the broadcast message and tt denotes the current time. For the
purpose of message authentication, sensor nodes are preloaded with PKSink before the
network deployment; and message veri¯cation contains two steps: the user certi¯cate
veri¯cation and the message signature veri¯cation.
CAS su®ers from two main drawbacks. First and foremost, it is not e±cient in
communication, as the certi¯cate has to be transmitted along with the message across
every hop as the message propagates in the WSN. A large per message overhead will
result in more energy consumption on every single sensor node. In CAS, the per
message overhead is as high as jttj+ jSIGSKUIDfh(UIDjjM)gj+ jCertUID j = 128 bytes.
As in [104], the user certi¯cate is at least 86 bytes, when ECDSA-160 [32] is used.
Here, we assume that tt and UID are both two bytes, in which case the scheme
supports up to 65; 535 network users. Moreover, jSIGSKUIDfh(UIDjjM)gj = 40 bytes,
when ECDSA-160 [32] is assumed. Second, to authenticate each message, it always
takes two expensive signature veri¯cation operations. This is because the certi¯cate
should always be authenticated in the ¯rst place.
2.3.2 The Direct Storage Based Authentication Scheme (DAS)
One way to reduce the per message overhead and the computational cost is to elimi-
nate the existence of the certi¯cate. A straightforward approach is then to let sensor
nodes simply store all the current users' ID information and their corresponding public
keys. In this way, a broadcast message now only contains the following contents:
< M; tt; SIGSKUIDfh(UIDjjttjjM)g; UID;PKUID > : (II)
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Verifying the authenticity of a user public key is reduced to ¯nding out whether or
not the attached user/public key pair is contained in the local memory. Upon user
revocation, the sink simply sends out ID information of the revoked user, and every
sensor node deletes the corresponding user/public key pair in its memory.
The drawbacks of DAS are obvious. Given a storage limit of 5 KB, only 232
users can be supported at most; even with a memory space of 19:5 KB, DAS can
only support up to 1, 000 users. At the same time, CAS can support up to 2, 560
users given the same storage limit 5 KB. The reason is that in CAS only the ID
information of the revoked users are stored by the sensor nodes. Therefore, DAS
is neither memory e±cient nor scalable. However, the advantage of DAS is also
signi¯cant as compared to CAS. It successfully reduces the per message overhead
down to jttj + jSIGSKUIDfh(UIDjjM)gj + jUIDj + jPKUID j = 64 bytes. The above
analysis clearly shows that more advanced schemes are needed other than DAS and
CAS. And the direction to seek is to improve storage e±ciency while retaining or
further reducing the per message overhead.
2.4 The Advanced Schemes
In this section, advanced schemes are proposed to achieve both storage e±ciency and
communication e±ciency simultaneously. The proposed schemes signi¯cantly outper-
form the previous basic schemes through a novel integration of several cryptographic
techniques.
2.4.1 The Bloom Filter Based Authentication Scheme (BAS)
System Preparation: The sink generates the public keys for all network users, and
constructs the set:
S = f< UID1 ;PKUID1 >;< UID2 ;PKUID2 >; :::g;
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where #fSg = N , and #fg denotes the cardinality of the set. Using the Bloom
¯lter, the sink can apply k system-wide hash functions (cf. Section II.B) to map the
elements of S (each with L+2 bytes, that is, jUIDj = 2 bytes, and jPKUID j = L bytes)
to an m-bit vector V with V = v0v1:::vm¡1, where we have m < N(L + 2) to reduce
the ¯lter size and m > kN to retain a small probability of a false positive. These k
hash functions are known by every node and the sink. For each vi; i 2 [0;m¡ 1], we
have
vi =
8>>><>>>:
1; if 9 l 2 [1; k]; j 2 [1; N ];
s:t: hl(UIDj jjPKUIDj ) = i
0; otherwise
Additionally, the sink constructs a counting Bloom ¯lter V of m ¤ c bits with V =
v0v1:::vm¡1, where each vi; i 2 [0;m ¡ 1] is a c-bit counter, i.e., jvij = c bits. The
value of vi is determined as follows:
vi = #f(IDj;PKUIDj )jhl(UIDj jjPKUIDj ) = i;
for 9 l 2 [1; k]; j 2 [1; N ]g:
And c = dlog2(max(vi; i 2 [0;m ¡ 1]))e bits, which is usually of 4 bits for most
applications [49]. The above operations are illustrated in Fig. 2.2. The sink ¯nally
preloads each sensor node with V (not including V), as well as the sink's public key
and the common domain parameters of the ECDSA signature scheme.
Message Signing and Authentication: Let PKUID = sG, be the public key
of user UID, where s is the private key of the signer, and G is the generator of a
subgroup of an elliptic curve group of order r. Let SK(¢) be a symmetric key cipher
such as AES. To broadcast a message M (jM j ¸ 10 bytes), UID takes the steps below
following [66], a variant of ECDSA with the partial message recovery property:
² Concatenate < M jjttjjUID >, and break it into two parts, M1 and M2, where
jM1j · 10 bytes.
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Figure 2.2: An example of the Bloom ¯lter and Counting Bloom Filter
² Generate a random key pair fu; V g, where u 2 [1; r ¡ 1], V = uG = (x1; y1),
and (x1 mod r) 6= 0.
² Encode-and-hash V into an integer I [66].
² Form F1 from M1 by adding the proper redundancy [99].
² Compute C = (I + F1) mod r, and make sure that C 6= 0 or repeat the above
steps otherwise.
² Compute F2 = h(M2), and D = u¡1(F2 + sC) mod r.
² Repeat all the above steps if D = 0; Output the signature as < C; D > otherwise.
Then, UID broadcasts
< M2; C; D;PKUID >; (III)
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where tt and UID are parts of M2. And this is the known simplest message format
that can be achieved using PKC2. Now, upon receiving a broadcast message (not from
the sink), a sensor node checks the authenticity of the message in two steps. First, it
checks the authenticity of the corresponding public key by verifying its membership
in S. To do so, the sensor node checks whether V [hl(UIDjjPKUID)] ?= 1; l 2 [1; k], and
a negative result will lead to the discarding of the message. We note that here a false
positive may happen due to the probabilistic nature of the Bloom ¯lter, but only with
a very small (negligible) probability when appropriate parameters are chosen as we
will analyze later. Second, it veri¯es the attached signature as follows:
² Discard the message if C =2 [1; r ¡ 1] or D =2 [1; r ¡ 1].
² Compute F2 = h(M2), H = D¡1 mod r, and H1 = F2H mod r.
² Compute H2 = CH mod r, and P = H1G+ H2PKUID .
² Discard the message if P = O.
² Encode-and-hash P into an integer I [66] and compute F1 = C¡ I mod r.
² Discard the message if the redundancy of F1 is incorrect.
² Otherwise accept M1 (obtained from F1) and the signature and reconstruct
M jjttjjUID =M1jjM2.
User Revocation/Addition: To revoke a user, say UIDj , the sink follows the
steps below:
2The claim is true only when ID-based cryptography [95] is excluded from consideration, in which
case the user's ID is also his public key. Furthermore, the shortest signature size possibly obtained
from pairing is around 22 bytes [8], which is shorter than 40 bytes obtained from ECDSA. However,
to apply a pairing-based scheme (i.e., a ID-based signature or short signature) on sensor nodes, the
known reachable signature size has to be 84 bytes, even when a 32-bit microprocessor can be used
[118]. And the energy cost is also multiple times higher than that of an ECDSA-160 signature.
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² First, it hashes hl(UIDj jjPKUIDj ) = i and decreases vi by 1. It repeats this
operation for all hl; l 2 [1; k].
² From the updated counting Bloom ¯lter V , the sink obtains the corresponding
updated Bloom ¯lter V 0 with V 0 = v00v01:::v0m¡1. Here, v0i = 1 only when vi ¸ 1,
and v0i = 0 otherwise.
² The sink further calculates V¢ = V 0 © V and deletes V afterwards. Here ©
denotes bitwise exclusive OR operation. Obviously, V¢ is an m-bit vector with
at most k bits set to 1. Hence, V¢ can be simply represented by enumerating its
1-valued bits, requiring kdlog2me bits for indexing (k · k). This representation
is e±cient for a small k as will be analyzed in Section VI.B.
² The sink ¯nally broadcasts V¢ after signing it. The message format follows (III)
but with the sink's public key omitted, as every sensor already has it.
² Upon receiving and successfully authenticating the broadcast message, every
sensor node updates its own Bloom ¯lter accordingly, that is, if v¢;i = 1, then
vi = 0, i 2 [0;m¡ 1].
BAS also supports simultaneous multiuser revocation. Suppose that Nrev users
are revoked simultaneously. The sink follows the same manner to construct V¢ with
k bits set 1. Now we have k · kNrev. Furthermore, the compressed message for
representing V¢ now could achievemH(p) bits theoretically, whereH(p) = ¡p log2 p¡
(1¡ p) log2(1¡ p) is the entropy function and p = (1¡ 1m)k is the probability of each
bit being 0 in V¢. As pointed out in [65], using arithmetic coding technique can
e±ciently approach this lower bound.
BAS supports dynamic user addition in two ways. First, it enables a later binding
of network users and their (ID, public key) pairs. In this approach, the sink may
generate more (ID, public key) pairs than needed during system preparation. When
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Figure 2.3: The minimum probability of a false positive regarding m
N
a new network user joins the WSN, it will be assigned an unused ID and public key
pair by the sink. Second, BAS could add new network users after the revocation
of old members. This approach, however, could only add the same number of new
users as that of the revoked. This requirement ensures that the probability of a
false positive never increases in BAS. To do so, the sink updates its counting Bloom
¯lter by hashing the new user's information into the current Bloom ¯lter. The sink
then obtains a V¢ in the same way as in the revocation case, and broadcasts it after
compression. This time, if v¢;i = 1, sensor nodes will set vi = 1, i 2 [0;m ¡ 1] to
update their current Bloom ¯lters.
2.4.2 Minimize the Probability of a False Positive
Since the Bloom ¯lter provides probabilistic membership veri¯cation only, it is im-
portant to make sure that the probability of a false positive is as small as possible.
Theorem 1: Given the number of network users N and the storage space m bits
for a single Bloom ¯lter, the minimum probability of a false positive f that can be
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achieved is 2¡k with k = m
N
ln 2, that is,
f = (0:6185)
m
N :
Proof : since f = (1¡(1¡ 1
m
)kN)k ¼ (1¡e¡kN=m)k, we then have f = ek ln(1¡e¡kN=m):
Let g = k ln(1 ¡ e¡kN=m). Hence, minimizing f is equivalent to minimizing g with
respect to k. We ¯nd
dg
dk
= ln(1¡ e¡kN=m) + kN
m
e¡kN=m
1¡ e¡kN=m
It is easy to check that the derivative is 0 when k = m
N
ln 2. And it is not hard to
show that this is a global minimum [65]. Note that in practice, k must be an integer.
¤
Fig. 5.3 shows the probability of a false positive f as a function of m
N
, i.e., bits
per element. We see that f decreases sharply as m
N
increases. When m
N
increases
from 8 to 96 bits, f decreases from 2:1 ¤ 10¡2 to 9:3 ¤ 10¡21. Obviously, f determines
the security strength of our design. For example, when m
N
= 92 bits, the adversary
has to generate around 263:8 public/private key pairs on average before ¯nding a
valid one to pass the Bloom ¯lter. This is almost computationally infeasible, at
least within the lifetime of the WSN (usually at most several years). However, when
m
N
= 64 bits, the adversary is now expected to generate around 244:4 public/private
key pairs before ¯nding a valid pair. The analysis below shows the time and cost of the
attack. To generate a public/private key pair in ECDSA-160, a point multiplication
operation has to be performed, for which the fastest known implementation speed is
0.21ms through a specialized FPGA design [38]. Suppose the adversary could a®ord
100,000 such FPGAs, which would cost no less than one million dollars. Then, by
executing 100,000 FPGAs simultaneously, to generate one valid key pair still takes
13.2 hours roughly. With the above analysis, we suggest to select the value of f
carefully according to the security requirements of the di®erent types of applications.
Given a highly security sensitive military application, we suggest that f should be no
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Figure 2.4: Maximum supported number of network users with respect to storage
limit
larger than 6:36 ¤ 10¡20, i.e., m=N ¸ 92 bits. On the other hand, when the targeted
applications are less security sensitive as in the civilian scenario, we can tolerate a
larger f . This is because the adversary is now generally much less resourceful as
compared to the former case.
2.4.3 Maximum Number of Network Users Supported
It is important to know how many network users can be supported in BAS so that
the WSN can be well planned. The following theorem provides the answer.
Theorem 2: Given the storage space m bits for a single Bloom ¯lter and the
required probability of a false positive freq (freq 2 (0; 1)), the maximum number of
network users that can be supported is ¡m(ln 2)
2
ln freq
, that is,
N · ¡0:4805m
ln freq
:
Proof : Since the minimal probability of a false positive f = 2¡k is achieved with
k = m
N
ln 2, we have freq = 2
¡m
N
ln 2. Then, we can easily get N = ¡m(ln 2)
2
ln freq
in this case;
and this is the maximum number of users that can be supported given freq and m. ¤
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Fig. 2.4 illustrates the maximum supported number of network users as a function
of the storage limit. Fig. 2.4 shows that BAS supports up to 1,250 users when
freq = 4:42 ¤ 10¡14, 1,000 users when freq = 2:03 ¤ 10¡17, and 869 users when freq =
6:36 ¤ 10¡20, for a storage space of 9.8 KB. Obviously, BAS also allows tradeo®
between the maximum supported number of network users and the probability of a
false positive given a ¯xed storage limit.
D. Supporting More Users using the Merkle Hash Tree: The Hybrid Authentication
Scheme (HAS)
Through the above analysis, we know that the maximum supported number of
network users is usually limited given the storage limit and the probability of a false
positive. For example, if freq = 6:36¤10¡20 and the storage limit is 4.9 KB, the maxi-
mum number of users supported by BAS is 434. Therefore, an additional mechanism
has to be employed to support more users when necessary. HAS achieves this goal by
employing the Merkle hash tree technique, which trades the message length for the
storage space. That is, by increasing the per message overhead, HAS can support
more network users. Speci¯cally, HAS works as follows.
The sink ¯rst calculates the maximum number of users supported in case of BAS
according to the given storage limit and the desired probability of a false positive.
It then collects all the public keys of the current network users and constructs a
Merkel hash tree. In fact, the sink constructs N leaves with each leaf corresponding
to a current user of the WSN. For our problem, each leaf node contains the binding
between the corresponding user ID and his public key, that is, h(UID;PKUID). The
values of the internal nodes are determined by the method introduced in Section II.C.
The sink further prunes the Merkle hash tree into a set of equal-sized smaller trees.
We denote the value of the root node of a small hash tree as hir; i = 1; :::; jSj, where
jSj equals the maximum number of supported users the sink calculates in BAS.
Next, the sink constructs a Bloom ¯lter V following the same way as described
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in the last section. The di®erence is that now the member set S = fh1r; h2r; :::; hjSjr g.
Then, the sink preloads each sensor node with V . At the same time, each user should
obtain its AAI according to his corresponding leaf node's location in the smaller Merkle
hash tree. Let T denote all the nodes along the path from a leaf node to the root (not
including the root), and A be the set of nodes corresponding to the siblings of the
nodes in T. Then, AAI further corresponds to the values associated with the nodes
in A. Obviously, AAI is of size (L ¤ log2 NjSj) bytes, where L is the length of the hash
values. Upon user revocation, the sink simply updates all the sensor nodes with the
ID information of the revoked users. And each node directly stores the revoked IDs
as described earlier. Now a message sent by a user UID is of form
< M2; C; D;PKUID ; AAIUID > : (IV )
Each node veri¯es the authenticity of a user public key in two steps. First, it calculates
the corresponding root node value hir using AAIUID attached in the message. Second, it
checks whether or not the calculated hir is a member of V stored by itself. By checking
Message (IV), we can easily ¯nd that HAS doubles the maximum supported number
of users as compared to BAS at the cost of 20 more bytes per message overhead,
assuming SHA-1 is used [69]. And the number can be further doubled with 40 more
bytes per message overhead.
2.5 Further Enhancements
2.5.1 Dealing with Long Messages
The messages broadcast in WSNs are usually short, due to the application speci¯c
nature of WSNs. The query or command messages can be less than one hundred bytes.
However, there are few cases that long messages may be required to be broadcast in
WSNs. For example, the sink may broadcast code images to the sensor nodes for the
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purpose of retasking WSNs [36]. The size of such code images can be on the order
of KB. In this case, it is not desirable to apply the proposed BAS or HAS scheme
directly by signing the whole message (i.e., the message hash) only once or signing
on every single packet otherwise. This is because of two reasons. First, if we sign the
whole message once, then each sensor node can authenticate a message only after it
obtains the entire message. That is, the sensor nodes have to bu®er a large number
of received packets before it can authenticate them. This obviously introduces a
severe vulnerability that could result in message °ooding attacks. Second, if we
sign every packet belonging to the same message, the scheme overheads will increase
signi¯cantly with respect to both computation and communication. This is because
now every packet is attached with a signature, which is 40 bytes in our setting.
Fortunately, several solutions were proposed to solve this problem in the context
of code update in WSNs [50, 51, 22]. The ¯rst solution is suitable for lossless network
environments, which employs o®-line hash chain technique to amortize the cost of
a single digital signature over multiple packets and allow for incremental message
authentication and packet pipelining [50, 51, 31]. The second solution is aimed at
tolerating packet losses. This solution makes use of a signed hash tree technique
and trades message overhead for potential packet losses [22]. Both solutions can be
directly superimposed with BAS and HAS in dealing with long messages. We omit
the details of these solutions for space interest.
2.5.2 Reducing the Probability of a False Positive
In [61], a method is introduced to use two families of k hash functions, instead of using
one. And an element is in the set if either family gives back all 1s from the ¯lter.
The trick is to choose one of the two families of the hash functions adaptively: choose
which family of hash functions to use for each element of your set in such a way to
keep the number of 1s in the ¯lter as small as possible. In such a way, a smaller false
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positive probability in the same space can be achieved at the cost of more hashing.
This method can reduce the probability of a false positive to the half under certain
conditions using the same storage space. This technique can be exploited by BAS
so that we achieve a desirable probability of a false positive with a smaller storage
space.
2.5.3 Optimization on Constructing the Merkle Hash Tree
Di®erent types of network users may have di®erent broadcast frequencies in practice.
This fact can be exploited by HAS, when supporting a vast number of network users
is a must. Instead of pruning the user Merkle hash tree into a set of equal-sized
smaller trees, now the tree can be trimmed into the same number but di®erent-sized
smaller ones based on user broadcast frequency. The higher the frequency is, the
smaller hash tree the user is grouped in. In such a way, the energy e±ciency can
be improved in the overall sense, as more messages being broadcast containing only
smaller AAI sizes. This is similar to the idea introduced in [27].
2.6 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of BAS and HAS with respect to commu-
nication and computational overheads (in terms of energy consumption), and security
strength. We give a quantitative analysis of the schemes and compare them with the
other two basic schemes.
2.6.1 Communication Overhead
We study how the message size a®ects the energy consumption in communication
in a WSN. We investigate the energy consumption as the function of the size of
the WSN (denoted as W ). We denote by Etr the hop-wise energy consumption
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Figure 2.5: Energy consumption in communication regarding di®erent schemes
for transmitting and receiving one byte. As reported in [104], a Chipcon CC1000
radio used in Crossbow MICA2DOT motes consumes 28.6 and 59.2 ¹J to receive and
transmit one byte, respectively, at an e®ective data rate of 12.4 Kb/s. Furthermore,
we assume a packet size of 41 bytes, 32 bytes for the payload and 9 bytes for the header
[104]. The header, ensuing an 8-byte preamble, consists of source, destination, length,
packet ID, CRC, and a control byte [104]. We also assume that jM j = 20 bytes.
Then, for BAS, the signature size is still the same as that of ECDSA, but only
part of the message now has to be transmitted, with the saving of up to 10 bytes.
Therefore, the per message overhead of BAS is 54 bytes, which is 10 bytes less than
that of DAS. As Message (III) is 74 bytes, there should be 3 packets in total, among
which two of them are 41 bytes, and one is 19 bytes. Therefore, there should be
41 ¤ 2 + 19 ¤ 1 + 8 ¤ 3 = 125 bytes for transmission (including 8-byte preamble per
packet). Hence, the hop-wise energy consumption of message transmission is 125¤59:2
¹J = 7.40 mJ; and the energy consumption of message reception is 125¤28:6 ¹J = 3.58
mJ. For each message broadcast, every sensor node should retransmit the message
once and receive w0 times of the same message assuming the blind °ooding is used3.
3In an idealized lossless network, blind °ooding, i.e., every node always retransmits exactly once
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Here, w0 denotes node density in terms of the total number of sensor nodes within
one unit disc, where a unit disc is a circle area with radius equal to the transmission
range of sensor nodes4. Hence, the total energy consumption in communication will
be W ¤ (7:4 + 3:58 ¤ w0) mJ.
Fig. 4.11 illustrates the energy consumption in communication as a function of
W with w0 = 20. Clearly, BAS consumes a much lower energy as compared to others.
For example, when W = 15; 000, CAS always costs 2.20 KJ, while BAS costs only
1.18 KJ. The energy saving for a single broadcast can be more than 1,000 J between
BAS and CAS. Note that although DAS also consumes much less energy than CAS,
DAS only supports up to 10000=22 ¼ 454 users. At the same time, BAS can handle
869 users even when freq = 6:36¤10¡20. CAS handles more users than BAS and DAS,
however, at the cost of much higher energy consumption. Moreover, HAS can handle
a large number of users but with a much lower energy consumption when compared
to CAS. In summary, BAS demonstrates the highest communication e±ciency, as
well as a desirable storage e±ciency. From Fig. 4.11, we also ¯nd that the energy
consumption in communication is the critical cost for WSNs, as a single broadcast
of a message of only 20 bytes in length could cost energy on the order of KJ. This
also exposes the severe vulnerability of the ¹TESLA-like schemes, as they allow the
adversary to °ood the WSN arbitrarily.
2.6.2 User Revocation/Addition Tra±c Overhead
Another important performance metric for the broadcast authentication schemes is
the overhead of the user revocation/addition tra±c. As analyzed in Section V.A, BAS
requires the sink to broadcast V¢ upon user revocation/addition. We have shown
every unique message it receives, is wasteful, as individual nodes are likely to receive the same
broadcast multiple times. In practice, however, blind °ooding is a commonly used technique, as its
inherent redundancy provides some protection from unreliable (lossy) wireless networks [39].
4We assume an uniform transmission range for all sensor nodes.
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that in the single user case, V¢ can be e±ciently represented by simply enumerating
all its 1-valued bits, the length of which is bounded by kdlog2me bits. That is,
the per user revocation tra±c overhead is upper bounded by kdlog2me bits. And
the theoretical lower bound obtained from the entropy function is mH(p) bits with
H(p) = ¡p log2 p ¡ (1 ¡ p) log2(1 ¡ p) and p = (1 ¡ 1m)k. It is not hard to see that
the expectation value of k is around k=2, where k = m
N
ln 2. Our simulation shows
that k is always around k=2. Hence, for a given freq = 6:36 ¤ 10¡20, we will have
kdlog2me = 68 bytes, and mH(p) ¼ 52 bytes, for N = 1; 000. This implies that
the per user revocation tra±c V¢ only ranges from 52 to 68 bytes on average for
N = 1; 000, depending on the used coding method5. And for N · 11; 000, V¢ is at
most 80 bytes on average. This overhead is much lower as comparable to that of the
¹TESLA-like scheme proposed for supporting multiple users [58]. In [58], the per user
revocation tra±c (i.e, a revocation certi¯cate) is no less than 1+dlog2Ne hash values,
which is 220 bytes for N = 1; 000, and 300 bytes for N = 11; 000, assuming the same
hash length of 20 bytes. We further note that in contrast to ¹TESLA-like schemes,
BAS does not require periodic key chain update (for running out of available keys)
among users and sensor nodes. This is the advantage inherent to the PKC-based
schemes.
2.6.3 Computational Overhead
It was previously widely held that PKC is not suitable in WSNs, as sensor nodes are
extremely computation constrained. However, recent studies [104, 27] showed that
PKC with only software implementations, is very viable on sensor nodes. For example
in [104], an ECC signature veri¯cation takes 1:61s with 160-bit keys on ATmega128
8MHz processor used in a Crossbow mote. We analyze the computation cost of the
proposed schemes to further justify the suitability of PKC-based schemes in WSNs.
5We assume that the number of simultaneous network users are always around N .
CHAPTER 2. MULTI-USER BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION 38
In all our proposed schemes, the major computational cost is due to the signature
veri¯cation operation. In the following analysis we omit the cost of other operations
such as hash operations and table lookup, as they are negligible as compared to the
signature veri¯cation operation [104].
In CAS, two ECDSA signature veri¯cations are needed for each broadcast mes-
sage. In BAS, to verify a message takes k = m
N
ln 2 hash operations and one ECDSA
signature veri¯cation. It was reported in [104] that an ECDSA-160 signature ver-
i¯cation operation costs 45.09 mJ on a 8-bit ATmega128L processor running at 4
MHz. If we assume that the sensor CPU is a low-power high-performance 32-bit
Intel PXA255 processor, the energy cost can be further minimized. Note that the
PXA255 has been widely used in many sensor products such as Sensoria WINS 3.0
and Crossbow Stargate running at 400 MHz. According to [2], the typical power con-
sumption of PXA255 in active and idle modes are 411 and 121 mW, respectively. It
was reported in [7] that it takes 92.4 ms to verify an ECDSA-160 signature with the
similar parameters on a 32-bit ARM microprocessor at 80 MHz. Therefore, the same
computation on PXA255 roughly needs 80=400 £ 92:4 ¼ 18:48 ms, and the energy
cost is hence around 7.6 mJ. Therefore, we can obtain the computational costs of
the proposed CAS and BAS schemes on di®erent sensor platforms6. The results are
summarized below.
Scheme ATmega128L PXA255
CAS 90.18 mJ 15.4 mJ
BAS 45.09 mJ 7.6 mJ
BAS is obviously also more computationally e±cient than CAS. Furthermore,
when we compare the computational cost with the communication cost on hop-wise
6DAS and HAS consume similar amount of energy as BAS does, as they both require one signature
veri¯cation.
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message transmission, we can ¯nd that both are on the same order, which justi¯es
the suitability of PKC-based schemes in WSNs.
2.6.4 Security Strength
The Bloom ¯lter based public key veri¯cation ensures the security strength of the
proposed scheme by enabling immediate message authentication. That is, there is
no authentication delay on messages being broadcast. Therefore, it is very hard
for the adversary to perform network wide °ooding in the WSN. As we analyzed
above, by appropriately choosing a suitable value of freq, such as 6:36 ¤ 10¡20 in
military applications, it is infeasible to forge a valid public/private key pair during
the lifetime of the WSN. Furthermore, by embedding a time stamp into the message,
the message replay attack is also e®ectively prevented, as WSN is assumed to be
loosely synchronized [73]. Therefore, the immediate message authentication capability
provided by the proposed schemes can e®ectively protect the WSN from network wide
°ooding attacks. This is the most signi¯cant security strength over the ¹TESLA-like
schemes, in which network wide °ooding attacks are always possible.
Moreover, since the public key operation is expensive, it is also important that
sensor nodes can be resistant to the local jamming attacks. Under such attacks, the
adversary may simply broadcast random bit strings to the sensor nodes within his
transmission range. If these neighbor sensors have to perform the expensive signature
veri¯cation operation for all received messages, it will be a heavy burden on them.
CAS obviously su®ers from this type of attacks, as the signature veri¯cation operation
has to be performed for every received message. However, in both BAS and HAS,
such an attack can be e®ectively mitigated. This is because in both schemes, a
sensor node ¯rst veri¯es the authenticity of the attached user public key through
hash operations, so it performs signature veri¯cation operation for a bogus public
key only with a negligible probability (e.g., 6:36 ¤ 10¡20). As reported in [104], the
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energy cost of SHA-1 is only 5.9 ¹J/byte on a 8-bit ATmega128L processor, while
ECDSA-160 could consume 45.09 mJ on signature veri¯cation. An adversary may
also °ood the sensor nodes with forged messages but containing valid user public
keys, which can be obtained by eavesdropping the network tra±c. In this case, the
forged messages can only be discarded after signature veri¯cation, and sensor nodes
that are physically close to the adversary can thus be abused. We note that this
type of attacks is always possible for PKC-based security mechanisms. However, this
attack can still be mitigated in BAS by implementing an alert report mechanism. If
a sensor node fails to authenticate the received messages multiple times in a row, it
will derive that an attack is going on and alert the sink about the attack. The sink
further carries out ¯eld investigations or other means to detect the adversary and
take corresponding remedy actions that are outside the scope of this paper.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the problem of multiuser broadcast authentication in
WSNs. We pointed out that symmetric-key-based solutions such as ¹TESLA are
insu±cient for this problem by identifying a serious security vulnerability inherent to
these schemes: the delayed authentication of the messages can easily lead to severe
energy-depletion DoS attacks. We then came up with several e®ective PKC-based
schemes to address the problem. Both computational and communication costs of
the schemes are minimized through a novel integration of several cryptographic tech-
niques. A quantitative energy consumption analysis, as well security strength analysis
were further given in detail, demonstrating the e®ectiveness and e±ciency of the pro-
posed schemes.
Chapter 3
Multicast Encryption
In this chapter, the problem of multicast encryption in WSNs is addressed. We aim at
providing message con¯dentiality for the multicast tra±c from a sink to the sensors.
We approach the problem by ¯rst classifying the multicast group semantics in WSNs.
We then propose our scheme called GPLD. GPLD focuses on scheme e±ciency and its
support to various multicast group semantics. GPLD partitions sensors into a series of
elementary groups using their location and class information, and accordingly builds
a location-class-aware symmetric key management framework. Further leveraging the
fact that sensors are both end receivers and routers, GPLD develops a novel multicast
encryption technique called global-partition, local-di®usion. This technique e®ectively
minimizes global (sink-to-sensor) group key distribution and re-keying tra±c, while
maintaining its support to various multicast group semantics. The e±ciency and
security property of GPLD are justi¯ed through both analysis and simulations.
3.1 Multicast Group Semantics in WSNs
Consider a military application where a large number of sensors with di®erent func-
tionalities are deployed in the strategic ¯eld to detect and identify the presence of
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critical events of interest as illustrated in Fig. 3.1, where each di®erent shape of
symbols denotes a di®erent sensor class with a di®erent functionality, such as image
sensors, acoustic sensors, or actuators1. Di®erent classes of sensors are used for dif-
ferent purposes. For example, image sensors may be used to identify enemy tanks
and soldiers; acoustic sensors may be used to detect other targets based on acoustic
signals. Actuators may launch certain actions like activating the preinstalled military
devices upon the command from the sink. At the same time, all sensors also col-
laborate with each other and form a multi-hop wireless network to support network
communications.
As WSNs are inherently location-aware and function-speci¯c, multicast group
semantics from the sink to the sensors can be classi¯ed into four most common cat-
egories as shown in Fig. 3.1: a) broadcast { all network sensors are the intended
recipients of multicast messages, i.e., recipient sensors. b) class-based multicast {
only the sensors of certain class are the recipient sensors. c) location-based multicast
{ the sink may multicast groups of sensors subject to certain dynamic spatial con-
straints. Since sensors are always deployed in a discrete manner at certain density, we
can easily express the location constraints of sensor groups as a few basic geometric
shapes, which can be e±ciently described using simple mathematical representations.
In Fig. 3.1 (c), the recipient sensors are those sensors located inside the elliptic area.
d) location-class-based multicast { the sink may also multicast messages to groups
of sensors subject to both spatial constraints and class requirements. In Fig. 3.1 (d),
the recipient sensors are those sensors of classes 0?0 and 020 located inside the rect-
angular area. Depending on di®erent applications, more sophisticated semantics may
exist, but these four categories are certainly the most common ones and su±ce in
most scenarios. Therefore, any multicast encryption scheme designed for WSNs has
to support (at least) these multicast group semantics.
1For our purpose in this chapter, we do not distinguish sensors from actuators.
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(c) Location-based Multicast
(a) Broadcast (b) Class-based Multicast
(d) Location-Class-based Multicast
Figure 3.1: Multicast group semantics in WSNs with the solid symbols denote the
intended recipients of multicast messages in each case
3.2 Related Work
Multicast encryption problem has been extensively addressed in the context of wired
networks and ad hoc networks. Below we introduce some typical schemes that are
closely related to this work.
Group Key Distribution Schemes : The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) model was
¯rst introduced in [106] to address secure multicast for the Internet. For each group,
LKH maintains a key tree which is used for group key update and distribution. The
root of the key tree is the group key used for encrypting data in multicast, and is
shared by all users. The leaf nodes of the key tree are keys shared only between
the individual users and the key distribution center (KDC), whereas the intermediate
nodes are auxiliary key encryption keys used to facilitate the distribution of the root
key, i.e., the group key. Of all these keys, each user stores the keys from its leaf
node all the way up to the root of the key tree. As a result, when a user joins/leaves
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the group, all the keys on its path (i.e., from its leaf node to the root node of the
key tree) have to be changed and re-distributed to maintain backward/forward data
con¯dentiality. Various schemes such as OFT [10], ELK [74], Seclor [52] are later
proposed to further optimize rekeying overhead. Group key distribution schemes are
unsuitable for WSNs because they are inherently single group oriented. For a single
group, these schemes require a storage overhead of O(logN) keys; and to revoke a
single user, KDC has to send the rekeying message containing O(logN) keys, where
N is the group size. However, in WSNs there may exist a large number of ad hoc and
dynamic groups due to its abundant multicast group semantics. Thus, it is highly
ine±cient, if not impossible, for these schemes to support multicast encryption in
WSNs.
Broadcast Encryption Schemes : First introduced in [67], broadcast encryption
schemes enable a centralized server to securely multicast messages to a dynamically
changing subset of users of a group. In [67], an e±cient broadcast encryption scheme
called SD was proposed based on a subset-cover framework. In contrast to group
key distribution schemes, SD is stateless. That is, a user receiving only the current
rekeying message can recover the group key used for the current session based on
his initial con¯guration, even if he missed previous rekeying operations. Also, unlike
group key distribution schemes, SD allows multiuser revocation at a time. SD is by
far the most e±cient broadcast encryption scheme in terms of rekeying message size,
which is 1:25r keys on average and bounded by 2r ¡ 1 keys, and r is the number of
group users excluded from the recipients of the current session. SD further requires a
storage overhead of O(log2N) keys at each user. When applied in WSNs, SD is still
highly ine±cient. For example, consider a multicast session in a WSN that consists of
10,000 sensors. If the sink wants to multicast a subset of sensors, say 8,000 of them,
the size of the rekeying message for this session is 2; 500 keys on average; and such
rekeying messages are broadcasted to the whole WSN. Obviously, this is impractical
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in WSNs. We further note the existence of PKC based broadcast encryption schemes
[24], which are e±cient in communication. However, because these schemes are highly
ine±cient in computation as they require a large number of PKC operations, they
are also inapplicable in WSNs.
Other Multicast Encryption Schemes : In [121], GKMPAN was proposed to address
secure multicast in ad hoc networks. GKMPAN assumes that all nodes in an ad hoc
network are predistributed certain number m of keys randomly out of a big pool of
l keys, which are used to update group keys. If a node is compromised, the key
server ¯rst determines a non-compromised key that is the most common among the
remaining members of the group. Then, the key server broadcasts a new group key
encrypted with the chosen non-compromised key. Consequently, nodes that have this
key can decrypt the group key independently. These nodes further re-encrypt the new
group key with another non-compromised key and forward it to those neighbors yet to
obtain it. In this way, the new group key is propagated to all the members in a hop-
by-hop fashion. However, GKMPAN is vulnerable to the selective node compromise
attack. Compromising as low as 50 out of 1,000,000 nodes could be su±cient to break
the whole scheme given m = 100 and l = 5; 000. This attack is possible because the
attacker can derive which keys are carried by which nodes simply based on nodes'
ids, and hence could selectively compromise those nodes carrying no keys in common.
Additionally, GKMPAN only supports single multicast group scenario. Hence, it is
inapplicable in WSNs.
In [76], LKHWwas proposed, which directly applies the LKH technique intoWSNs
while using directed di®usion [37] to support membership management. LKHW only
considers the single group case, and also su®ers from many attacks. There are also two
other group key rekeying schemes proposed for WSNs. The scheme proposed in [14]
aims to maintain a network wide group key in the presence of node compromise; and
the scheme in [114] provides an approach to renew group keys for mulitgroups. None
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of the above schemes supports the multicast group semantics discussed in Section 3.1.
3.3 GPLD: Setup
3.3.1 System Assumptions and Design Goals
Network Model : In this work, we consider a large-scale WSN that monitors a vast
terrace of interest via a large number of static sensors of di®erent functionalities.
We assume that the WSN is densely deployed and always well connected; sensors of
each class are also interconnected among themselves. We further assume that the
approximate estimation on the size and shape of the terrain of interest is known a
priori. Without loss of generality, we assume that the terrain is square in shape. In
WSN, there exists a sink which is the data collection center equipped with su±cient
computation and storage capabilities. We assume that all sensors can receive the
messages from the sink, since the WSN is well connected. We do not address reliability
issue of the message delivery [72], since it is orthogonal to this work. In this work,
the sink is centralized authority being responsible for the key management tasks to
ensure multicast security. We assume that sensors are classi¯ed into several di®erent
classes based on their functionalities and resource-constrained regarding computation,
communication, and storage capabilities. Sensors are also not tamper-resistant.
Threat Model : We assume that the WSN is deployed in hostile environments with
attackers exist. The attackers not only eavesdrop all the network communications,
but also are able to compromise a small number of sensors in order to obtain the
contents of the messages multicast by the sink. On the other hand, we also assume
that compromised sensors can be detected in a timely manner, and no new sensors
are compromised before the current rekeying operation is completed. We do not spec-
ify the particular mechanisms that detect compromised sensors, as it is orthogonal
to this paper. But schemes like watchdog [116] can be well suited for this purpose.
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We note that before compromised sensors are detected, no key management scheme
is able to prevent information from being leaked to the adversary through compro-
mised sensors. However, an e®ective key management scheme can always exclude the
detected compromised sensors from the WSN so that no further damage can occur.
Furthermore, we assume that the sink is always secure and has a secure mechanism
(e.g., ¹TESLA [75]) to authenticate its multicast messages to all sensors. In addition,
we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against multicast messages as it
is also out of the scope of this paper.
Design Goals : GPLD is designed to achieve the following goals: 1) Support the
multicast group semantics discussed in Section 3.1; 2) Provide e±cient group key dis-
tribution mechanism to support ad-hoc group formations; 3) Provide e±cient rekeying
mechanism to support group membership dynamics.
3.3.2 The `Global-Partition, Local-Di®usion' Technique
The performance of secure multicast schemes is determined by its group key distri-
bution and/or rekeying operation overhead, as well as the storage and computation
overhead. In most existing schemes, it is always the central authority's sole respon-
sibility to deliver each individual group member the keying materials whenever re-
quired; group members are all end hosts, which neither have the responsibility nor
are possible for such tasks2. However, for secure multicast in WSNs, sensors are both
group members and routers; any multicast message sent by the sink has to be relayed
by intermediate sensors before reaching all the target recipients. Consequently, it is
possible and also convenient for sensors to di®use the group key obtained to other
members of the same group at their vicinities. The sink thus could reduce the length
of the keying materials it broadcasts to the whole WSN.
Based on this key observation, we develop aGlobal-Partition, Local-Di®usion tech-
2One group member might not even aware the existence of other group members.
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nique, which provides highly e±cient group key distribution and rekeying operations.
On the one hand, the proposed technique partitions sensors into a series of prede¯ned
elementary groups based on their location and class information. According to this
partition, the proposed technique further assigns each elementary group a common
group key encryption key (GKEK), and preloads each sensor with the GKEKs cor-
responding to all the elementary groups it belongs to. The proposed technique can
hence e±ciently support dynamic group formation by utilizing elementary groups and
the corresponding GKEKs. These GKEKs can be used to e±ciently and securely de-
liver the fresh group keys to the members of the dynamically formed groups. On the
other hand, the proposed technique further avoids a large portion of global (sink-to-
sensor) keying material tra±c by carrying minimum number of GKEKs; But it still
guarantees that all the group members obtain the group keys by allowing e±cient
local (sensor-to-neighbor-sensor) key di®usion.
3.3.3 Grid and Elementary Group Setup
Grid Setup: Before network deployment, the network planner prepares a geographic
virtual grid system for the targeted terrain [83], which partitions the terrain into mul-
tilevel cells of di®erent sizes following a quad-tree approach. Such a grid is described
through three parameters, i.e., < (x0; y0); L; len >. (x0; y0) is a reference point of the
grid, which is usually set as the location of the sink for convenience; L is the max-
imum level of the corresponding quad-tree; and len is the side length of the lowest
level cells. Note that sensors in the same lowest level cell are always within the direct
communication range of each other. Fig. 3.2(a) shows an example of such a grid,
where the quad-tree has four levels, i.e., L = 4, and level-1 is the lowest level. Each
cell in the grid is uniquely indexed based on its position; a level-i cell is uniquely
indexed by L ¡ i digits with each digit ranging from one to four. Particularly, the
level-L cell refers to the whole WSN and is indexed by 0. In the example, cell 222
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Figure 3.2: a) A virtual grid system that partitions sensor ¯eld using a quad-tree
approach (L = 4); b) Seven level-1 location-based elementary groups that all sensors
located at cell 222 belong to and their group IDs.
denotes a level-1 cell located at the top right corner of its belonging level-2 cell; and
this level-2 cell is located at the top right corner of its own belonging level-3 cell, etc.
In our de¯nition, if a sensor is located at a certain cell, we call this cell a home cell
of that sensor. Clearly, every sensor has one home cell at each level.
Elementary Groups : GPLD further de¯nes the following six kinds of elementary
sensor groups based on the grid concept:
1. Network-wide group: Sensors from the level-L cell form a network-wide sensor
group.
2. Individual groups: Each sensor itself is an elementary group by de¯nition.
3. Neighbor-pair groups: Each pair of immediate neighbor sensors form such a
group.
4. Class-based groups: Sensors of each di®erent class form a class-based group,
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respectively.
5. Location-based groups: For every four level-i (i 2 [1; L ¡ 1]) cells constituting
a level-(i+1) cell, sensors from each possible combination of these four level-i
cells form a location-based group, respectively.
6. Location-class-based groups: Within each location-based group, sensors of each
di®erent class form a location-class-based group, respectively.
Here, the network-wide group is the largest group, while an individual group is the
smallest, and a neighbor-pair group is the second smallest. Furthermore, we say that
one elementary group is larger than another, if the former contains more level-1 cells
than the latter; and a location-based group is said larger than a location-class-based
group containing the same number of level-1 cells.
Group ID : Each of these elementary groups is uniquely indexed in GPLD to
facilitate the subsequent scheme operations. For the network-wide group, the group
ID is set as ('all'). For an individual group corresponding a sensor Su, the group
ID is set as (sink, u). For a neighbor-pair group between two sensors Su and Sv,
the group ID set as (u,v), suppose u < v in its binary expression. For a class-based
group corresponding to Cj, the group ID set is as (Cj). For a location-based group
at level-i, the group ID is set as the ID(s) of the corresponding cell(s) at level-i with
common pre¯x suppressed. An example is shown in Fig. 3.2. For a location-based
group at level-1 consisting of cells 222 and 223, we have its group ID as (22-(2,3)).
Last, for a location-class-based group regarding Cj, its group ID is composed of Cj
and the ID of the corresponding location-based group it derives from. For a location-
class-based group regarding Cj at level-1 consisting of cells 222 and 223, we have its
group ID as (22-(2,3); Cj). This indexing approach allows to 1) compare the size
of di®erent groups directly from their group IDs; 2) support e±cient location-based
message forwarding as will be shown shortly.
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3.3.4 Key Setup
GPLD initializes each sensor with the GKEKs corresponding to the elementary groups
it belongs to during the bootstrapping phase. GPLD adopts a robot-assisted network
bootstrapping technique [118]. We assume that a group of mobile robots are dis-
patched to sweep across the whole sensor ¯eld along pre-planned routes after the
deployment of sensors. Mobile robots have GPS capabilities as well as more powerful
computation and communication capacities than ordinary sensors. The leading robot
is also equipped with the network master secret key K. The robots securely localize
every sensor using the secure localization protocol given in [11]. For a sensor Su of
class Cj with its level-1 home cell as aL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai ¢ ¢ ¢ a1 (ai 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g; i = 1; :::; L¡1),
the following GKEKs corresponding to the elementary groups it belongs to are loaded:
1) A broadcast key (BCK): corresponding to ('all'); BCK = H(Kj0jK), where
`j' denotes concatenation operation, and H() denotes a cryptographically secure hash
function such as SHA-1 [69].
2) An individual key (IDK): corresponding to (sink,u); IDK = H(KjujK). IDK
is known only to Su and the sink.
3) A set of pairwise keys (PWKs): For every pair between Su and its immediate
neighbors, there is a PWK; corresponding to (u,v) formed by Su and a neighbor Sv,
PWKu;v = H(KjujvjK), assuming u < v.
4) A class key (CLK): corresponding to (Cj); CLK = H(KjCjjK).
5) A set of location-aware keys (LAKs): At each level, Su belongs to all the groups
that involve Su's home cell at that level. There are totally seven such groups at each
level. The corresponding group IDs and LAKs at level i are:
aL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1-(ai) :
LAKaiaL¡1¢¢¢ai+1 = H(KjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1aijK),
aL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1-(ai; a0i) :
LAK
ai;a
0
i
aL¡1¢¢¢ai+1 = H(KjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1aijKjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1a0i
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jK), for 8a0i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4gnai.
aL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1-(ai; a0i; a00i ) :
LAK
ai;a
0
i;a
00
i
aL¡1¢¢¢ai+1 = H(KjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1aijKjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1a0i
jKjaL¡1 ¢ ¢ ¢ ai+1a00i jK), for 8a0i; a00i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4gnai.
Here, the sequence of the concatenation depends on the actual values of ai; a
0
i; and
a00i and ai 6= a0i 6= a00i . An example is illustrated in Fig. 3.2(b), where seven location-
based elementary groups at level-1 that Su belongs to are shown, assuming that Su's
home cell is a3a2a1 = 222. The corresponding group IDs and LAKs are:
22-(2) : H(Kj222jK),
22-(1; 2) : H(Kj221jKj222jK),
22-(2; 3) : H(Kj222jKj223jK),
22-(2; 4) : H(Kj222jKj224jK),
22-(1; 2; 3) : H(Kj221jKj222jKj223jK),
22-(1; 2; 4) : H(Kj221jKj222jKj224jK),
22-(2; 3; 4) : H(Kj222jKj223jKj224jK).
The number of LAKs is 7 ¤ (L¡ 1) for every sensor.
6) A set of location-class keys (LCKs): For each location-based group Su be-
longs to, Su also belongs to the corresponding location-class-based group de¯ned
for class Cj sensors; and a LCK is derived from the corresponding LCK as follows:
Cj-LCK = H(KjLAKjCjjK). For example, Cj-LCK1;222 = H(KjLAK1;222 jCjjK). Clearly,
the number of LCK for Su is also 7 ¤ (L¡ 1).
In addition to GKEKs, each sensor is also loaded with < (x0; y0); L; len >, and the
locations of the sensors in its level-1 home cell and all eight neighboring level-1 cells.
Note that the authentication between the sensors and the leading robot can be easily
achieved using the technique introduced in [115]. We omit it here for space limit.
By the end of the bootstrapping phase, mobile robots leave the sensor ¯eld and the
leading robot should securely erase all the keys from its memory but should report
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the locations of sensors to the sink. The assumption underlying this approach is that
adversaries do not launch active and explicit pinpoint attacks on mobile robots at this
stage which usually does not last too long. That is, the robots are not likely subject
to compromise. We further note that the above bootstrapping operation can also be
realized through key predistribution approach [28, 26], instead of using mobile robots.
In this case, sensor nodes utilize secure localization protocols [117, 103, 53] to obtain
their locations. The choice of the approaches could depend on their availabilities in
practice.
3.4 GPLD: Operation
In this section, we illustrate how fresh group keys and key update keys can be e±-
ciently distributed using the `Global-Partition, Local-Di®usion' technique.
3.4.1 Notation
W: all network sensors except for the revoked ones
N: all the recipient sensors of a multicast/rekeying session
R: all the revoked sensors in a rekeying session
Su: the set of all immediate (non-revoked) neighbor sensors of a sensor Su
E: an elementary group
Kg: a fresh group key of a multicast session
Kupd: a fresh key refresh key of a rekeying session
Su: the (sub)set of Su that contains only those recipient sensors yet to obtain Kg
or Kupd in a multicast/rekeying session.
Msg: a to-be-sent message
Hdr: a header attached to a to-be-sent message.
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3.4.2 Multicast Operation
To ensure the security strength, GPLD requires the sink to generate a fresh group
key for encrypting the to-be-sent message in each multicast session. For this purpose,
the sink attaches a header to the message, which includes the speci¯cations of the
multicast group, and the keying materials that enable the recipient sensors to recover
the group key.
Group Description: As GPLD allows dynamic formation of multicast groups to
support various multicast group semantics discussed in Section 3.1, it is impossible
for sensors to know in advance their memberships of a given multicast session. Hence,
there has to be a group description mechanism. One way to do so is to list all the IDs
of the recipient sensors in the message header. Another way, as in broadcast encryp-
tion schemes [67], is to list all the indices of keys that are used to encrypt the group
key in the message header; if a sensor possesses one of the corresponding keys, it is
a recipient sensor for the session. However, both methods are very costly in WSNs
because the resulted message header could be very long in both cases. Moreover, both
methods implicitly entail the use of network-wide °ooding to deliver the multicast
messages to the recipient sensors, which is neither necessary nor e±cient. Derived
from the multicast group semantics discussed in Section 3.1, GPLD, however, e±-
ciently describes multicast groups using the location and/or class information of the
recipient sensors. Since sensors are always deployed in a discrete manner at certain
density, we can easily express location constraints in terms of basic geometric shapes,
which can be e±ciently expressed using simple mathematical representations. More
importantly, this location-aware group description approach is naturally supported
by e±cient message delivery approaches like geocast [45, 100] so that network-wide
broadcast can be avoided.
Message Format : In GPLD, a multicast message contains two parts, the header
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and message body:
fHdr; E(Kg;Msg)g;
where E(K; ²) is a symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES [70] and encrypts
² with key K. Hdr further contains two ¯elds: fHdr = Grp Spec;GK Infog: Grp Spec
contains the multicast group information so that each sensor can judge whether or
not it is a recipient sensor of the session. Grp Spec = (Loc Info;Cla Info), where
Loc Info is the description of the location constraints of N, and Cla Info is the class
information of N. Recall that N denotes the recipient sensors of a multicast session.
GK Info contains the encrypted Kg and the ID of the elementary group corresponding
to the GKEK used for encryption.
Header Generation: In a multicast session, Hdr is generated as follows, once N is
determined:
1) Generate Grp Spec = (Loc Info;Cla Info) according to the location and class
constraints of N.
2) Find the largest elementary group E with E µ N; if there is a tie, select the
one that is the closest to the sink.
3) Generate a fresh Kg and encrypt it with the GKEK corresponding to E. GK Info
thus contains the encrypted Kg and the group ID of E.
Message Delivery : GPLD employs geocast to deliver multicast messages. By
making use of the location-aware nature of WSNs, geocast utilizes a greedy forwarding
for the packet delivery toward the target region. In greedy forwarding, a packet is
forwarded to only one of the neighbor nodes whose geographical location is closest
to the destination. As soon as the message reaches the target region, a restricted
°ooding or intelligent °ooding technique [100] can be used to disseminate the packet
inside the target region. Speci¯cally, the multicast message is delivered via a localized
and hop-by-hop manner as follows:
1) The sink uses greedy forwarding to deliver Hdr to the region taken up by E.
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2) As soon as Hdr reaches the target region, sensors in E that receive Hdr directly
recover Kg from the attached GK Info.
3) Once having obtained Kg, each recipient sensor Su:
3.1) Determine whether or not it should di®use the key to its neighbor recipient
sensors based on the underlying multicast technique, the preloaded location
information of the sensors in its neighboring level-1 cells, and Grp Spec. If not,
proceed to Step 4). If yes, proceed to Step 3.2).
3.2) Find Su (Ref. Section 3.4.1) out of Su. For every member of Su, ¯nd the
largest elementary group Ei it belongs to (based on Su's own location knowl-
edge), where Ei µ N. If there is a tie, select the one that Su belongs to (if
applicable), and otherwise randomly select one.
3.3) For every found Ei, if Su 2 Ei, encrypt Kg with the GKEK corresponding
to Ei; if Su =2 Ei, pick up one member from Su \ Ei and encrypt Kg with the
PWK shared between Su and the selected member.
3.4) Replace GK Info with the encryptions of Kg obtained in Step 3.3) and the
group IDs corresponding to the GKEKs used for encryption. Locally broadcast
the updated Hdr.
4) The sink further uses greedy forwarding to deliver E(Kg;Msg) to the region
taken up by N. As soon as E(Kg;Msg) reaches the target region, a sensor in N that
receives it determines whether or not to di®use it in the neighborhood based on the
underlying routing strategy such as restricted °ooding or intelligent °ooding [100]. If
yes, Su locally rebroadcast E(Kg;Msg).
5) Finally, every recipient sensor recovers Msg using the obtained Kg, and deletes
Kg in the end.
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z
Figure 3.3: Two examplnary multicast sessions, where each solid symbol denotes a
recipient sensor, each shadowed area denotes one location-based elementary group,
and each of the three irregular circled area denotes a location-class-based elementary
group.
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3.4.3 Examples
The two examples shown in Fig. 3.3 illustrate a location-class-based multicast ses-
sion at time T1 and a location-based multicast session at time T2, respectively.
In the former session, the multicast group happens to be an elementary group.
That is, N is the set of class `4' sensors located inside Rec consisting of cells 11
and 12, i.e., the group (1-(1,2); `40), and Rec is the rectangle function. Hence,
Grp Spec = (Loc Info : Rec;Cla Info : `40). According to the header generation al-
gorithm, GK Info = (E(`40-LCK1;21 ;Kg); (1-(1,2); `40)). The sink then uses greedy
forwarding to send Hdr to the closest recipient sensor in Rec. Next, Kg is securely
di®used among N according to the message delivery step 3). In this example, if a
recipient sensor determines that it should di®use Kg, it simply locally rebroadcasts
Hdr.
In the latter session, N is the set of sensors located inside Elp, and Elp is the
corresponding elliptic curve. Here, Grp Spec = (Loc Info : Elp;Cla Info : `all0).
GK Info = (E(LAK1;34 ;Kg); (4-(1,3))). Again, the sink uses greedy forwarding to
send Hdr to the closest recipient sensors in cells 41 and 43. Then Kg is securely
di®used among N. According to the scheme, Kg is securely di®used inside each shadow
area (i.e., each corresponding location-based group) by using the corresponding LAK,
respectively. For instance, inside (3-(2)), Kg is encrypted using LAK
2
3. Furthermore,
Kg is securely di®used from one elementary group to another using a GKEK shared
between the sender sensor in the former group and the receiver sensor in the latter.
For instance, Between (4-(1,3)) and (14-(3,4)), Kg is securely di®used from sensor
Su to Sv after being encrypted with PWKu;v; and between (4-(1,3)) to individual
sensor Sz, Kg is securely di®used from Su to Sz after being encrypted with PWKu;z.
CHAPTER 3. MULTICAST ENCRYPTION 59
3.4.4 Rekeying Operation
Once compromised sensors are detected, all the GKEKs they possess should be either
obsoleted or securely refreshed in such a way that no compromised sensor could
do so even by colluding. Thus, all subsequent multicast communications can be
kept secret from the revoked sensors. GPLD supports both on demand and batched
(periodical) rekeying strategies. Suppose r compromised sensors, i.e., #fRg = r, are
to be excluded in a rekeying session, where r is usually a small number. The rekeying
operation works as follows:
The Sink :
1) Find the largest location-based elementary group E, where E µ N = W; if
there are multiple sets of the same cardinality, select the one that is the closest to
the sink.
2) Generate a fresh Kupd and encrypt it with the LAK corresponding to E.
3) Generate the rekeying message containing the following information: i) the IDs
of revoked sensors; ii) the encrypted Kupd; iii) the group ID of E; iv) E(Kupd; 'Revocation'),
the encrypted revocation notice.
4) Geocast the rekeying message to E.
Sensors (except for the revoked ones):
1) Di®use Kupd according to the same approach described for multicast operation
(Ref. Section 3.4.2).
2) Perform key refreshing operation. For every GKEK held by each sensor (except
for the IDK and PWKs), GKEK = H(KupdjGKEKjKupd).
3) Delete Kupd; delete the revoked sensors from Su and the PWKs shared with
them, if any.
Hence, after a rekeying operation, all GKEKs held by the revoked sensors are now
obsoleted, and they are therefore permanently excluded from the WSN.
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3.5 Security Analysis
Correctness : The correctness of GPLD derives from the following facts. First, no
revoked sensors excluded from the WSN can refresh the GKEKs they hold after
revocation. This is true because the revoked sensors can never obtain a Kupd using
their GKEKs. Since the status of the system is reinstated to its original setting after
every rekeying, we only need to consider the possible security issues that arise during
a single rekeying operation. There are only two ways for a sensor to obtain a Kupd in
a rekeying session. That is, a sensor recovers a Kupd either by directly decrypting the
rekeying message sent by the sink or indirectly receiving it from a neighbor recipient
sensor, which encrypts Kupd with a GKEK shared between the two and known only
to the recipient sensors. However, neither way can be exploited by revoked sensors.
A revoked sensor cannot recover Kupd because it has no corresponding GKEKs; at
the same time, its neighbor sensors will not send it the key, as its ID is explicitly
listed in the rekeying message. Without Kupd, it is computationally infeasible for a
revoked sensor to refresh its GKEKs due to the underlying cryptographically secure
hash function used. Consequently, the revoked sensors can never recover the group
keys of the multicast sessions after their revocation, due to the obsoleteness of their
GKEKs.
Second, the recipient sensors can always verify the correctness of the update
keys and group keys they obtain. The reason is as follows: 1) The authenticity of
the rekeying and multicast messages, and hence that of E(Kupd; `Revocation') and
E(Kg;Msg), can always be guaranteed through authentication schemes like ¹TESLA
[75]. 2) Both `Revocation' and Msg follow certain prede¯ned format and are mean-
ingful. Therefore, by decrypting E(Kupd; `Revocation') and E(Kg;Msg), and ver-
ifying the validity of the recovered `Revocation' and Msg, the correctness of the
received Kupd and Kg can further be veri¯ed.
Last, GPLD allows that all recipient sensors in a rekeying/multicast session to se-
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curely obtain the corresponding Kupd or Kg. That is, no sensor can be excluded from
the session in GPLD as long as it is physically reachable. In the worst case, a sensor
can always be updated through the IDK it shares with the sink. Note that the secu-
rity of GPLD can be formally proved following the notion of `key-indistinguishability '
[67]; we omit it here for space limit.
Compromise Resilience: Since sensor compromise is unavoidable when WSNs are
deployed in hostile environments, it is crucial to minimize the resulted security risk.
Ideally, after a sensor is compromised and before its revocation, the keying infor-
mation it possesses should only allow the adversary to compromise those multicast
messages, of which it is a legitimate recipient sensor ; all other messages should still
be kept secure against the adversary. That is, the security of a multicast message is
broken only if at least one of the corresponding recipient sensors is compromised and
yet revoked. GPLD achieves this full security strength for all four multicast group
semantics discussed in Section 3.1. The reason is that 1) A fresh key is always gener-
ated in each di®erent rekeying/muliticast session; 2) The fresh key is securely di®used
among the recipient sensors, always encrypted with the GKEKs that are known only
to the recipient sensors.
Other Attacks : We assumed that the adversary may eavesdrop on all tra±c, in-
ject packets or replay old packets. Because the sink authenticates all the rekey-
ing/multicast messages by ¹TESLA [75], no sensors can inject any fake messages into
the WSN or modify any messages they forward while impersonating the sink. The
adversary also cannot replay old rekeying packets because of time-stamp information
is used in ¹TESLA. The adversary may also want to launch refusal-of-service attacks,
such as dropping the packets and jamming the network3. However, revoked sensors
normally does not help the adversary drop the packets, because all the revoked sen-
3Such attacks are always possible and are not speci¯c to multicast encryption schemes. Mecha-
nisms dealing with such attacks can be found in [108].
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sors have already been excluded from the WSN, that is, no tra±c is going through
them. The worst situation caused by such attacks is hence equivalent to that due to
packet losses. One salient property of GPLD is that it allows a sensor to miss certain
multicast sessions without a®ecting its ability to participate any future multicast ses-
sion, as long as it does not miss any rekeying operation. Therefore, GPLD is also
resilient to such attacks.
3.6 Performance Analysis and Simulation
In this section, the performance of GPLD is analyzed. We mainly focus on the
communication cost of GPLD, as it is most signi¯cant factor of energy consumption
in WSNs. The computation and storage cost of GPLD is discussed as well.
3.6.1 Communication Overhead
Models for Lower Bound and No-design Cases: The lower bound of the communi-
cation overhead happens in the ideal situation where a di®erent elementary group is
established for each possible combination of network sensors; each sensor stores all
GKEKs for the groups it involves in, which are up to 2#fWg¡1 keys. In this ideal
situation, every multicast group is an elementary group. Hence, to securely di®use
a message among the recipient sensors, single GKEK corresponding to the elemen-
tary group is su±cient. On the contrary, when there is no pre-distributed keys for
elementary groups except for the pairwise keys existing between neighbor-pairs, the
multicast/rekeying message has to be encrypted using various PWKs at each step of
the di®usion. This is the typical setting provided by most key management schemes
designed for WSNs [28, 16], without involving any designs for the purpose of multicast
encryption.
In the simulation, we adopts the above two models as the bases for analyzing
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and comparing the communication overhead of GPLD. We denote the two models,
in which the di®usion of messages is achieved through single GKEK (i.e. the lower
bound case), and through only PWKs, as the LB model and the PWKD model,
respectively. Hence, including GPLD, three models are simulated below.
Simulation Settings and Evaluation Metrics: The communication overhead of a
multicast/rekeying session in GPLD consists of two parts: 1) the cost to unicast the
multicast/rekeying message to the largest elementary group of the recipient sensors;
2) the cost to locally di®use the message among recipient sensors. Since the former
is relative small and is the same for all the models, only the latter is considered
in the simulation. A multicast/rekeying message in GPLD contains the header and
message body. We do not analyze the cost spent on message body since this cost
is independent to the multicast encryption scheme. Instead, we focus on the header
part, which contains i) the description of multicast group or revoked sensors, and ii)
the keying materials. While the size of part i) is usually small and is identical in all
the models, part ii) dominates the communication overhead of a multicast/rekeying
session and may vary greatly in length.
Consequently, in the simulation, we use the total number of keys sent or forwarded
by all the unrevoked sensors as the metric of evaluating the communication cost.
Note that, in the case that a sensor sends/forwards the fresh group/update key to its
neighbors using pairwise keys, we count the number of keys sent as the number of its
neighbors. This sensor may put all the encrypted key materials in one message, but
this will increase the length of the key materials transmitted anyway.
In the simulation, there are 10,000 sensors randomly distributed in the network,
the size of which is 3000m x 3000m. The transmission range denoted as tr is 100m
or 135m, which is corresponding to 36 or 64 neighbors per sensor. For each setting,
we run the simulation for 100 times, and calculate the average values. Two routing
strategies are simulated. One is Restricted Flooding (RF), where each sensor broad-
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RF RF RF OPC OPC
tr = 100 tr = 100 tr = 100 tr = 135 tr = 135
L = 6 L = 7 L = 8 L = 5 L = 6
LB 858.86 940.50 878.92 107.64 398.38
GPLD 1844.81 1349.26 1233.88 285.63 478.28
PWKD 27489.39 30188.34 28107.67 830.43 869.33
Table 3.1: Comparison of Multicast Cost under Di®erent Settings
casts any message received once using the key according to the largest elementary
group to which it and all or part of its neighbors belong, and for those neighbors
that only share pair-wise keys with this sensor, it will send the message to them in-
dividually. In the other strategy called Once-Per-Cell (OPC), the same message is
broadcasted exactly once within any level-1 cell within the target region using a key
corresponding to an elementary group covers this level-1 cell, if any. If such a key
does not exist, the message is di®used using pairwise keys. Since in GPLD we assume
that sensors in the same level-1 cell are always within the direct communication range
of each other, the optimization can still ensure the successful transmission of fresh
group/update keys.
Multicast: Table 3.1 compares the communication cost of a multicast session under
all the models. In the simulation, the multicast group consists of all the sensors
within a randomly-generated rectangle for simplicity. The lengths of the sides of the
rectangle are uniformly chosen between 300m and 1500m. As shown in Table 3.1,
not only GPLD is more e±cient than the PWKD model under both RF and OPC,
but also by appropriately choosing L its communication overhead is only 20.06% and
40.39% more than the LB model under RF and OPC, respectively, with signi¯cantly
less pre-distributed keys.
We also notice that, in RF the multicast cost of GPLD can be decreased by in-
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Figure 3.4: Multicast Cost (in terms of Ratio to The LB Model) under Di®erent
Multicast Group Sizes and Various Routing Strategies (tr = 100m, L = 6)
creasing the maximum level of the quad-tree, i.e. L. For example, the cost decreases
by 26.86% when increasing L from 6 to 7. However, the advantage of further in-
creasing L has recessive e®ects. When increasing L from 7 to 8, the cost decreases
by only 8.55%. Therefore, we need to balance between the storage overhead and the
communication overhead while selecting the optimal value of L. Table 3.1 also shows
that, by employing the optimal routing strategy (i.e. OPC4) the communication cost
of GPLD can be lowered down to only 286 when L = 5. Since OPC helps only when
the number of sensors per level-1 cell is more than one, we only simulate the scenarios
of L = 5 and L = 6.
To evaluate the e®ectiveness of GPLD under di®erent sizes of multicast groups,
we uniformly choose the length of the sides of the rectangle between lR and lR+200,
and increase lR from 300m to 1300m. Figure 3.4 shows that GPLD is more e®ective
4Since in GPLD we assume that sensors in the same level-1 cell are always within the direct
communication range of each other, we cannot set L = 5 when tr = 100m. Thus, to show the
e®ectiveness of OPC under di®erent L's, we simulate OPC under tr = 135m.
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GPLD-RF PWKD-RF GPLD-OPC PWKD-OPC
r = 10 1.007 61.127 1.015 2.442
r = 20 1.012 61.103 1.027 2.443
r = 30 1.017 61.017 1.038 2.444
r = 40 1.022 60.949 1.049 2.444
r = 50 1.027 60.884 1.060 2.445
Table 3.2: Comparison of Rekeying Cost under Di®erent Number of Revoked Sensors
and Various Routing Strategies
when the size of a multicast group is large. It is because, the larger is the area that a
multicast group covers, the higher is the percentage that a fresh group/update key is
encrypted by LAKs/LCKs instead of PWKs during the di®usion. By employing the
method for optimally choosing the LAKs/LCKs (Ref. Section 3.4.2), the di®usion
using LAKs/LCKs is more e±cient than that using PWKs. As a result, GPLD
presents higher e±ciency for larger multicast groups.
Rekeying: In the simulation, for each rekeying session we randomly choose r
revoked sensors from the network. Table 3.2 shows the rekeying cost of GPLD and
the PWKD model (in terms of the ratio to that of the LB Model) under di®erent r and
various routing strategies, when tr = 135m and L = 6. Similar to multicast, GPLD
is more e±cient than the PWKD model. Moreover, the ratio of the rekeying cost of
GPLD to that of the LB model is much smaller than the multicast case. The extra
overhead of GPLD over the lower bound is only 2.7% to 6%. It is due to the reason
that, given that the number of revoked sensors is small, in a rekeying session the
majority of di®usion messages are encrypted using LAKs/LCKs. More importantly,
simulation results also show that the performance of rekeying in GPLD is not sensitive
to the increase of the number of revoked sensors. For example, when r increases from
10 to 50, the additional keying materials required are only around 160 under both
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RF and OPC. It is a signi¯cant advantage over other works. Other schemes (like
LKH and SD [106, 67]) either can only revoke one member per session, or have the
revocation cost (i.e., the number of keys broadcasted to the whole network) at least
linear to the number of revoked members.
3.6.2 Storage and Computation Overhead
Storage Overhead : In GPLD, a sensor stores the GKEKs corresponding to all the
elementary groups it belongs to. Speci¯cally, a sensor of class Cj belongs to the
network-wide group, the individual group of itself, and the class-based group con-
sisting of all class Cj sensors. Moreover, there are n
0 neighbor-pair groups de-
¯ned for each sensor, where n0 is the number of immediate neighbors a sensor has.
Additionally, each sensor also belongs to 7*(L-1) location-based groups and 7*(L-
1) location-class-based groups (Ref. Section 3.3.4). Therefore, there are totally
1+ 1+1+n0+7(L¡ 1)+ 7(L¡ 1) = 14L+n0¡ 11 GKEKs that should be stored by
each sensor. In a WSN, n0 usually could range from 20 to 60, depending on di®erent
applications [28, 16, 90], while L is a system parameter of the grid. Recall that sen-
sors in a level-1 cell are within each others' direct communication range as required
in GPLD. Then, the number of sensors in a level-1 cell is around 4 to 10, given n0
ranging from 20 to 60. Hence, for a WSN, whose size is no more than 100,000, L = 9
will be more than enough to support GPLD as there will be up to 4L¡1 = 65; 536
level-1 cells. Thus, each sensor stores at most 161 GKEKs. Suppose each GKEK is
8 bytes, then 161 GKEKs require a storage space of 1.26 KB only. Also note that
although the sink is required to know all the GKEKs, it does not have to directly
store all of them. Instead, the sink could store only the master key and the locations
of each sensor, and compute the GKEK on-the-°y.
Computation Overhead : The computation overhead introduced by GPLD is lightweight,
as each sensor are only required to perform several times of encryption and decryption
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operations over a very short message (i.e., one key). GPLD does not require sensors
to perform any kind of expensive public-key or polynomial based operations.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we analyzed and classi¯ed the multicast group semantics for WSNs
that are inherently demanded by most applications. We then proposed GPLD to
address multicast encryption problem in WSNs, which, to our best knowledge, is
the ¯rst scheme of its kind that supports various multicast group semantics and is
tailored for WSNs. Our proposed scheme advances the current state-of-the-art by
enabling not only the dynamic changing but also dynamic formation of multicast
groups. We developed a novel multicast encryption technique called global-partition,
local-di®usion to achieve scheme e±ciency and meet the resource-constrained nature
of WSNs. The security and performance of the proposed scheme are justi¯ed through
both analysis and simulations.
Chapter 4
Data Report Security
In this chapter, we propose an integrated security design providing comprehensive
protection over data con¯dentiality, authenticity, and availability. Our design estab-
lishes a location-aware end-to-end data security (LEDS) framework in WSNs.
In WSNs, data of interest, which may vary depending on di®erent applications,
usually appear as event reports sent by the sensing nodes from event happening area
via multihop paths to the sink. As the communication range of sensor nodes are
limited, the reports will be relayed by the intermediate nodes before ¯nally reaching
the sink. Hence, the requirement on data con¯dentiality in WSNs is naturally as
follows: as long as the event sensing nodes are not compromised, the con¯dentiality
of the corresponding data report should not be compromised due to any other nodes'
compromise including the intermediate nodes along the report forwarding route.
Data reports collected by WSNs is usually sensitive and even critical such as
in military applications, and hence, it is important to assure data authenticity in
addition to con¯dentiality. Since the undetected compromised node(s) can always
send false reports, cryptography can not fully prevent such attacks. However, if we
require a valid report be collectively endorsed by a number, say T (T > 1), of sensor
nodes who sense the event at the same time, we can protect data authenticity to the
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extent that no less than T compromised nodes can forge a valid report. Furthermore,
by exploiting static and location aware nature of WSNs, we can Furthermore require
that a legitimate event report corresponding to certain area can only be generated
by the collaborative endorsement of no less than T nodes of that area. That is, to
generate a valid report on a non-existing event happening at a certain area, the only
way is to compromise T nodes at that area, and otherwise impossible.
As compromised nodes are assumed existing in WSNs, it is important to prevent
or be tolerant to their interference as much as possible to protect data availability.
In this regard, security designs should be as robust as possible in the presence of
compromised nodes. In-network processing such as false data ¯ltering is important
to save scarce network resources and to prolong network lifetime. To this end, any
security design in WSNs should be highly resilient against two types of DoS attacks:
report disruption attack [109] and selective forwarding attack [44], in which compro-
mised nodes purposefully drop legitimate packets to disrupt the event report service
by taking advantage of the en-route ¯ltering policy.
4.1 Related Work
4.1.1 End-to-end vs. Hop-by-hop Design
In the past few years, many secret key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed
[28, 17, 55, 56, 26, 25, 122, 16, 114]. By leveraging preloaded keying materials on each
sensor node, these schemes establish pairwise keys between a node and its neighbors
after network deployment for every network node, respectively, and thus form a hop-
by-hop security paradigm. The security strength of these schemes is analyzed in term
of the ratio of compromised communication links over total network communication
links due to node compromise. Two types of node compromise are considered: random
node capture and selective node capture, according to key distribution information
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available to the attacker. Then to compromise the whole network communication,
the attacker is forced to capture at least several hundreds of sensor nodes even under
selective node capture attack. Hop-by-hop security design works ¯ne when assuming
an uniform wireless communication pattern in WSNs. However, in many applica-
tions node-to-sink communication is the dominant communication pattern in WSNs,
that is, data of interest are usually generated from the event happening area and
transmitted all the way to the sink. In this case, hop-by-hop security design is not
su±cient any more as it is vulnerable to communication pattern oriented node capture
attacks. Data con¯dentiality can be easily compromised due to lack of end-to-end
security guarantee, since compromising any intermediate node will lead to exposure
of the transmitted data. At the mean time, as the attacker could decrypt the in-
tercepted data, it could therefore, freely manipulate them to deceive the sink and
hence, severely a®ects data availability. The lack of end-to-end security association
also makes it hard, if not impossible at all, to enforce data authenticity. We there-
fore conclude that end-to-end security design is much more desirable for WSNs as
compared to hop-by-hop design when node-to-sink communication is the dominant
communication pattern as it can o®er a much higher security resilience.
4.1.2 Existing Data Report Security Designs in WSNs
The general approach adopted to protect data authenticity in WSNs is as follows: to
generate a valid report, T (T > 1) nodes that sense the event should ¯rst agree on
the content of the event report, and in order to be forwarded by intermediate nodes
and accepted by the sink, a valid report should be collaboratively endorsed (usually
through Message Authentication Codes (MACs)) by these T nodes. Reports that are
not properly endorsed will be ¯ltered out by the intermediate nodes or the sink. Here
the assumption is that every event of interest can be detected by at least T nodes
simultaneously and the value of T is a system parameter. In the past two years, a few
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schemes have been proposed to design suitable key management schemes based on
this approach, including Statistical En-route Filtering (SEF) [111], Interleaved Hop-
by-hop Authentication (IHA) [120] and Location-Based Resilient Secrecy (LBRS)
[109]. LBRS is the most recently proposed scheme, which aims to solve the problems
identi¯ed in the two previous schemes (SEF and IHA), and is a major improvement
over these two schemes. In both SEF and IHA, compromising T nodes could break
down the whole scheme. That is to say, after compromising T nodes, the attacker can
then freely forge events \appearing" at arbitrary locations without being detected.
In LBRS, the damage caused by node compromise is reduced due to the adopted
location-key binding mechanism. Compromising T nodes now enables the attacker to
fabricate events \appearing" at certain areas without being detected. However, it is
still far from achieving the data authenticity requirement as stated above: to generate
a valid report on a non-existing event happening at a certain area, the only way is to
compromise T nodes at that area, and otherwise impossible. Therefore, there is still
a big gap between the protection that existing schemes can o®er and the requirement
of data authenticity.
In addition, all three schemes mentioned above are highly vulnerable to report
disruption attack and selective forwarding attack. A single compromised node may
disrupt the event report service originating in its vicinity or passing through it. Once
a node in a certain area is compromised, the attacker can disrupt any event report
from that area from being forwarded to the sink thereafter by simply contributing
a wrong MAC to the ¯nal report. Since the en-route ¯ltering allow intermediate
node to drop packets with false MACs, such reports will be rejected on its way to
the sink because of the presence of the wrong MAC(s). On the other hand, with
the common one-to-one forwarding approach, a compromised node can also drop any
data report sent by its downstream nodes. Since the received report can only be
veri¯ed by the compromised node at that point, there is no way for other nodes in its
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vicinity to distinguish such malicious dropping from legal dropping due to failing to
pass the endorsement veri¯cation. As the number of compromised nodes increases,
the resulted damage will increase drastically as discussed later in Section V. Hence,
data availability in these schemes is poorly assured. The scheme presented in [114] is
a group key pre-distribution method which can serve as a base for designing secure
event report delivery approaches.
4.2 LEDS: Location-aware End-to-end Data Secu-
rity Mechanism
4.2.1 Assumptions, Threat Model and Design Goals
System Assumptions: In LEDS, we consider a large-scale uniformly distributed
WSN that monitors a vast terrain of interest via a large number of static sensor nodes,
which can be deployed via approaches such as aerial scattering. We assume that an
approximate estimation on the size and shape of the terrain of interest is known a
priori. Once deployed, each node is assumed to be static and can obtain its geographic
location via a secure and suitable localization scheme such as [11, 53, 103, 118, 117].
The network deployment guarantees that the established WSN is well connected and
dense enough to support ¯ne-grained collaborative sensing and be robust against node
lost and failure. We assume that each event of interest can be detected by multiple
sensor nodes [111, 120, 109]. Once an event happens, the sensing nodes agree on a
synthesized report, which is then forwarded toward the sink, typically traversing a
large number of hops. The sink is a data collection center equipped with su±cient
computation and storage capabilities. We assume every sensor node has an unique
id and is similar to the current generation of sensor nodes (e.g., the Berkeley MICA
motes [33]) in its computation and communication capability and power resource. We
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also assume sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant.
Threat Model: We assume that the attacker could compromise multiple nodes
chosen arbitrarily and Furthermore assume that if the node is compromised, all the
information it holds will also be compromised. However, the sink is assumed to be
secure as it is usually well protected and under the direct control of the network owner
[111]. We also assume that the attacker can eavesdrop on all tra±c, inject packets,
and replay older packets. The attacker can take full control of compromised nodes
and thus can manipulate compromised nodes to drop or alter messages going through
them. On the other hand, we assume there is a short bootstrapping phase right after
network deployment during which no sensor node are compromised.
Design Goals: LEDS seeks to provide end-to-end data security, as well as en-
route bogus data ¯ltering in WSNs. In particular, we focus on the data such as event
reports that are generated by the sensing nodes and transmitted from the sensing
area to the sink. More speci¯cally, the design of LEDS aims to achieve the following
goals:
² Provide end-to-end data con¯dentiality and authenticity: Both con¯dentiality
and authenticity of data reports should be guaranteed as long as the sending
nodes themselves are not compromised. Moreover, the impact of compromised
nodes (if any) should be con¯ned to their vicinity. In other words, the attacker
cannot utilize the cryptographic materials obtained from compromised nodes
to launch attacks at places other than the locations of compromised nodes.
² Achieve high-level of assurance on data availability: 1) Be resilient against
report disruption attack and selective forwarding attack; 2) Be able to early
detect and drop bogus reports in an e®ective and deterministic manner, that
is, having en-route ¯ltering capability.
² Realize all the security goals in a single integrated design without relying on any
CHAPTER 4. DATA REPORT SECURITY 75
other security infrastructures; Be simple and e±cient while providing end-to-end
security guarantee; And have low computation and communication overheads
for it to be suitable in WSNs.
4.2.2 Notation and Terms
For the convenience of description, we use the following notation and terms. Notation
are give in Tab 4.1.
geographic virtual grid : A geographic virtual grid is a virtual geographic partition
of the target terrain, which divides the terrain into multiple square cells. The param-
eters of a geographic virtual grid consists of a reference point and the cell size. For
convenience, the reference point, referred to as (x0; y0), is set to be the location of
the sink, which is known before network deployment. For simplicity, we assume there
is only one static sink in the WSN. The size of a cell is de¯ned by l, which is the
side length of the cell. A cell is uniquely indexed by its center's location. Thereafter,
when we refer to the location of a cell, we use its center's location for convenience.
home cell, event cell : The cell that a node, say u, locates in after network deploy-
ment, is called home cell of u, denoted as Iu, and Iu = (x1; y1) when its location is
(x1; y1). We call a cell an event cell, when a certain event of interest happens in that
cell. Each report is therefore corresponding to one particular event cell.
report-forward route: In LEDS, an event report is relayed from the event cell
to the sink in a cell-by-cell basis along its report-forward route. A report is always
relayed between adjacent cells1 towards the sink. More speci¯cally, a report is always
sent from one cell to one of its four adjacent cells that is closest to the sink2. The
1Two cells are adjacent if they share a common side.
2In the case that two adjacent cells have the same distance to the sink, an agreement to solve the
tie needs to be pre-de¯ned. For example, one may pick the cell that has smaller x coordinate. The
purpose is to guarantee that the route pre-computed at the node would be the same as the actually
route a report travels in a distributed cell-by-cell manner.
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N network size
n0 number of nodes within one cell
u; v; z;m unique ids of sensor nodes
Iu index of node u's home cell
l side length of a cell
KIM , K
II
M two master secret keys
Ku the unique secret key shared between
u and sink
KIu the cell key shared among the nodes in the same cell Iu
KIu;Iv the authentication key shared between
nodes in cell Iu and nodes in cell Iv
H pseudo-random functions
M the event report to be protected.
C encrypted report
Cu a share of C computed through a LSSS, contributed by node u
Cshare a set of shares with jCsharej = T
E²(M) encryption of M using key \²"
Mac²(M) the message authentication code (MAC)
computed over M using key \²"
T the number of endorsements included when generating a valid report
t the minimum number of endorsements to validate a report
r (r > l) communication radius of sensor nodes
p a large prime number
Table 4.1: Notation
report-forward route of node u therefore consists of all the cells that are intersected
by the line segment that connects the center of Iu and the sink (as shown in Fig. 1
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(a)). These cells are sequenced according to their distances to the sink. The cell that
a report travels ¯rst ranks ¯rst and so on.
report-auth area: The report-auth area of a node u consists of two parts, the down-
stream report-auth area and the upstream report-auth area. They are both de¯ned
with regard to a sector area that is bound by two rays. Each of these two rays starts
from the sink (x0; y0) and goes through one vertex of cell Iu; and the two rays form
the smallest angle which contains Iu (as shown in Fig. 1 (b)). Then the downstream
report-auth area of u is de¯ned to be all the cells that are farther to the sink than
Iu and each has at least half part located inside the sector-area, while the upstream
report-auth area consists of all the cells that are closer to the sink than Iu and have
any part of them falls into the sector-area. Obviously, report-forward route of node
u is always a part of its upstream report-auth area.
report-auth cell : A cell is called a report-auth cell of node u, if it belongs to u's
report-auth area and every node in this cell shares an authentication key with u.
Furthermore, if a report-auth cell of u locates in the upstream report-auth area of u,
it is a upstream report-auth cell of u. Otherwise, it is a downstream report-auth cell
of u.
These terms are graphically illustrated in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2.
4.2.3 Scheme Overview
The proposed LEDS scheme consists of two major components: one is the underly-
ing key management framework and the other is the corresponding end-to-end data
security mechanism.
Location-aware key management framework: In LEDS, each node stores
three di®erent types of location-aware keys: 1) a unique secret key shared between
the node and the sink which is used to provide node-to-sink authentication; 2) a
cell key shared with other nodes in the same cell which is used to provide data
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con¯dentiality; 3) a set of authentication keys shared with the nodes in its report-
auth cells which are used to provide both cell-to-cell authentication and en-route
bogus data ¯ltering. Together with a prede¯ned threshold secret sharing scheme, the
key management framework serves as the basis for the upper layer end-to-end data
security mechanism.
End-to-end data security mechanism: LEDS seeks to protect data reports
in a comprehensive and end-to-end manner. Data con¯dentiality : In LEDS, every
event report is encrypted by the corresponding cell key of the event cell. As the cell
key is solely shared among nodes of the event cell and the sink, the con¯dentiality
of the report is guaranteed as long as no node in the event cell is compromised.
Data authenticity : 1) Each report is endorsed by multiple sensing nodes and the
endorsements can be individually authenticated by the sink and 2) Each report is
also authenticated in an interleaved cell-by-cell manner along the report-forwarding
route. Data availability : 1) Be robust against report disruption attacks: the encrypted
report is divided into a number of unique shares through a pre-de¯ned linear secret
sharing scheme (LSSS). Each share is independently generated by a participating node
using its unique secret key shared with sink. A pre-de¯ned number of MACs are then
computed over all the shares using cell-to-cell authentication keys as another layer
of endorsements, which enables the intermediate nodes to perform en-route ¯ltering.
2) Be robust against selective forwarding attacks : Using cell-to-cell authentication
keys guarantees that each report can be veri¯ed simultaneously by multiple next-hop
nodes at any point in the route. This unique feature of LEDS makes it possible for
the one-to-many data forwarding approach to be used in LEDS in stead of vulnerable
one-to-one approach adopted by most existing security schemes. Sink ¯nally veri¯es
whether the report is indeed sent by the nodes from the event cell as claimed through
examining both the authenticity of the MACs and the uniqueness of the shares. The
sink can always recover the report from a subset of the shares even if a small number
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of wrong shares exist due to threshold property of the underlying LSSS.
4.2.4 Protocol Detail
4.2.4.1 Location-aware key management framework
Before network deployment, the network planner prepares a geographic virtual grid
of the targeted terrain with reference point (x0; y0) and cell size l. Based on total
number of nodes in the network N , cell size l, and average number of nodes in each
cell n0, the network planner further decides the values of T and t: the former is the
number of endorsements included when generating a valid report and the latter de¯nes
the minimum number of correct endorsements to validate a report. The impact of
di®erent values of these parameters will be discussed in Sections IV and V when
we analyze security strength and performance of LEDS. The network planner also
prepares two master secret keys, KIM and K
II
M . In addition, a large prime number p is
prepared, which together with t and T de¯nes a (t; T ) LSSS over ¯nite ¯eld GF (p).
LEDS adopts a robot-assisted network bootstrapping technique [117]. We assume
that a group of mobile robots are dispatched to sweep across the whole sensor ¯eld
along pre-planned routes after the deployment of sensors. Mobile robots have GPS
capabilities as well as more powerful computation and communication capacities than
ordinary sensors. The leading robot is also equipped with the following bootstrapping
parameters
fKIM ; KIIM ; l; (x0; y0); (t; T ); pg:
The robots securely localize every sensor using the secure localization protocol given
in [11], and load each of them the corresponding location-aware keys in a cell by cell
manner.
Speci¯cally, the robots ¯rst determine a node u's home cell Iu = (x1; y1), then
CHAPTER 4. DATA REPORT SECURITY 81
`
l
u
upstream report-auth area of u
report-forward route of u
sink
(x0,y0)
X
Y 
… ...
… ...
… ...
v
report-forward route of v
2nd
4th
Figure 4.3: Illustration of report-auth cells of node u
compute a unique secret key Ku which u shares with the sink as
Ku = H(K
I
M jujIu);
where j denotes concatenation operation. A cell key KIu is further calculated which
is shared among u and other nodes in Iu(x1; y1), and
KIu = H(K
I
M jIu):
The robots load u with KIu as well as the ID list of all the nodes in Iu.
The robots next compute a set of authentication keys for all the sensors in the
same cell. An authentication key is shared among all the sensors in a given cell and
its corresponding report-auth cells. Suppose a report-auth cell of Iu has its location
as (xc; yc), then the authentication key between the two cells is
H(KIIM j(x1; y1)j(xc; yc)):
The report-auth cells of Iu are determined according to Iu's relative location with
respect to the sink. In speci¯c, a member of downstream report-auth cells of u is any
cell in its downstream report-auth area that is no more than T +1 cells away from Iu
3.
3Adjacent cells are considered one cell away.
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For example, all the grey cells shown in Fig. 4.2 are u's downstream report-auth cells
with T = 3. On the other hand, cell Iv is not such a member because only horizontal
or vertical cell transverse is allowed in LEDS, that is, no diagonal cell transverse is
allowed and hence, Iv is ¯ve cells away from Iu. The quantitative analysis on the
number of downstream report-auth cells of a node will be discussed in Section V in
the context of key storage overhead analysis.
Furthermore, the upstream report-auth cells of u comprise of the following ones:
the robots ¯rst randomly rank all the sensors in Iu, assigning each of them a rank
between 1 and T . Suppose u is assigned a rank as ranku, then the (ranku mod (T+1))-
th cell in the report-forward route of u is the ¯rst such a cell. The remaining ones
for u are those cells within its upstream report-auth area that are exactly T + 1 cells
closer to the sink as compared to Iu. In case that Iu is less than T +1 cells away from
the sink, the sink itself is chosen. An example is shown in Fig. 4.3. Suppose T = 3,
then the 2nd and 4th cells denoted in the ¯gure are u's upstream report-auth cells.
In fact, for any two nodes u and v, if Iv is a member of downstream report-auth
cells of u, then
² every node in Iu shares the authentication key KIu;Iv = H(KIIM jIujIv) with at
least one node in Iv. Furthermore, if two cells are exactly T +1 cells away from
each other in the report-forward route of v, then every node in Iu shares KIu;Iv
with every node in Iv.
² the upstream report-auth area of u is a part of that of v, that is, the report-
forward route of v falls into the upstream report-auth area of u after the route
reaches Iu as shown in Fig. 4.3.
The robots also load every sensor with f(t; T ); pg. The same bootstrapping pro-
cedure is repeated for all nodes in every cell. Note that the robots may also need to
relocate a small number of sensors to ensure that each cell contains no less than T
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nodes. The communication between the sensors and the leading robot can be easily
secured using the technique introduced in [115]. We omit it here for space limit.
By the end of the bootstrapping phase, mobile robots leave the sensor ¯eld and the
leading robot should securely erase all the keys from its memory but should report
the locations of sensors to the sink. The assumption underlying this approach is that
adversaries do not launch active and explicit pinpoint attacks on mobile robots at this
stage which usually does not last too long. That is, the robots are not likely subject
to compromise. We further note that the above bootstrapping operation can also
be realized through key pre-distribution approach [28, 26], instead of using mobile
robots. In this case, sensor nodes utilize secure localization protocols [117, 103, 53]
to obtain their locations. The choice of the approaches could depend on the security
conditions and their availabilities in practice. We further point out that some sensors
may be dislocated during the network lifetime in many scenarios. In this case, once
they are dislocated, their possessed keys should also be updated according to their
new location. Such dislocation and update operations can also be ful¯lled by using
the mobile robots.
4.2.4.2 End-to-end data security mechanism
LEDS requires each valid event report to be encrypted and, at the same time, attached
with T endorsements from T di®erent nodes when generated from the event cell.
While an event report is relayed to the sink, the intermediate nodes will drop any
invalid endorsements to the report. Moveover, the report itself will be dropped when
the number of valid endorsements becomes less than t. This is in contrast to the
existing designs in which a report is dropped as soon as an invalid endorsement
is found. The proposed design is important as it makes the system more robust
in that it tolerates up to T ¡ t compromised nodes in an event cell colluding to
launch report disruption attack by contributing invalid endorsements to the legal event
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reports. Meanwhile, the requirement of multiple endorsements makes the system
more reliable by disabling the possibility that up to t ¡ 1 compromised nodes of an
event cell or unlimited number of compromised nodes from any other cell(s) collude
to forge a report of event \appearing" at that event cell. The encryption prevents
unlimited number of compromised nodes not in the event cell from colluding to obtain
the content of the reports. LEDS further adopts a one-to-many report forwarding
paradigm, which ensures the system being highly resilient to selective message forward
attacks [44]. The detailed security mechanism is described as follows.
Report generation: Each of T participating nodes ¯rst agree on an event reportM
using the technique introduced in [112] based on signal strength strategy. M usually
contains information such as event type, sensing location (i.e., id of event cell 's), and
a timestamp, etc. Note that all the related communications are protected by the
cell key so that M is con¯dential against any outside node. Next, each participating
node, say u, encrypts M using the cell key KIu and obtains C = EKIu (M). u further
computes an unique share Cu of C through the prede¯ned (t; T ) LSSS. In speci¯c,
Cu is obtained by evaluating the following univariate polynomial of degree t¡ 1 over
¯nite ¯eld GF (p) using Ku:
Cu = F(Ku) =
X
0·i<t
aiK
i
u mod p; (1)
where ai (i = [0; t ¡ 1]) are a full partition of C, and both p and t are the two
preloaded parameters. Note that Cu is uniquely generated by u and therefore can be
viewed as an endorsement to be veri¯ed by the sink. This is because the polynomial
is evaluated using u's unique secret key Ku which is only known to u and the sink.
Node u then broadcasts tuple fu;Cug and also collects the corresponding T¡1 shares
from other nodes. u then computes two MACs over all the T shares of C, i.e., Cshare,
as another layer of endorsement to the report, which enables the intermediate nodes
to perform en-route ¯ltering. The two MACs are computed using the authentication
keys that u shares with two of its upstream report-auth cells. Suppose Iv and Io are u's
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two upstream report-auth cells, and both of them belong to u's report-forward route,
in which Io ranks (T + 1)-th. Then the obtained MACs are MacKIu;Iv (Cshare) and
MacKIu;Io (Cshare): The tuple fu;MacKIu;Iv (Cshare);MacKIu;Io (Cshare)g is then broad-
cast to complete the synthesization of the ¯nal report. Node u constructs and sends
out the ¯nal report after it collects T +1 di®erent MACs and 2T MACs in total. The
¯nal report contains: 1) event cell id, 2) ids of T participating nodes, 3) Cshare, and
4) T + 1 MACs. Note that both the ids of the participating nodes and the T + 1
MACs are listed in the ¯nal report in order based on the node ranks (The common
MAC is listed lastly). The report is sent by the node who completes the synthesis of
the report and seizes the channel ¯rst. To avoid sending duplicate reports, each node
overhears the channel and uses exactly the same random timer technique described
in [109, 40].
Interleaved cell-by-cell en-route ¯ltering : In LEDS, data reports are relayed cell
by cell and delivered following a robust one-to-many, instead of existing failure-prone
one-to-one, forwarding paradigm. A sending/intermediate node locally broadcasts a
data report to the next cell in its route-forward route. As we mentioned before, it is
easy to determine the next cell on the report-forward route, which is the one that is
adjacent to the sending cell and is closer to the sink. Nodes in the receiving cell verify
the report and, upon successful veri¯cation and processing, one of them rebroadcasts
the report further to the next cell. Again, duplicate reports are suppressed by using
the techniques like back-o® before sending [109, 40].
In LEDS, an appropriate intermediate node authenticates a received report by
checking 1) the validity of the ¯rst MAC attached in the report and 2) the number
of non-zero MACs. The node veri¯es the ¯rst MAC attached in the report through
using the corresponding authentication key :
² If the 1st MAC is zero, deletes it and attaches another zero to the next to the
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end of the report4;
² If the 1st MAC is valid, deletes it and attaches a new MAC to the next to the
end of the report;
² If the 1st MAC is invalid, deletes it and attaches a zero to the next to the end
of the report.
Here, the newly attached MAC is computed over Cshare using the corresponding
authentication key shared between the node and one of its upstream report-auth cells
which is exactly T +1 cells closer to the sink with respect to its report-forward route.
The node also checks whether or not the number of non-zero MACs is enough and
discards the report if the number is not enough. The number of non-zero MACs is
considered not enough by an intermediate node if 1) it contains less than t+1 di®erent
non-zero MACs or 2) it contains less than T ¡ j + 2 di®erent non-zero MACs, when
event cell is j cells (j 2 [1; T ¡ t]) away from its own. If there are enough number of
non-zero MACs, the node now forwards the processed report to the next cell. Note
that there is no way for a single node to launch selective forwarding attack, since each
report can be veri¯ed by multiple nodes simultaneously. Every node in the same cell
can be the one to forward a legal report. The pseudo-code of the above authentication
procedure is shown in Table I.
Sink veri¯cation: A report is veri¯ed at the sink in two aspects to ensure its
authenticity: 1) it veri¯es whether the report contains no less than t + 1 valid non-
zero MACs; 2) it checks whether the report is indeed endorsed by the T nodes as
claimed. Sink veri¯es 1) using the authentication keys it shares with the intermediate
cells, and checks 2) by recovering the report C from Cu. To do this, it tries to
recover C from any t correct shares, and then decrypts the recovered C using the
corresponding cell key of event cell 5. More speci¯cally, the recovery operation of M
4That is, always keeps the common MAC the last.
5Based on the cell id contained in the report.
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1 verify the 1st MAC contained in the report;
2 if (the 1st MAC is zero or invalid)
3 newMAC = 0;
4 if (the 1st MAC is valid)
5 newMAC = createMAC(Cshare, key);
6 delete the 1st MAC;
7 attach newMAC to the next to the end of the report;
8 get number of di®erent non-zero MACs;
9 if (((j · T ¡ t)&&(Num of MAC < T ¡ j + 2)) jj (Num of MAC < t+ 1))
10 // the event cell is j cells away from its own
11 discard report; // not enough
12 else
13 forward report to the next cell; // enough
Table 4.2: Pseudo-code for authenticating a received event report
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Figure 4.4: An example of the proposed end-to-end data security mechanism
goes as follows: sink picks t out of T shares, using their corresponding secret keys6,
sink solves a t-variable linear equation system to get ai; i = [0; t ¡ 1] in Equ. (1)
and thus obtains C. Sink further decrypts C and gets M . At this point, if M is
meaningful (i.e., conforming to the pre-de¯ned report format), recovery operation
succeeds. Otherwise, sink tries another combination of t shares. Note that as long
as there are no more than T ¡ t invalid shares, sink is always able to recover the
original report due to the nice threshold property of the adopted (t; T ) LSSS. And
as long as the sink can recover the original report M , it may ascertain that all the
corresponding shares are indeed generated by the nodes as claimed.
4.2.5 An example
In Fig. 4.4, we show how the proposed data security framework works through a
simple example. For brevity, we show the corresponding security operations only.
Suppose T = 3, t = 2 and nodes m; s and u (m < s < u) are three nodes from event
6Based on the node id contained in the report.
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cell. Hence, a report can be:
fIu;m; s; u; Cm; Cs; Cu;MacKIu;Iv (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIu;Iz (CmjCsjCu);MacKIu;Io (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIu;Iv0
(CmjCsjCu)g:
Then a successful protocol run goes as follows: when node v receives the report, it
checks that the report contains 4 non-zero MACs. Next, v veri¯es the 1st MAC in
the report using KIu;Iv . Then v removes this MAC and attaches a new one to the
end, which is also computed over Cshare but with KIv ;Iz0 , because Iz0 is 4 cells closer
to the sink with respect to the report forwarding route of Iu. Lastly, node v forwards
the processed report:
fIu;m; s; u; Cm; Cs; Cu;MacKIu;Iz (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIu;Io (CmjCsjCu);MacKIu;Iv0 (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIv;Iz0
(CmjCsjCu)g:
As the report is forwarded along the route, it is Furthermore veri¯ed and processed
by the intermediate nodes accordingly. Therefore, node z0 receives the report as
fIu;m; s; u; Cm; Cs; Cu;MacKIv;Iz0 (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIz;Io0
(CmjCsjCu);MacKIo;sink(CmjCsjCu);
MacKIv0 ;sink
(CmjCsjCu)g:
And sink receives the report as
fIu;m; s; u; Cm; Cs; Cu;MacKIz;Io0 (CmjCsjCu);
MacKIo;sink(CmjCsjCu);MacKIv0 ;sink(CmjCsjCu);
MacKIz0 ;sink
(CmjCsjCu)g:
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Sink ¯rst veri¯es all the 4 MACs and then recovers the original C from any two of
Cm; Cu and Cs. From the id information in the report and Equ. 1, sink solves a
2-variable linear equation system and thus obtains C. Sink Furthermore decrypts
C using KIu , and therefore obtains M . If M is meaningful, the recovery operation
succeeds. Sink won't be able to recover M if there are more than T ¡ t = 1 invalid
shares. Hence, as long as sink could recover the report, it accepts the report.
4.3 Security Analysis of LEDS
In this section, security strength of the proposed LEDS is analyzed with respect to
the three aspects as mentioned in design goals, i.e., data con¯dential, authenticity
and availability.
4.3.1 Security Strength of LEDS Regarding Data Con¯den-
tiality
In LEDS, every report is encrypted by the corresponding cell key and therefore, no
nodes out of the event cell could obtain its content. Compromising any number of
intermediate nodes won't break the con¯dentiality of the report. Only when a node
from the event cell is compromised could the attacker obtain the contents of the cor-
responding reports. We say a cell is compromised with regard to data con¯dentiality
in this case. Our concern here is how compromised nodes under both random and
selective node capture attacks a®ect the con¯dentiality of the communications from
di®erent cells? That is, given the number of compromised nodes, what is the fraction
of the compromised cells with respect to total network cells?
Random node capture attack : Given network size N and the average number
of nodes in each cell n0, there are altogether N
n0 cells in a geographic virtual grid,
assuming n0 divides N . Therefore, if x nodes are compromised under random node
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Figure 4.5: Data con¯dentiality in LEDS under random node capture attack
capture attack, the probability that a given cell is compromised is
1¡
¡
N¡n0
x
¢¡
N
x
¢ (2)
On the other hand, Equ. (2) also represents the fraction of total cells that are
compromised given x nodes are compromised. In Fig. 4.5, we show how the number of
compromised nodes a®ects data con¯dentiality in LEDS. It is clear that to compromise
40% of the total cells, at least 5% of the total nodes have to be compromised. This
means at least 500 nodes, given N = 10; 000 and n0 = 10. Furthermore, the security
resilience increases as n0 decreases as shown in Fig. 4.5. Therefore, LEDS compares
favorably with respect to security resilience against random node capture attacks to
existing security designs [17, 26, 25], in which compromising a few hundred nodes
usually compromises all the network communications, given the same network size.
Selective node capture attack : In this case, to compromise the whole network, the
attacker has to selectively capture at least one node from each cell. This implies
at least N
n0 nodes are required, that is, around 1000 nodes, given N = 10; 000 and
n0 = 10. Note that this is 10% of the total network nodes. In LEDS the damages
caused by the compromised nodes are con¯ned due to location-aware nature of the cell
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keys. Compromised nodes in one area cannot be used to compromise communications
originated from other areas, since they do not have any information on cell keys of
other cells.
4.3.2 Security Strength of LEDS Regarding Data Authentic-
ity
In addition to obtaining the content of legitimate reports, the attacker may also want
to insert bogus reports to fool the sink with non-existing events. In LEDS, in order
for a bogus report to successfully pass both en-route ¯ltering and sink veri¯cation, the
attacker has to compromise at least t nodes in the corresponding event cell. We say a
cell is compromised with regard to data authenticity in this case. Notice that under
this worst case scenario, namely, t or more nodes in a single cell have been compro-
mised, only events \appearing" in that cell can be forged, due to the location-aware
property of the underlying endorsement keys that provides both node-to-sink and
cell-to-cell authentications. Therefore, LEDS presents an improvement over existing
security designs such as SEF, IHA, and LBRS [111, 120, 109], in which compromising
any single node would result in multiple gains, i.e., helping the attacker compro-
mise the authenticity of both its own home cell/cluster and any of its downstream
cells/clusters.
Therefore, our ¯rst concern is that given the number of compromised nodes, what
fraction of the total cells are a®ected with respect to data authenticity? Under random
node capture attack, if the number of compromised nodes is x, then the probability
that a cell is not a®ected, i.e., no node in a cell is compromised, is given by
Pf0g =
¡
N¡n0
x
¢¡
N
x
¢ (3)
This also represents the percentage of cells that are secure. Accordingly, the percent-
age of cells that have at least one node compromised, respectively, is given by 1¡Pf0g.
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Furthermore, let Pfig represent the probability that exactly i nodes are compromised
in a cell, we have
Pfig =
¡
n0
i
¢¡
N¡n0
x¡i
¢¡
N
x
¢
Then the probability that the authenticity of a cell is compromised, i.e., having at
least T compromised nodes is
Pf¸tg =
n0X
i=t
Pfig =
n0X
i=t
¡
n0
i
¢¡
N¡n0
x¡i
¢¡
N
x
¢ (4)
This also represents the percentage of authenticity compromised cells. Then the
percentage of a®ected cells, i.e., each of which has at least 1 and at most t ¡ 1
compromised nodes, can be expressed as 1¡Pf0g¡Pf¸tg: Fig. 4.6 illustrates how data
authenticity is a®ected as the number of compromised nodes increases. It is observed
that the percentage of compromised cells increases very slowly with the increase of
number of compromised nodes. And it is kept very low: even if the compromised nodes
reach 1750, only 10% of cells are compromised. This indicates that under random
node capture attacks, it is very hard for the attacker to compromise a cell and thus fool
the sink with the undetectable bogus reports. On the other hand, it is observed that
the percentage of secure cells in the network deceases slowly while the percentage
of a®ected cells increases quickly as the number of compromised nodes increases.
This observation tells us that it is relatively easier for the attacker to insert the bogus
reports into the network; however, these bogus reports can be deterministically ¯ltered
by the intermediate nodes or the sink.
Hence, our next concern is that given the number of compromised nodes, what's
the expected ¯ltering position of a bogus report sent from an a®ected cell? In LEDS,
in order for a bogus report from an a®ected cell to reach the sink (but be rejected
by the sink), there should be at least t ¡ x2 of the ¯rst T cells in its report-forward
route being a®ected simultaneously, assuming the number of compromised nodes in
this a®ected cell is x2 (1 · x2 · T ¡1). This is because, to insert a bogus report, the
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Figure 4.6: Data authenticity in LEDS under random node capture attack, where
N = 10; 000, n0 = 10 and (t; T ) = (4; 5).
compromised nodes in this a®ected cell have to forge at least t ¡ x2 MACs to have
enough number of them. And to let pass these t¡x2 invalid MACs, there should be at
least t¡ x2 a®ected cells of the ¯rst T cells in its report-forward route: compromised
node(s) from each a®ected cell could therefore let pass one corresponding invalid
MAC and attach a new one as de¯ned in LEDS. Therefore, there is no way for the
intermediate nodes to check the authenticity of the received report after T cells, since
now all the contained MACs in the report are indeed valid ones. In this case, the
¯ltering position of the bogus reports from this a®ected cell should be its distance to
the sink. Otherwise, any bogus report from this cell will be ¯ltered at most at T -th
cell and T
2
-th cell on average. Assuming there are less than t¡x2 a®ected cells of the
¯rst T cells in its report-forward route, then at least one invalid MAC will be detected
by nodes from the remaining secure cells. Now the bogus report originated from this
cell will be ¯ltered out at most at the T -th cell along the route. Under random node
capture attack, the average ¯ltering position will be bounded by T
2
, since the invalid
MAC can be detected at any position between the 1st and T-th cell. Therefore, given
the number of compromised nodes as x, the expected ¯ltering position of the bogus
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Figure 4.7: Expected ¯ltering position vs. number of compromised nodes with respect
to di®erent distance to the sink
reports from an a®ected cell is bounded by
y
t¡1X
i=1
Pfig(1¡ Pf0g)t¡i + T
2
(1¡
t¡1X
i=1
Pfig(1¡ Pf0g)t¡i); (5)
suppose this a®ected cell is y cells away from the sink with respect to its report-
forward route. Fig. 4.7 illustrates how the ¯ltering position varies as the number of
compromised nodes increases, when N = 10; 000, n0 = 10 and (t; T ) = (4; 5). It is
clearly shown in Fig. 4.7 that the bogus reports sent from most a®ected cells can be
e±ciently ¯ltered under random node capture attack. For example, the bogus reports
from an a®ected cell that is 30 cells away from the sink will be ¯ltered at less than
the 10-th cell in the route on average, where the number of compromised nodes is
1000.
On the other hand, under selective node capture attack, the attacker can choose
as low as t nodes from one particular cell to compromise data authenticity of that
cell. As discussed above, unlike existing security designs [109, 120, 111], compromised
nodes from one cell in LEDS can not be used to compromise data authenticity of other
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cells. Note that in existing security designs, data authenticity of one cell can always
be compromised because of the compromise of nodes from other cells. Hence, this
feature of LEDS greatly increases the attacker's cost to launch such attacks.
4.3.3 Security Strength of LEDS Regarding Data Availabil-
ity
As discussed before, there are two possible attacks that could severely a®ect data
availability in WSN, namely, report disruption attack and selective forwarding attack.
Existing security designs are highly vulnerable to these attacks [111, 120, 109]. In
contrast, LEDS makes signi¯cant improvement in terms of data availability by being
more resilient to such attacks. The strength of LEDS comes from both its report
endorsement mechanism and its forwarding mechanism.
On the one hand, in LEDS, each node only contributes one share of the report
following a (t; T ) threshold LSSS. Therefore, the sink can always recover the original
report even if there are up to T ¡ t compromised nodes from the corresponding event
cell that contribute wrong shares to prevent the sink from obtaining the report. At
the mean time, the intermediate nodes only discard a report which contains less than
t valid MACs. That is, if there are up to T ¡ t compromised nodes that contributes
invalid MACs, the report can still be relayed to the sink. While in existing security
designs, a single compromised node could prevent the sink from obtaining any re-
port from that cell. Simply by contributing an invalid MAC to any report sent from
that cell, the compromised node can always make the report to be discarded by the
intermediate nodes. Under random node capture attack, given the number of com-
promised nodes x, the percentage of cells that have at least one node compromised,
respectively, is given by 1 ¡ Pf0g; Furthermore the percentage of cells that have at
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Figure 4.8: Data availability in LEDS under report disruption attack
least T ¡ t+ 1 nodes compromised, respectively, is given by
1¡
T¡tX
i=0
Pfig (6):
Fig. 4.8 compares the data availability protection of LEDS with other existing
security designs. It clearly shows that LEDS is much more resilient to the report
disrupt attacks. In other words, an attacher needs to compromise a lot more nodes
to successfully launch report disrupt attacks in LEDS. Given N = 10; 000, n0 = 10
and (t; T ) = (4; 5), to successfully launch report disrupt attack in 10% of total cells,
around 100 nodes have to be compromised in existing security designs, while this
number has to be no less than 600 in LEDS. Furthermore, by increasing T ¡ t, LEDS
can increase the resilience even more, or in other words, making the attack even
harder, as shown in Fig. 4.8. Lastly, even under selective node capture attacks,
the cost to successfully launch report disrupt attack in the same number of cells in
existing security designs, will still be T ¡ t times higher than in LEDS.
On the other hand, a compromised node can always drop all the reports going
through itself in existing security designs due to the failure-prone nature of one-to-one
forwarding paradigm. Compromising any intermediate node from the report-forward
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Figure 4.9: Data availability in LEDS under selective forwarding attack
route would be su±cient enough for the attacker to successfully drop the message
without being detected, since other nodes have no appropriate keys to verify the
authenticity of the report. However, in LEDS it is impossible for a compromised
node to prevent the report from being forwarded. This is because every report in
LEDS is forwarded to all nodes in the next cell and each of them function the same
way. Therefore, as long as not all the nodes that hear the report are compromised,
the report can always be forwarded to the next cell. Hence, the proposed one-to-many
forwarding approach in LEDS greatly enhances data availability in WSNs.
More precisely, suppose a cell is y cells away from the sink. Then applying one-
to-one forwarding approach as in existing security designs, the probability that the
corresponding report sent from this cell is dropped by a compromised intermediate
node can be estimated by
yl
r
(1¡ Pf0g); (7)
under random node capture attack, while in LEDS this probability is bounded by
y(1¡
bn0(r¡l)
l
cX
i=0
Pfig); (8)
assuming l · r · 2l. Fig. 4.9 clearly illustrates the huge improvement on data
availability provided by LEDS.
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4.4 Performance analysis of LEDS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed LEDS in terms of storage
overhead, computation and communication overheads and energy savings.
4.4.1 Key storage overhead
In LEDS, each node stores an unique secret key which is only known to itself, and
one cell key shared with all other nodes in its home cell. Of course, both keys are also
known by the sink in addition. Furthermore, each node also stores one authentication
key for each of its report-auth cells. For a particular node, say u, the number of its
report-auth cells is decided by u's relative position with respect to the sink.
More speci¯cally, the number of downstream report-auth cells of u is bounded by
(T+1)(T+2)
2
; when home cell Iu is right next to the sink as shown in Fig. 4.10(a). On
the other hand, from its de¯nition, we know that any node's upstream report-auth
area is a subset of the two-cell-wide band area as shown in Fig. 4.10(b). Obviously,
in a two-cell-wide band area, all the possible routes monotonically toward the sink7
have at most two di®erent choices at each step. Therefore, the cells that are exactly
T + 1 cells closer to the sink as compared to Iu also have at most 2 di®erent choices.
Hence, the number of upstream report-auth cells of any node is bounded by 3, and
the total number of keys stored by each node in LEDS is bounded by
(T + 1)(T + 2)
2
+ 5: (9)
Therefore, LEDS only requires the nodes to storage a small number of keys, which
can be as low as 20, given T = 5. Moreover, the number of keys is independent to the
network size, which makes LEDS highly suitable in large scale WSNs. Furthermore,
the sink also stores very few keys in LEDS, i.e., two master keys KIM and K
II
M only.
7horizontal and vertical cell transverse only
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All the other keys can be derived on-the-°y from the id and location information (i.e.,
cell id) contained in the received data reports.
4.4.2 Computation and communication overheads
In LEDS, key establishment only involves e±cient hash operations during the boot-
strapping period. And since the authentication keys are shared in a cell-to-cell man-
ner, they can be reused for en-route ¯ltering during whole network life. This feature
saves a lot of unnecessary computation due to key reestablishment. In contrary,
whenever forward route changes, all the authentication keys should be reestablished
to enable en-route ¯ltering as in IHA [120] due to the weakness of one-to-one forward-
ing approach. On the other hand, to generate an authentic report, each node needs to
compute two MACs and execute one LSSS operation, which can be performed using
e±cient O(jpj log2 jpj) algorithms [30]. Furthermore, to forward a report, each node
needs to verify one MAC and compute another MAC. Since the energy for computing
a MAC is about the same as that for transmitting one byte, the computation cost
involved by LEDS is highly e±cient. In addition, to judge whether a node belongs
to a particular report-forward route, only simple geometry computation is involved
based on geographic virtual grid.
The communication overhead of our scheme arises from two sources as compared
to the original report. First, every authentic report contains T + 1 MACs. Since the
size of these MACs only impacts the capability of en-route ¯ltering, in practice it can
be made smaller as a tradeo® between performance and security. For example, if we
use 6 bytes for all the MACs, and T = 5, the size of a MAC will be 1 byte. Therefore,
the introduced additional message overhead is only 6 bytes in this example. Second,
since the encrypted report is divided into a set of unique shares as node-to-sink
endorsements, this would result in possible message size enlargement. For example,
assuming M is 36-byte (288-bit) long as in TinyOS [4] and (t; T ) = (4; 5), then each
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share will be 9 bytes in length and there will be 5 shares in total according to the
underlying LSSS. Hence, the size of additional message overhead is only one-fourth
of the original message length, i.e., 9 bytes. Note that these additional message
overheads provide much stronger security strength and resilience. Also note that the
choice of T should be based on both security and node density. A large T makes it
more di±cult for the adversary to launch a false data injection attack, but it also
requires more nodes to form a cell. Moreover, report delivery in LEDS follows a
pre-de¯ned route in a cell-by-cell manner. Hence, it is highly robust and resilient
against node failures and other possible routing changes as compared to one-to-one
forwarding paradigm in existing security designs [111, 120, 109]. The elimination of
unnecessary routing overheads also help LEDS achieve communication e±cient.
4.4.3 Energy savings
Existing security designs only aim to save the energy of intermediate nodes along
the forwarding path to the sink through early detection and dropping of bogus data
reports inserted by compromised nodes. However, compromised nodes may also in-
tentionally drop legitimate reports and thus cause futile energy consumption, which
implies extra energy waste. To address this problem, LEDS aims to reduce the energy
waste resulting from both bogus data report insertion and legitimate report dropping.
On the other hand, in doing so, the introduced message overhead and enroute ¯lter-
ing operations inevitably incur extra energy consumption in both communication and
computation.
In the following, we employ a similar model to that of [111] to analyze the energy
savings caused by the proposed LEDS. We denote by Etr the energy consumption for
transmitting and receiving one bit, by Ln the bit-length of an original report without
using LEDS, by La the bit-length of a report with LEDS, and by h the average number
of cells a report travels. We Furthermore assume that the ratio of legitimate data
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tra±c to bogus data tra±c is 1 : ½ and an uniform tra±c pattern (i.e., nodes from
each cell generates the same amount of data reports.). Then the normalized energy
waste in delivering all the tra±c, denoted by Ew without LEDS and E
0
w with LEDS
will be:
Ew = Ln½Etr
hl
r
+ Ln
hl
r
(1¡ Pf0g)Etr hl
2r
= LnEtr
hl
r
(½+ (1¡ Pf0g)hl
2r
) (10)
E 0w = (Ln + La)½Etr(h
t¡1X
i=1
Pfig(1¡ Pf0g)t¡i
+
T
2
(1¡
t¡1X
i=1
Pfig(1¡ Pf0g)t¡i))
+(Ln + La)h(1¡
bn0(r¡l)
l
cX
i=0
Pfig)Etr
h
2
(11)
It was reported in [30] that Rockwell Science Center's WINS sensor node consumes
about Etr = 10¹J for the hop-wise transmission and reception of one bit. Using this
exemplary value, Fig. 4.11 plots the comparison of Ew and E
0
w as a function of the
bogus tra±c ratio ½ and the number of compromised nodes x, when Ln = 288 bits,
La = 112 bits, (t; T ) = (4; 5), (N;n
0) = (10; 000; 10), l = 2r
3
and h = 30.
We can see that Ew increases dramatically with the increase of injected bogus
data reports, while E 0w always maintains a rather stable level because 1) most bogus
reports can be detected and dropped during their early transmission stages with
LEDS in place; 2) it is much harder to drop the legitimate reports with LEDS in
place. Furthermore, LEDS shows remarkable energy savings in contrast to the case
without using LEDS. For example, when x = 300 and ½ = 5, LEDS saves more than
85% energy, i.e., 385mJ .
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Figure 4.11: Energy waste due to node compromise under di®erent bogus tra±c ratio
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, through exploiting the static and location-aware nature of WSNs we
came up with a location-aware end-to-end security framework to address the vul-
nerabilities in existing security designs. In our design, the secret keys are bound to
geographic locations, and each node stores a few keys based on its own location. This
location-aware property successfully limits the impact of compromised nodes only to
their vicinity without a®ecting end-to-end data security. Furthermore, the proposed
multifunctional key management framework assures both node-to-sink and node-to-
node authentication along report forwarding routes. Moreover, our data delivery ap-
proach guarantees e±cient en-route bogus data ¯ltering, and is highly robust against
DoS attacks. We evaluate our design through extensive analysis, which demonstrates
its high resilience against an increasing number of compromised nodes and e®ective-
ness in energy savings, that is, achieving 85% or more energy savings in contrast to
the case without using our design when appropriate parameters are chosen.
Chapter 5
Event Boundary Detection
Security
In this chapter, we study how to securely detect event boundary in WSNs under ad-
versarial environments with enhanced fault-tolerance. In a trustworthy environment,
each node reports its measurements honestly and a node with erroneous measure-
ments will suppress/abort its own observation based on the information collected
from other nodes in its neighborhood. However, this is not true in an adversarial en-
vironment where malicious compromised nodes exist. Compromised nodes can always
lie about its measurements, claim to be a boundary node when it is not, or refuse
to report itself as a boundary node when it is. Moreover, compromised nodes may
also collude to fabricate non-existing event boundary to deceive the sink and cause
erroneous actions taken. Sensor random measurement error further complicates the
problem. Hence, to fully address these problems, the interferences from both node
compromise and random measurement fault should be taken into consideration.
We propose a Secure Event Boundary Detection (SEBD) scheme, which allows
secure detection of event boundaries in a localized manner, and is highly resilient
against both node compromise and random measurement fault. In SEBD, with an
105
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e±cient key establishment protocol, each sensor node establishes a unique secret key
shared only with the sink, and several pairwise secret keys each shared with one of its
neighbors. Those keys are bound to a node's physical location so even if the node is
compromised, the impact is e®ectively con¯ned to that particular node and at its par-
ticular location only. In SEBD, each node senses its local environment independently.
Once an event of interest is detected, senor nodes ¯rst exchange their measurements
among neighbors and benign nodes suppress possible faulty measurements following a
majority rule. To enhance fault tolerance and prevent fabrication, once a node is de-
tected as a boundary node, a number of its neighbors will collaboratively endorse the
corresponding boundary claim message. A neighbor node endorses a boundary claim
message only if the contained information is consistent with its own knowledge. The
sink accepts a claim only when it contains a required number of valid endorsements.
A nonparametric statistical boundary detection model is also developed, which is
seamlessly integrated with the proposed security mechanism. It facilitates localized
boundary node determination, and helps to suppress random measurement fault and
malicious false readings. It shows a much higher accuracy and better fault-tolerance
and compromise-resilience as compared to previous schemes [19, 48, 23]. The per-
formance and security strength of the proposed SEBD are examined by analysis and
extensive simulation study.
5.1 Related Work
Several localized event boundary detection schemes have been proposed recently [21,
19, 48, 23, 71, 47]. Among them, Clouqueur, et. al. [21] sought algorithms to
collaboratively detect the presence of a target in a region. Each sensor obtains the
target energy (or local decision) from all other sensors in the region, drops extreme
values if faulty sensors exist, computes the average, and then compares it with a
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pre-determined threshold for ¯nal decision. Krishnamachari et. al. [48] proposed
several localized threshold based decision schemes to detect both faulty sensors and
event regions. The 0/1 decision predicates from the neighborhood are collected and
the number of neighbors with the same predicates are calculated. This number is
used for the ¯nal decision based on a majority vote. Another work that targets
localized boundary detection in sensor networks was proposed by Chintalapudi et.
al. in [19]. All of the three schemes in [19] take as inputs the 0/1 decision predicates
from neighboring sensors. The statistical approach computes the number of 0's and
1's in the neighborhood and a boundary sensor is detected if its neighbors contain a
\similar" number of 0's and 1's. Here the \similarity" is de¯ned based on a threshold
value that can be obtained based on a lookup table. Ding et. al. further proposed a
similar approach [19] that takes as input not only binary 0/1 decision predicates but
also real values that abstract sensor readings or sensor behaviors [23]. Note that all
these schemes work in trustworthy environments.
Meanwhile, several schemes have been proposed to provide secure discrete event
detection under adversarial environments [111, 120, 109, 83, 118]. In these schemes,
every single event of interest is assumed to be detectable by at least T nodes, where T
is a prede¯ned threshold value and usually very small (< 10). The approach adopted
in these schemes is to let every valid event detection report be collaboratively gener-
ated and independently endorsed by T nodes that have detected the event simulta-
neously. Cryptographic techniques are then used to generate such endorsements to
allow both en-route and sink veri¯cation, while keeping the event report as short as
possible. However, this approach can not be applied to a large-scale event directly,
since it is neither feasible nor necessary for all the nodes in the event region to report
its detection back to the sink due to the stringent resource constraints in WSNs. So
far, there is no published work on secure protocols that aim to correctly identify and
communicate event boundaries, rather than the event itself, in the presence of both
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node compromise and random node measurement faults.
5.2 SEBD: The Scheme
5.2.1 Problem Identi¯cation
In this part, we describe how the event boundary detection schemes proposed under
trustworthy environments would fail in adversarial environments. In adversarial en-
vironments, sensor nodes could be compromised and controlled by the attacker [90].
These compromised nodes will lie about their measurements and result in severe se-
curity threat, which greatly jeopardizes boundary detection functionality of a WSN.
Both faulty nodes and compromised nodes may inappropriately cause non-boundary
nodes (including themselves) to be recognized as boundary nodes due to the nature
of statistical method used by most of exiting schemes. However, the damage caused
by the compromised nodes is much worse than that of faulty nodes. This is because
a faulty node is still a benign node, and would suppress its own measurements af-
ter referring to other measurements in its neighborhood. However, a compromised
node will always lie about its measurements, report itself as a boundary node when
it is not, and suppress such claims when it is1. A collection of compromised nodes
could prevent the event boundary from being correctly detected by presenting false
measurement information. Moreover, compromised nodes may collude to fabricate
non-existing events and event boundaries. They may claim such boundaries appear-
ing at any location of the network as desired by the attacker, not necessarily at their
own actual locations.
1When it does not lie, it does not need to be treated.
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Figure 5.1: The left ¯gure denotes a sensor ¯eld, where the event area is located
inside the outer square and circle. In the ¯gure, normal nodes are denoted as `±',
compromised and faulty nodes are denoted as `2'. The right ¯gure is an illustration
of boundary B with r = R
2
. By de¯nition, the nodes denoted as `*' are the boundary
nodes.
5.2.2 Assumptions, network model and design goal
We assume that sensor nodes are uniformly deployed in a two-dimensional territory,
i.e., a sensor ¯eld, and they are dense enough to support ¯ne-grained collaborative
sensing. Topology control mechanisms for such purpose have been studied in [105].
We assume that sensor nodes are similar to the current generation of sensor nodes
(e.g., the Berkeley MICA motes [33]) in their computation and communication capa-
bility and power resource and they are loosely synchronized. We assume that even if
sensor nodes may execute certain sleeping strategy for energy conservation, they can
still wake up periodically or be woken up by ceratin events to work collaboratively,
according to certain wakeup mechanism [102]. The term sensor ¯eld, denoted as S, is
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referred to both the geographical region covered by the WSN, and the set of sensors
within the region. A sensor Si and its location will be used interchangeably, that is,
Si = (xi; yi). We assume that sensor nodes can make random measurement errors,
and such nodes are called faulty nodes. (However, we do not address location infor-
mation measurement errors, since our focus in this chapter is how to securely detect
event boundary given correct location information). Furthermore, we assume that
sensor nodes can be compromised and controlled by the adversary, whose purposes
are to 1) prevent event boundary from being correctly detected; 2) collude to fabricate
non-existing events and event boundaries.
We use a re¯ned event boundary model as compared to the ones in [19, 23].
Consider a phenomenon (i.e., event E) that spans some arbitrarily shaped sub-region
of S. Each sensor can, based on locally collected measurements, determine whether
it belongs to the sub-region covered by the phenomenon or not. Ideally, a boundary
node, say Si, is such a node that every closed disc centered at Si contains both
points in E and E (that is, the boundary node should be right on the real event
boundary, denoted as BR.), where E is the ground truth of the event covering sub-
region in S, and E represents the remaining region, i.e., E = S¡ E . Hence, an event
boundary, denoted as B, when represented by sensor nodes, is simply a collection of
such boundary nodes. However, due to the actual node density in practice, an event
boundary found in this case constitutes only a very restrictive node set, which is far
from enough to approximate/reveal BR [19]. For this reason, the notion of boundary
width is introduced with its value 0 < r < R in SEBD, where R is the communication
radius of sensor nodes. In SEBD, we de¯ne a sensor node, Si, as a boundary node,
B =
S
i Si; 8 i : jSi ? BRj · r; and Si 2 E ; where jSi ? BRj denotes the distance
between Si and BR. The de¯nition is illustrated in Fig.5.1.
Naturally, the design goal of SEBD is then to securely identify as many nodes as
possible in B (bounded by the underlying distributed statistical model) under adver-
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sarial environments. In other words, SEBD should have a strong security strength to
prevent compromised nodes from successfully claiming themselves as boundary nodes
when they are actually not. Furthermore, even if a compromised non-boundary node
succeeds in claiming itself as a boundary node, it should not be able to claim the
boundary at locations other than where it is. That is, the damage caused by com-
promised nodes should be limited to their vicinity only.
5.2.3 Overview of SEBD
The proposed SEBD is designed to be robust against node compromise and random
fault. SEBD consists of two key components: the underlying location-aware key man-
agement framework, and the corresponding distributed statistic boundary detection
model that is seamlessly built upon the former.
Key management framework in SEBD exploits the static and location-aware na-
ture of WSNs. By leveraging robot-assisted secure bootstrapping technique, a secure
location-aware key management is e±ciently realized through embedding location in-
formation into the keys. In SEBD, each node possesses two di®erent types of location-
aware symmetric keys: 1) a unique secret key shared between the node and the sink
that is used to provide node-to-sink authentication and data con¯dentiality; 2) a set
of neighbor pairwise keys shared with each of the neighbor nodes respectively for
node-to-node authentication and data con¯dentiality.
In our design, a sensor, after having detected an event of interest, proceeds to ¯nd
out whether or not it is a boundary sensor. To do so, it ¯rst shares its sensing result
within the neighborhood, and then makes use of the collective sensing result infor-
mation for 1) suppressing its own potential sensing error; 2) judging whether or not
a neighbor sensor/itself is a boundary node. If a sensor recognizes itself as boundary
node, it further proceeds to request endorsements from its neighbors. Every neighbor
sensor chooses to or not to endorse such requests independently. The judgement is
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based on 1) the collective sensing results in the neighborhood; 2) the behavior of
the sensor that seeks endorsements. In this way, the boundary sensors are detected
statistically, and, at the same time, the illegal attempts of claiming a non-boundary
node as a boundary node are e®ectively suppressed. More speci¯cally, SEBD detects
an event boundary in three essential stages: In 1) local sensing and measurement
adjusting stage, each node exchanges its event measurement in the neighborhood.
Then, every node adjusts its own measurement result according to the majority rule.
Next, in 2) distributed boundary detection stage, each node independently determines
whether or not it is a boundary node according to the updated measurements distri-
bution in its neighborhood and the prede¯ned statistic model. Once a node judges
itself as a boundary node, it makes a boundary claim and seeks endorsements from
its neighbors. Then, a neighbor node that receives a boundary claim will carry out a
consistency check based on knowledge it learned directly from its neighbors and will
follow the same statistical model to judge whether or not the sender is a boundary
node or not. Upon getting a positive result, the receiving node endorses the boundary
claim using the unique secret key it has. Lastly, in 3) ¯nal message composition stage,
a boundary node constructs an overall synthesized endorsement from the individual
ones it collected from its neighbors. The sink only accepts a boundary claim with a
valid overall synthesized endorsement.
5.2.4 The Enhanced Statistical Boundary Detection Model
The observation behind our statistical boundary detection model is two-fold: 1) The
original event measurements collected from neighbor nodes usually contain faulty
measurements due to node measurement error and compromise; if faulty measure-
ments can be corrected, boundary detection can certainly be more accurate and thus
more tolerant against node fault and compromise. 2) Statistically, a boundary node
can be determined by comparing the event measurements among its neighbor nodes
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Figure 5.2: An illustration of areas I and II
by assuming that the neighbor area of a sensor node is so \small" in comparison to the
area covered by the entire event that the ground truth boundary can be approximated
by a straight line in this area. In Particular, a boundary node (i.e., belonging to B)
will always have the di®erence between the numbers of `0' and `1' measurements in its
neighborhood limited by a certain threshold and its value is determined by boundary
width r given a uniform node distribution.
In SEBD, the following speci¯c rules are designed to re°ect the above observation:
Majority rule: A node maintains its own measurement only when this result is
the majority result within its neighborhood. Statistically, this rule could lead to error
correction, as long as sensor fault probability is less than 50%. Note that the majority
rule has been proved to be optimal based on an Bayesian fault recognition model in
detecting node random measurement errors [47]. We refer the interested reader to
[47] for the detailed proof.
Consistency rule: Since compromised nodes may lie about its measurements, we
further require that, if a node does not follow the majority rule, its result will be
ignored by its neighbors. This consistency rule is enforced in SEBD by consistency
veri¯cation.
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Determination rule: A node recognizes itself as a boundary node only when
1¡ n+ ¡ n¡
nu
¸ °; (1)
where n+ is the number of `1' measurements in a node u's neighborhood, n¡ is the
number of `0's, and nu = n+ + n¡ is the actual neighborhood size. Furthermore, °
is a preset system parameter, called normalized acceptance threshold. In contrast to
the previous schemes, the optimal choice of ° in SEBD does not rely on the sensor
fault probability. In fact, we set ° = 1 ¡ II(r)¡I(r)
¼R2
; where the areas of II and I are
illustrated in Fig.5.2. This selection of ° is based on uniform node distribution, since
the area size is proportional to the number of nodes located inside the area.
5.2.5 Scheme Details
5.2.5.1 Network initialization phase
SEBD adopts a robot-assisted bootstrapping technique, which securely initializes each
sensor node with the required scheme parameters and the secret symmetric keys.
Speci¯cally, we assume that a group of mobile robots are dispatched to sweep across
the whole sensor ¯eld along pre-planned routes. Mobile robots have GPS capabilities
as well as more powerful computation and communication capacities than ordinary
nodes. The leading robot is also equipped with the network master secret keys KIM
and KIIM , and °. To localize a node, say Siu , mobile robots run the secure range-based
localization protocol given in [103, 117] to ¯rst measure their respective absolute
distance to node Siu and then co-determine its location (xiu ; yiu). Subsequently, the
leading robot computes the unique secret key that is only shared between the sink
and Siu after bootstrapping:
KSiu = H(K
I
M jSiu); (2)
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where `j' denotes concatenation operation. It also generates a complete list of neighbor
nodes, denoted as NSiu for a node Siu
2, and computes a set of neighbor pairwise keys:
suppose Siv = (xiv ; yiv) is a neighbor of Siu , then the neighbor pairwise key between
the two is
KSiu ;Siv = H(K
II
M jSiu jSiv); (3)
where Siu < Siv in their binary representations. The leading robot repeats the cal-
culation for all nodes in NSiu and sends all the generated keys plus ° to Siu . Note
that the authentication between the sensor nodes and the leading robot can be easily
achieved using the technique introduced in [115]. We omit it here for the space limit.
Following this process, all the nodes can be furnished with their respective location
and the required keys. After that, mobile robots leave the sensor ¯eld and the leading
robot should securely erase all the keys from its memory. The assumption underlying
this approach is that adversaries do not launch active and explicit pinpoint attacks on
mobile robots at this stage which usually does not last too long. That is, the robots
are not likely subject to compromise. However, the adversaries may still perform
relatively passive attacks such as message eavesdropping or strategic channel infer-
ence to disturb the localization process [103]. This assumption is reasonable in that
mobile robots are much fewer than ordinary sensor nodes and hence we can spend
more on them by enclosing them in high-quality tamper-proof hardware and putting
them under super monitoring.
5.2.5.2 Boundary detection phase
For each sensor node Siu , the following data structures are de¯ned: listSiu is a table
used to store the measurements from nodes in NSiu . nu is the actual number of the
one-hop neighbors of node u, and n0 is the expected node degree. ttSiu is used to
store current operation time. n+ is the number of `1' measurements in NSiu , while
2#fNSiu g = n0 on average, where n0 is the expected number of sensor nodes in ¼R2 area.
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n¡ is the number of `0's. EN is a list used to store the ids of nodes having endorsed
on Siu 's boundary claim message if any. Lastly, Mac is for ¯nal overall endorsement
constructed. Note that all of them are initialized to zero or ;.
Upon receiving a boundary extraction request on event type eid, from the sink
or a pre-de¯ned periodical time-out, a node Siu performs the measurement, noti¯es
its neighbors of the result, and adjusts the result according to others' noti¯cations if
necessary:
{ Siu prepares MRSiu := feid; Siu ;m0; 0g, and broadcasts MRSiu to
its neighborhood.
{ Siu collects MRSij for all Sij 2 NSiu and updates listSiu , i.e., upon
receiving message MRSij = feid; Sij ;m0; 0g, Siu updates listSiu
by including an entry (Sij ;m0).
{ Once having received MRSij from all Sij 2 NSiu , Siu calculates the
number of `1' measurements n+ and the number of `0' measurements
n¡ from listSiu ; Siu adjusts its own measurement m as follows: if
m0 == 1 and n+ < bnu¡12 c, Siu reverses its measurement to m1 :
= 0; if m0 == 0 and n¡ < bnu¡12 c, Siu reverses its measurement to
m1 := 1, otherwise, the original measurement is retained, m1 := m0.
{ Siu then broadcasts the updated MRSiu := feid; Siu ;m1; 1g together
with listSiu in its neighborhood.
Here, a measurement report message MRSiu consists of four ¯elds: i) an event id,
eid, ii) a node id, iii) m, a logic value `0/1', representing whether event eid is detected
or not, and iv) a `0/1' valued indicator, indicating the message is either an original
measurement report or an updated report after local adjustment for random error
correction. Next, if a node Siu 's updated measurement is `1', it proceeds to check
whether or not it is a boundary node based on the information it received. Note
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that, if the measurement of Siu is now a `0', then no further operation is needed. The
following operations are sequentially executed before reaching the decision:
{ For every node Sij in NSiu , Siu does the following consistency check
and updates listSiu accordingly: 1) it veri¯es that the measurements in
the common entries in listSij and listSiu are consistent; and 2) it
veri¯es that node Sij 's self-adjusted value, i.e., m1 in MRSij = f
eid; Siu ;m1; 1g, conforms to the majority measurements in listSij .
{ Siu then calculates n+ and n¡ for the updated listSiu and further
calculates 1¡ jn+¡n¡j
nu
. If 1¡ jn+¡n¡j
nu
¸ °, Siu considers itself
a boundary node and prepares a boundary claim message, BCSiu :=
feid; Siu ; 1; ttSiug, where ttSiu is a time stamp. Siu then broadcasts
flistSiu ;BCSiug to the neighbors to seek their endorsements. listSiu
is attached for consistency veri¯cation.
Now assume that a neighbor node, say Sij , receives flistSiu ;BCSiug. Sij proceeds
as follows to endorse the BC 3.
Here, the endorsement to BCSiu from Sij , i.e., MACSij , is a unique MAC gener-
ated over message feidjSiuj1jttSiug using the unique secret key KSij shared between
Sij and the sink. Hence, no node could forge such a MAC on behalf of others.
SEBD also ensures that only the claimed sender can get the endorsement from the
receiver/endorser: MACSij is sent after encryption using the neighbor pairwise key
shared between the sender and receiver. Meanwhile, MACSij ;Siu is computed over
ERSij using the same neighbor pairwise key shared between the sender and receiver,
which authenticates the message sender to the receiver. The intended receiver could
therefore be assured that the endorsement is indeed from the claimed endorser. Note
3Below MAC(M;K) denotes the message authentication code generated over message M using
symmetric key K and E(M;K) denotes an encryption operation over message M using K.
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{ Consistency check: 1) it veri¯es if the time stamp is fresh, i.e., within the
allowed delay interval; 2) it checks the measurement consistency of the
common entries contained in both listSiu and its own listSij ; 3) it
carries out the same procedure to determine if node Siu is a boundary
node and veri¯es that the result conforms to Siu 's claim.
{ Upon successful checking, Sij endorses BCSiu := feid; Siu ; 1; ttSiug
by calculating MACSij :=MAC(BCSiu ; KSij ), generating ERSij
:= fSij ; Siu ; eid; ttSij ; E(MACSij ; KSij ;Siu )g. It further calculates
MACSij ;Siu :=MAC(ERSij ; KSij ;Siu ), and sends fERSij ;
MACSij ;Siug back to Siu .
that MACSiu ;Sij 6=MACSij ;Siu .
Lastly, node Siu collects all the ERs replied by its neighbors after sending BCSiu .
It then constructs a ¯nal synthesized boundary report with appropriate endorsements
from its neighbors, and sends it to the sink.
A BRSiu is accepted by the sink if and only if i) MACSiu ;sink is authentic; and
ii) t ¸ bn0¡1
2
c, where t is the number of members in EN; and iii) all nodes in EN
are indeed the neighbors of Siu
4; and iv) Mac is authentic, which, in other words,
means that all the t individual MACSij s are authentic; Note that, in this chapter,
we focus on the compromise-tolerant event boundary detection mechanism, thus we
simply assume all BRs are directly forwarded to the sink 5.
4This is achieved by extracting node's location information from its id, and ensuring that the
distance between two nodes is no farther than R.
5The sink is always assumed trustworthy and well protected.
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{ Upon receiving fERSij ;MACSij ;Siug from its neighbor Sij ; Siu ¯rst
checks the time stamp included in ER to make sure the freshness of the
message. It further veri¯es MACSij ;Siu .
{ Upon successful veri¯cation, Siu then includes Sij into EN, i.e., EN :=
EN [ Sij , and recovers the unique MAC generated by Sij , which is
further combined to the synthesized MAC, i.e., Mac :=Mac©
D(E(MACSij ; KSij ;Siu ); KSiu ;Sij ), where D(M;K) denotes a
decryption operation over message M using symmetric key K and `©'
denotes exclusive or operation.
{ Upon #fENg ¸ bn0¡1
2
c, Siu forms a boundary report message BRSiu
:= fBCSiu ;Mac;ENg, and forwards fBRSiu ;MACSiu ;sinkg to
the sink, where MACSiu ;sink :=MAC(BRSiu ; KSiu ).
5.3 Security Analysis
5.3.1 Qualitative Analysis
The proposed SEBD presents several nice security features as below, which greatly
mitigate the security threat caused by compromised nodes. Firstly, in SEBD, to suc-
cessfully claim itself as a boundary node, a node has to collect enough endorsements
from its neighbors so that its claim can be accepted by the sink. Meanwhile, each
sensor node independently makes endorsement decisions by itself based on the infor-
mation it collected directly from its neighborhood. Therefore, in contrast to existing
boundary detection schemes, before compromised nodes are able to make such claims,
a required number of endorsements have to be collected. Secondly, even if a compro-
mised node has collected enough endorsements, it can only claim the boundary at its
own location. That is, the damage caused by compromised nodes is limited to their
vicinity only. This is because the location information has been embedded into the
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unique secret key shared between each node and the sink, and any claim other than
a node's actual location will be rejected by the sink due to lack of the corresponding
unique secret key.
SEBD also withstands the following attacks:
Cheating attack: Under this attack, a compromised node lies about some of its
neighbors' measurements in a boundary claim message in order to deceive its neighbors
and obtain the endorsements. However, this attack will not likely succeed in SEBD.
Although a broadcast BC in plaintext cannot be veri¯ed through cryptographic means
like MAC, it is indeed veri¯ed through consistency check, which relies on the local
and direct knowledge each node learned from its neighborhood. This is so designed
because, in order to provide a cryptographically authentic BC, the sender has to
attach up to nu di®erent MACs from its neighbors. This, however, will unnecessarily
waste large amounts of the precious energy and bandwidth, and greatly decrease the
protocol e±ciency.
Consistency check, on the other hand, is more e±cient, and e®ectively prevents
cheating attack. This is because every node in SEBD is required to maintain a table
storing the measurement information of its neighbors, which serves as the informa-
tion source for boundary nodes self-determination. This table, at the same time, is
also conveniently used for consistency check: each node u independently veri¯es the
authenticity of a BC using its own local knowledge stored in listSiu . Although each
node may not be able to verify the whole information contained in a received BC,
a lie about one node's measurement will always be detected by some corresponding
neighbor nodes, since the messages are always broadcast. It is very hard for a com-
promised node to lie about a number of nodes' measurements simultaneously in order
to be falsely recognized as a boundary node (or reverse) and still get enough endorse-
ments without being detected. If a complete consistency check is necessary, we may
allow each node to increase its transmission range to 2R only when broadcasting its
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event measurements. Then, a listSiu can contain the whole measurement information
of all two-hop neighbors. And, in this case, any individual node can detect a lie in
listSij from its immediate neighbors. Thus, the cheating attack can be completely
prevented.
Impersonating and colluding attack: Under this attack, a compromised node may
try to impersonate another node at a di®erent location. And compromised nodes
at di®erent locations may collude and endorse each others' boundary claim message.
However, this attack is not possible in SEBD because the sink only accepts those
endorsements obtained from neighbor nodes. Since the location information is em-
bedded into the unique secret key shared between a node and the sink, and the com-
munication of any two neighbor nodes is protected by the corresponding neighborhood
pairwise key, there's no way for a node to impersonate another node or generate a
valid endorsement for a colluding node which is not in its neighborhood.
Replay attack: Under this attack, a compromised node may replay old messages
in response to a new boundary query. This attack is prevented in SEBD through
embedding time information in the BR messages. Any boundary report message that
is out of the pre-speci¯ed delay tolerance will be automatically rejected.
Node Relocation and Replication Attack: Under this type of attacks, the adver-
sary may 1) compromise and relocate some sensor nodes to other positions in the
sensor ¯eld; 2) replicate compromised sensors and place them to the positions of the
adversary's interest. The goal of the adversary is to have the compromised nodes
outnumber the normal nodes at certain areas, and hence try to cheat the sink with
bogus boundary claims. However, this type of attacks are also not possible in SEBD
because the location information is always embedded into all the keys that are used to
endorse the boundary claims. Similar to the analysis for impersonating and colluding
attacks, we can easily ¯nd that the relocated sensors can never obtain the legitimate
unique secret key and the neighborhood pairwise keys.
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5.3.2 Quantitative Analysis
In SEBD, compromised and faulty nodes could still possibly result in false recogni-
tion of non-boundary nodes (including compromised and faulty nodes themselves) as
boundary nodes. This is because the sink accepts a boundary claim as long as such a
message is endorsed by bn0¡1
2
c nodes, and n0 is the expected neighborhood size. That
is, a compromised/faulty node could pass its boundary claim, as long as there are
no fewer than bn0¡1
2
c faulty/compromised nodes in its neighborhood. However, the
attack is actually very hard to succeed as the following analysis shows.
Assume a WSN consisting of N nodes, node compromise and fault probability
pc and pf respectively, the expected number of compromised nodes is then N(pc +
pf ). Therefore, the probability that exactly i nodes are compromised/faulty in a
neighborhood is Pfig =
(n
0
i )(
N¡n0
N(pc+pf )¡i)
( NN(pc+pf ))
; assuming compromised and faulty nodes are
uniformly distributed in the sensor ¯eld. Hence, the expected probability that a
non-boundary node is falsely detected as a boundary node, is
Pf¸bn0¡1
2
cg =
n0X
i=bn0¡1
2
c
Pfig (4)
Obviously, Pf¸bn0¡1
2
cg also represents the fraction of nodes that are falsely detected as
boundary nodes when there are no events going on in a WSN.
Fig. 5.3 shows how the value of Pf¸bn0¡1
2
cg changes as node compromise probability
changes under di®erent neighborhood size n0. It is clearly shown that as long as n0
is reasonably large (¸ 15), the value of Pf¸bn0¡1
2
cg keeps below 0:8%, given pc · 15%.
Even when pc reaches as high as 20%, we still have Pf¸bn0¡1
2
cg < 3% with n
0 = 30.
Furthermore, the number of nodes in a single area can be modelled as poisson random
variable as we assume a uniform node distribution in WSN [19]. This implies that,
given the expected neighborhood size (i.e., node degree) n0 · 50, the probability that
the number of nodes in a neighborhood is less than n0¡4 is very small. That is, given
an expected n0, the size of a neighborhood in WSN has an overwhelming probability
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Figure 5.4: An illustration of boundary model with r = R=4
to be larger than n0 ¡ 4. Therefore, in SEBD, it is very hard for compromised nodes
to fabricate non-existing events and event boundaries.
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5.4 Simulation Studies
5.4.1 Metrics for Performance and Security Strength
The following three metrics are used to evaluate the performance of SEBD. Let B0 be
the set of boundary nodes detected by SEBD. Let B be the set of actual boundary
nodes as de¯ned in Section III.A.
Hit Rate ef : ef represents the fraction of sensors in B that are detected by SEBD,
with respect to the size of B:
ef =
#fB \ B0g
#fBg (5)
On top of boundary width r, we futher introduce the notion of tolerance radius to
characterize the distribution of the boundary nodes detected by SEBD. In particular,
any falsely detected boundary node that has its distance to real boundary B no more
than R¡r
2
is said to be within tolerance radius. We are more interested in the fraction
of falsely detected boundary nodes that are far from the event boundary B. An
illustration of this de¯nition is shown in Fig. 5.4. Based on the de¯nition of tolerance
radius, False Detection Rate is de¯ned.
False Detection Rate ed: ed represents the ratio of falsely detected sensors with
respect to the size of B. Here, only those falsely detected sensors whose distance to
the boundary are at least R¡r
2
are counted. Let A denote the set of falsely detected
nodes whose distance to the boundary is larger than R¡r
2
.
ed =
#fAg
#fBg (6)
Furthermore, we denote the mean distance of the nodes in B0 to BR as dB0 .
Normalized Mean Distance ew: ew represents the normalized mean distance of B0
regarding boundary width:
ew =
dB0
r
(7)
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5.4.2 Simulation setup
In all simulations, sensor nodes are located in a 200m by 200m area, their locations
drawn from a uniform distribution over the area. The radio range of all the sensors
is 10m and assumed omni-directional. In all simulations, we arbitrarily choose the
boundary width r = R=2. And ° = 1 ¡ II(r=R2 )¡I(r=R2 )
¼R2
= 2¼¡3
p
3
3¼
¼ 0:12; the areas
of II and I are illustrated in Fig. 5.2. Note that our ° value is independent of
node compromise probability. We report the results for event regions with ellipses or
straight lines as the boundaries. And our simulation produces similar results for event
regions with other boundary shapes. The simulation runs under di®erent densities
and node compromise probabilities. For each given density and node compromise
probability, the results for the three security and performance metrics are averaged
over 50 simulation runs.
5.4.3 Simulation results
In this subsection, the simulation results are reported in details. The three perfor-
mance and security strength evaluation metrics de¯ned in section V.A with regard to
network density and node compromise probability are reported in Fig. 5.5 (a), (b)
and (c), respectively. In contrast to the previous schemes, we did not change any set-
ting on parameters as node compromise probability increases from 0% to 25%. That
is, our simulation results do not rely on the pre-knowledge of node compromise/fault
probability, which, in fact, may not be available as a priori in many practical appli-
cations.
Firstly, we observe that the proposed SEBD performs very well, when node com-
promise probability equals to zero. In this case, the hit rate ef is always as high as
93%, no matter what the network density n0 is. Note that we still have pf = 2:5%
in this case. In fact, when both pc and pf equal to zero, ef is always around 95% in
SEBD. In the previous schemes [19, 23], ef is generally no more than 85%, even if all
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Figure 5.5: Simulation results with respect to three evaluation metrics
the compromised nodes can be assumed as random faulty ones. Hence, SEBD has
the highest hit rate in the ideal situation as compared to the previous schemes.
Secondly, Fig. 5.5 (a) shows that 1) the hit rate ef in SEBD does not rely on
network density; this is because we intentionally used normalized threshold value in
boundary node detection process. 2) SEBD is very good at detecting boundary nodes:
ef remains to be larger than 55%, when pc reaches as high as 25% plus 2:5% node
fault probability. This result signi¯cantly outperforms any of the previous schemes
[19, 23, 48].
Thirdly, SEBD presents a high security strength as shown in Fig. 5.5 (b). When
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Figure 5.6: Simulation results: top): ef = 85% with pc = 5%; left) ef = 79% with
pc = 12:5%; right) ef = 60% with pc = 25%. And pf = 2:5% in all three cases.
`*' denotes the detected boundary nodes, and `2' denotes compromised and faulty
nodes.
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n0 is as low as 20, the false detection rate ed is still less than 5%, given pc = 10%.
And for the same pc, ed can be kept as low as 30% when n
0 = 50. Furthermore,
given n0 = 50, ed increases very slowly as pc increases; ed equals to only 67%, when
pc reaches to 25% plus 2:5% node fault probability.
Fourthly, Fig. 5.5 (c) shows that the detected boundary nodes by SEBD are very
close to the de¯ned boundary B. It is shown that as long as n0 ¸ 25, the normalized
mean distances of the detected boundary nodes are always kept to be around the
ideal value 0:5, given pc · 15%.
In summary, the simulation results shown in Fig. 5.5 indicate that 1) SEBD
performs well until pc is up to 10%, even when n
0 is as low as 20; 2) SEBD keeps
presenting a very good performance and security strength even when pc goes up
as high as 20%, given a reasonable high n0; 3) SEBD signi¯cantly outperforms the
previous schemes in all the three metrics [19, 23].
Fig. 5.6 gives several visualized results to illustrate the performance of SEBD.
The top ¯gure gives the performance of SEBD at low node compromise probability.
Clearly, when pc = 5% and pf = 2:5%, SEBD has a very high hit rate: ef = 85%. The
left ¯gure gives the performance of SEBD at medium node compromise probability:
ef = 79%, when pc = 12:5% and pf = 2:5%. Obviously, the detected event boundaries
in both top and left ¯gures are very good approximations of the real event boundaries
as de¯ned in Fig. 5.1. In the right ¯gure, we can ¯nd that as node compromise
probability continues to be higher, the detected boundary presents a larger false
detection rate as compared to the previous ones. But still, we have ef = 60%, given
pc as high as 25% and pf = 2:5%.
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5.5 E±ciency Evaluation of SEBD
Communication Overhead: One can easily see that the performance of SEBD
improves as we require each node to collect more event measurements from more
sensor nodes in its neighborhood. This is because each node can get more samples
from both the interior and exterior of the event, and makes more accurate estimate in
the presence of node compromise and fault. However, collecting more measurements
from more nodes other than the immediate neighbors incurs much higher commu-
nication overhead. As mentioned in [19], communication overhead increases roughly
quadratically as the neighbor range increases. This will result in a much higher energy
consumption. In SEBD, we assume that the underlying network is well connected,
that is, neighborhood size is reasonably large to support ¯ne grained collaborative
event detection. Hence, a good energy-accuracy tradeo® is achieved by letting each
node collect the measurements from their immediate neighbors only. As we have
shown in Fig. 5.5 (a), ef is larger than 80% with n
0 as low as 20, given pc up to 10%.
Computation Overhead: SEBD uses very simple arithmetic computations to
obtain the measurement statistics. At the same time, SEBD also involves some secu-
rity related computations: endorsement operation, message authentication operation,
and overall endorsement synthesization operation. SEBD exploits highly e±cient se-
curity primitives to construct these operations: the ¯rst two are both realized through
highly e±cient MAC algorithm, while the last requires \exclusive or" operation only.
More speci¯cally, to accomplish a boundary node detection and authentication pro-
cess, there are up to 2n0 MAC operations required in total. Hence, the computation
costs incurred by the security related operations in SEBD is light-weight.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have studied a special instance of fault-tolerant collaborative in-
network processing tasks in WSNs, i.e., distributed event boundary detection. We
¯rst introduced the problem of securing event boundary detection in WSNs for the
applications related to large-scale phenomena monitoring, and showed how existing
boundary detection schemes fail in adversarial environments. Then, we presented the
SEBD scheme, which withstands many di®erent types of attacks. To the best knowl-
edge of the authors, SEBD is the ¯rst protocol of its kind to secure event boundary
detection in WSNs. Along with SEBD, we also proposed an enhanced nonparametric
statistic model for localized event boundary detection, which allows faulty measure-
ment correction and thus achieves higher performance. The security strength and
performance of SEBD are justi¯ed by our extensive analysis and simulations.
Chapter 6
Random Key Pre-distribution
In this chapter, we focus on the random key pre-distribution scheme without net-
work pre-deployment knowledge. The drawback of the above mentioned random key
pre-distribution schemes [28, 17] is that they are not suitable for large scale sensor
networks as they require each node to load a large number of keys. For instance,
implementation of random key distribution schemes in [28, 17] results in a storage
overhead of at least 200 keys at each sensor node for a WSN of size 10,000, which is
almost half of the available memory (assume 64-bit keys and less than 4KB of data
memory [75]). The problem becomes even worse when the network size is larger. This
fact makes the previously proposed random key distribution schemes less practical
for large-scale WSNs.
We propose a highly e±cient random key pre-distribution scheme in this chapter,
which combines the random key pre-distribution technique and the hash chain tech-
nique. The novelty of our scheme lies in that, instead of requiring each sensor node
to store all the chosen keys, the majority of the keys a node possesses are represented
and stored in the form of a small number of key-generation keys by carefully design-
ing the key pool, and therefore, the storage overhead is signi¯cantly reduced while
the same security strength holds. Compared with the existing schemes, the proposed
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scheme is more scalable and more secure in the sense that 1) Under the given resilience
requirement against node capture, the proposed scheme requires a much smaller key
ring size than the previous schemes; 2) Under the given maximum allowed key ring
size, the proposed scheme has a much better resilience property against node capture
than the previous schemes. The performance of the proposed scheme is justi¯ed by
our thorough analysis and simulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the background and
related work in Section 6.1. Then we de¯ne the terms and notation and describe our
new scheme in Section 6.2. Next we discuss the performance and security strength
of the proposed scheme in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in
Section 6.5.
6.1 Background on Key Management in WSN
In a WSN without pre-deployment knowledge, sensor nodes can be viewed as random
points which are uniformly distributed (i.e., with equal probability). Thus, the su±-
ciency problem of the secure links resided in a WSN can be reduced to the connectiv-
ity problem of the generalized random graph, which, hence, can be mathematically
treated using the well known connectivity theory for random graph by Erd¶os and
R¶enyi [98]. The connectivity of a key graph G(V;E) is then given as: for monotone
properties, there exists a value of p such that the property moves from \nonexistent"
to \certainly true" in a very large random graph. The function de¯ning p is called
the threshold function of a property. If p = ln(n)
n
+ c
n
, with c being any real constant
then
Pc = lim
n!1
Pr([G(n; p) connected]) = e¡e
¡c
(6.1)
where Pc denotes the desired probability that the key graph is connected. In ad-
dition, n denotes the network size and d denotes the node degree (i.e., the average
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number of edges connected to each node) necessary to assure that the key graph is
connected with probability Pc; p is the probability that an edge between any two
nodes exists in G(V;E):
p =
d
n
(6.2)
Due to the inherent communication constraints in WSNs, a sensor node can only
communicate directly with its n0 neighboring nodes. Since the expected node degree
must be at least d as calculated, the required probability of successfully performing
key-setup with some neighboring node is now:
prequired =
d
n0 ¡ 1 (6.3)
This implies that any two nodes in the WSN should share at least one secret key
with probability no less than prequired. Further, the probability of two nodes i and j
sharing at least one secret key can be computed as follows:
p = P (Ri \Rj 6= ;) = 1¡ P (jRi \Rjj = 0) (6.4)
For the key pre-distribution scheme in [28], p is computed as
p = 1¡
¡
K¡R
R
¢¡
K
R
¢ (6.5)
whereK is the size of the key pool, and R is the size of the key ring. In q-composite
scheme proposed in [17], the above calculation is now
p = P (jRi \Rjj ¸ q) = 1¡
q¡1X
s=0
P (jRi \Rjj = s) (6.6)
Note that in [28, 17]
P (jRi \Rjj = s) =
¡
K
s
¢¡
K¡s
2(R¡s)
¢¡
2(R¡s)
m¡s
¢¡
K
R
¢2 (6.7)
Therefore, key pool size K and key ring size R can be calculated by relating Eq.
(6.3) with Eq. (6.5) or (6.6).
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6.2 The Proposed Random Key Pre-Distribution
Scheme
6.2.1 Terms and Notation
In this chapter we use the following notation and terms for the convenience of de-
scription.
² Key Pool : A key pool K with jKj = K is a pool of random symmetric keys,
from which each sensor node is independently assigned a subset, namely, a key
ring in the key pre-distribution scheme for a WSN. The cardinality of K equals
to K.
² Key Chain: A key chain C with jCj = C is a subset of K, and L equal-sized key
chains in total form a complete key pool. Therefore, we have C = K=L. Each
key chain is independently generated via a unique generation key, namely, gi
and a publicly known seed, namely, seed, by applying a keyed hash algorithm
repeatedly. The value of the publicly known seed is the same for every key chain.
Each key chain is uniquely indexed by its ID, namely, Ci and Ci 2 [0; L¡ 1].
² Key Ring : A key ring Ri with jRij = R is a subset of Key Pool with the
cardinality of R (R · K), which is independently assigned to a sensor node i
following the assignment rules de¯ned by the key pre-distribution scheme. Note
that R is the same for every sensor node.
² Key Graph: Let V represent all sensor nodes in a WSN. A key graph G(V;E)
is constructed in the following manner: for any two nodes i and j in V , there
exists an edge eij 2 E between them if and only if Ri \ Rj 6= ;. Note that
jV j = n for a WSN of size n. We say that a key graph G(V;E) is connected if
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and only of any two nodes i and j belonging to V can reach each other via edge
set E only.
² In a WSN of size n, each network node is uniquely identi¯ed through its ID,
which ranges from 0 to n¡ 1. The length of a node ID is therefore up to log2 n
bits.
We say that a key graph G(V;E) is connected if and only if any two nodes i and
j belonging to V can reach each other via edge set E only. In q-composite scheme
[17], a key graph G(V;E) is connected if and only if any two nodes i and j belonging
to V can reach each other through no less than two independent paths via edge set
E only.
A cryptographically secure one-way hash function H has the following property:
for y = H(x; k), 1) given x, it is computationally infeasible to ¯nd y without knowing
the value of k; 2) given y and k, it is computationally infeasible to ¯nd x. A keyed
hash algorithm like HMAC is provably secure and can be easily constructed on top of
any secure one-way hash algorithms like SHA-1 [46]. However, a general purpose hash
algorithm like SHA-1 is not suitable for sensor nodes, because 1) it is too complicated
for an 8-bit micro-processor; 2) its message block length is at least 512-bit, which
might be too large for sensor nodes and thus is not energy e±cient. In [113], a class
of universal hash functions WH is proposed for sensor nodes, whose message block is
w-bit with a 2¡w collision probability. This hash function is highly power e±cient.
The implementation of WH shows that it consumes only 11.6¹W at 500 kHz. In the
proposed scheme, we use WH in our key chain generation. The input and output
length will be both 64-bit and no padding operation is needed at all. By applying
the keyed hash function H repeatedly on an initial value m, one can obtain a chain
of outputs. Based on the properties described above, we know that these outputs are
independent with each other and without knowing the secret key used by H, one can
not deduce any value on the chain even from other values of the same hash chain.
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Figure 6.1: A sample key pool and key ring
6.2.2 Random Key Pre-distribution Scheme
The proposed key pre-distribution scheme consists of two phases: key assignment
phase and shared-key discovery & path-key establishment phase. Although the way
to ¯nd shared keys is di®erent, the shared-key discovery and path-key establishment
phase is more or less the same as in the previous schemes. In our scheme, the most
signi¯cant di®erence lies in the key assignment phase. We propose two di®erent
schemes: the basic scheme and the q-composite scheme for key assignment phase.
The details of the proposed schemes are described below.
Key Assignment Phase:
² Key pool generation: Key pool K is determined by the following two parameters:
key pool sizeK and the number of key chains L. Therefore, a key poolK consists
of L di®erent key chains: K = S
i
Ci (i = 0; ::; L ¡ 1) and Ci \ Cj = ; (i 6= j).
Each key chain Ci is generated via a unique generation key gi and the publicly
known seed seed by applying a keyed hash algorithm repeatedly. Thereby, the
l-th key of key chain Ci is conceptually computed as
kci;l = Hl(seed; gi) (6.8)
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whereHl(seed; gi) = H(Hl¡1(seed; gi); gi) and so on. Note that gi is only known
to its assigned sensor nodes and should be strictly kept secret from other nodes
in the WSN. At the same time, we use the pair (Ci; l) to index the corresponding
key. Hence,
Ci =
K=L[
l=1
kci;l (6.9)
A graphical illustration of the concepts of key pool and key chains is shown in
Fig. 6.1(a).
² Key ring loading : In this step, each node is loaded with its assigned key ring R,
which contains two parts, R1 and R2, where R1 is the generation knowledge of
a number of key chains and R2 is a set of individual random keys from di®erent
key chains. To be more speci¯c, for node i, Ri = Ri;1 [ Ri;2. The assignment
rules are as follows. First, node i is assigned with r0 randomly selected key
chains. However, instead of storing all the K=L keys in each key chain, node
i only stores the corresponding key chain generation keys (one key per key
chain). Therefore, it stores r0 keys for this part, i.e., jRi;1j = r0. From these
r0 key-generation keys, r0 £ (K=L) random keys can be calculated e®ectively.
Second, node i is additionally assigned with r1 randomly selected keys each
from a di®erent key chain. Hence, we have jRi;2j = r1. An example is shown
in Fig. 6.1(b), where the key chain and keys in green (¯lled with color) can be
a sample key ring, where r0 = 1. For the proposed q-composite scheme, the
assigning rules are the same but with larger r0; r1 values in general.
Shared-key Discovery & Path-key Establishment Phase:
During the network bootstrapping phase, each sensor node is required to broadcast
the key index information of its key ring, i.e., Ri, to expose its key information to
the neighbor nodes. Hence, each node will know which keys its neighbors have. Each
node then examines the key index information of its own key ring to ¯nd or calculate
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the keys it shares with the neighbor nodes. For node i to ¯nd the shared key(s) with
node j, it matches the key indexes ofRi andRj;2. IfRi;2\Rj;2 6= ;, those are the keys
node i shared with node j. If Ri;1 \Rj;2 6= ;, node i needs to calculate the key(s) in
common. For example, if node x contains a key indexed as kci;l and node y contains
key chain Ci, node y immediately knows that it shares key kci;l with node x upon
receiving node x's broadcast message. Node y then simply calculates kci;l following
Eq. (6.8). If node y also contains key kci;l, then there is no need for calculation. If
there are more than one shared key, the ¯nal pairwise key is simply computed as the
hash value of the shared keys. The concatenation sequence of the shared keys can be
easily enforced to ensure the same output hash value. For example, if IDx < IDy,
then the keys sent by node x becomes the ¯rst in the concatenation. In case that two
neighbor nodes share no common key directly, we use the same path-key establishment
technique as described in [28] to establish a pairwise key between them. Note that
in our setting, no shared key is established when two nodes only share one or more
key chains, that is, we do not count in the situations that for any two nodes i and j,
Ri;2 \Rj;2 = ; and Ri;1 \Rj;2 = ; and Ri;2 \Rj;1 = ; and Ri;1 \Rj;1 6= ;. We treat
this case the same as that the two nodes do not share any key and use the path-key
establishment technique to establish a shared key between them. At this point, each
node now shares at least a key with each of its neighbor nodes, respectively. We use
the same method as in [17] to generate the link key klink = hash(k1jk2j:::jki) to secure
the communication between two sensor nodes, where i (q · i · r0+r1) is the number
of keys it actually shares with a particular neighbor node.
6.3 Performance Analysis and Simulation
In this section, we evaluate the proposed two schemes in terms of required storage
space (i.e., key ring size) at the sensor node, given the required key sharing probability
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prequired. For a WSN of network size n and neighborhood size n
0, prequired can be
calculated using Eq. (6.3). Then the key pool size K and key ring size R can be
properly chosen according to Eq. (6.5) [28] and Eq. (6.6) [17], respectively. We ¯rst
develop the equations to calculate the probability that two nodes sharing at least one
or q keys for the proposed two schemes. We next compare the performance of the
proposed schemes with that of [28] and [17], respectively. From the description of
the scheme we know that key ring R contains two parts: R1 and R2 in addition to a
public seed. Hence, R is calculated as follows:
R = jR1j+ jR2j+ 1 = r0 + r1 + 1 (6.10)
Connectivity Calculation:
We consider the probabilities that any two nodes, say ni and nj, share at least
one key (for the basic scheme) and at least q keys (for the q-composite scheme).
For any node, say ni, the number of possible key ring assignments can be calculated
as follows:
(I) =
µ
L
r0
¶µ
L¡ r0
r1
¶µ
K=L
1
¶r1
For the other node, say nj, the number of possible key ring assignments that do
not share any key with node ni can be calculated as follows. Note that the two nodes
may share common key chains.
(II) =
r0X
s=0
µ
L¡ r0 ¡ r1
r0 ¡ s
¶µ
r0
s
¶ r1X
i=0
µ
L¡ 2r0 ¡ r1 + s
r1 ¡ i
¶
µ
r1
i
¶µ
K
L
1
¶r1¡iµK
L
¡ 1
1
¶i
Similarly, the number of possible key ring assignments at the other node nj that
share exactly x (1 · x · r0+ r1) keys with node ni (excluding key chain to key chain
overlapping) can be computed as follows:
(III) =
r0X
t=0
r0¡tX
s=0
µ
L¡ r0 ¡ r1
r0 ¡ s¡ t
¶µ
r0
s
¶µ
r1
t
¶ r0¡sX
i=0
min(r1¡t;r0¡s)X
j=0
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µ
L¡ 2r0 ¡ r1 + s+ t
r1 ¡ i
¶µ
r1 ¡ t
j
¶µ
r0 ¡ s
i
¶
jX
m=0
µ
j
m
¶µ
K
L
1
¶r1¡jµK
L
¡ 1
1
¶j¡m
where t+ i+m = x and t+ i+m · r0 + r1 ¡ t.
Therefore, the probability that any two nodes share no key is
PrfjRi \Rjj = 0g = (II)
(I)
and the probability that any two nodes share exactly x keys is
PrfjRi \Rjj = xg = (III)
(I)
.
Hence, for the basic scheme, we have
prequired = 1¡ (II)
(I)
(6.11)
For the proposed q-composite scheme (q=2), we have
prequired = 1¡ PrfjRi \Rjj = 0g ¡ PrfjRi \Rjj = 1g (6.12)
= 1¡ (II)
(I)
¡ (III)(x = 1)
(I)
(6.13)
Performance Evaluation:
In order to thoroughly examine the performance of the proposed two schemes,
we vary the values of r0 and r1 under di®erent network size n, key pool size K, and
the number of key chains L to see how the connectivity varies accordingly. The key
ring size R is calculated as r0 + r1 + 1. Also note that in the proposed schemes,
the value of L is a function of that of network size n. The value of L determines
the security strength against node capture as will be discussed in detail in the next
section. The network size is ¯rst set as n = 10; 000. The key pool size K is set
to 5, 10, and 50 times of the network size. The number of key chains L is set to
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Figure 6.2: The proposed basic scheme: p vs. r0 and r1 under di®erent values of K
and L, when network size n is 10; 000.
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Figure 6.3: (a) Performance of Gligor's Scheme and (b) performance of Chan's Scheme
(q = 2) when network size n = 10; 000.
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0:05, 0:1 and 0:25 times of the network size. Fig. 6.2 shows the performance of
the proposed basic scheme at n = 10; 000. Fig. 3(a) illustrates the performance of
Eschenauer et al.'s scheme at the same network size. The proposed basic scheme
o®ers a great performance improvement as compared to Eschenauer et al.'s scheme.
For example, When n = 10; 000 and prequired = 0:5, R is required to be around 260
given K = 100; 000 in [28]; on the other hand, under the same settings R can be
as low as 30 in the proposed scheme, although this choice is not good as it has a
low security strength against node capture, as we will show in Section 6.4. However,
when similar security strength is assumed, the required key ring size in the proposed
scheme is around 50% less than that of Eschenauer et al.'s scheme as will be shown
in Section 6.4. The evaluation of the proposed q-composite scheme is shown in Fig.
4 and as comparison, the performance of Chan et. al.'s q-composite scheme under
the same settings is illustrated in Fig. 3(b). The performance improvement is again
very signi¯cant. For instance, when n = 10; 000 and prequired = 0:5, R is required to
be around 275 (q = 2) given K = 50; 000 in [17]; on the other hand, in the proposed
scheme R can be as low as 50 (q = 2) in the proposed scheme.
The improvement of the proposed two schemes goes higher as the network size n
grows. For example, when n = 50; 000 and prequired = 0:5, the proposed basic scheme
requires as low as 100 keys with K = 250; 000 as shown in Fig. 5, while 410 keys are
required in Eschenauer et. al.'s scheme for comparable security strength. This fact
shows that our scheme is highly scalable to the larger network sizes. At the same
time, a requirement of R = 410 implies that the scheme is no longer practical under
the given network size due to the extremely limited storage space of the sensor nodes.
The above ¯gures (Fig. 2 and Fig. 4) also illustrate how the performance of the
proposed two schemes vary under di®erent system settings, i.e., di®erent values of K,
L and (r0; r1) pairs. We ¯nd that under a given network size n, the performance of the
proposed schemes decreases as either K or L increases. From Eq. (6.15) developed
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Figure 6.4: The proposed q-composite scheme: p vs. r0 and r1 under di®erent values
of K and L, when network size n = 10; 000 and q = 2.
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Figure 6.6: Security strength of the proposed basic scheme with n = 10; 000,
prequired = 0:5 and Rmax = 192
below, we know that the values of K and L also determine how resilient the proposed
schemes is against node capture. On one hand, we desire smaller values of K and L to
achieve better key sharing probability with R ¯xed; on the other hand, the proposed
schemes present better resilience property against node capture when larger values of
K and L are used. Therefore, this can be formulated as a constrained optimization
problem:
Under the given system parameters of networks size n and neighborhood size n',
minimize R, where R = r0 + r1 + 1 as de¯ned in Eq. (6.10) and the values of (r0; r1)
are subject to Eq. (6.11) or Eq. (6.13).
6.4 Security Strength Analysis
To study the security strength of the proposed scheme, we ¯rst prove that without
the knowledge of the corresponding key chain generation key gi, whatever number of
keys of a key chain that are compromised will not a®ect the security of the remaining
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keys in that key chain.
Lemma: For a given key chain Ci of size K=L, the knowledge of any combination of
K
L
¡1 keys except for the key in question can not result any advantage on the knowledge
of the remaining key without knowing the corresponding key chain generation key gi.
Proof: In the proposed scheme, a key chain is generated using the keyed hash
function following Eq. (6.8). Hence, any key kci;l inside a key chain holds the following
relationship with other keys of the same key chain:
¢ ¢ ¢ ; kci;l = H(kci;l¡1; gi); kci;l+1 = H(kci;l; gi); ¢ ¢ ¢
Therefore, it is computationally infeasible to compute kci;l from either kci;l+1 or kci;l¡1
without the secret key gi because the keyed hash function is used. On the other hand,
it is also computationally infeasible to recover the key chain generation key gi from
any combination of its generated keys because of the same reason. 2
Next we study the resilience property of the proposed scheme against node capture
by calculating the fraction of links in the network that are compromised due to
key revealing resulted from node capture. In the proposed scheme, since each node
actually has the knowledge of r0K
L
+ r1 keys, the probability that a given key does
not belong to a node is 1¡ ( r0
L
+ r1
K
). Therefore, if there are m compromised nodes,
the probability that a given key is not compromised should be (1¡ ( r0
L
+ r1
K
))m. The
expected fraction of total keys compromised is thus 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ( r0
L
+ r1
K
))m. If the
communication link between two nodes has its link key klink computed from s (s ¸ q)
shared keys, the probability of that link being compromised is then (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ( r0
L
+
r1
K
))m)s and hence, in the worst case the compromising probability is
(1¡ (1¡ (r0
L
+
r1
K
))m)q (6.14)
Therefore, averagely the compromising probability is
mX
s=q
(1¡ (1¡ (r0
L
+
r1
K
))m)s
P (jRi \Rjj = s)Pm
t=q P (jRi \Rjj = t)
(6.15)
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Figure 6.7: Security strength of the proposed q-composite scheme with n = 10; 000,
prequired = 0:5, q = 2 and Rmax = 161
Eq. (6.15) also represents the fraction of additional communications that an ad-
versary can compromise based on the key information retrieved from m captured
nodes in the worst case. Fig. 6 shows the security strength of the proposed basic
scheme, where n = 10; 000, prequired = 0:5 and Rmax = 192. Obviously, the proposed
scheme o®ers a much better resilience property while requiring a much smaller key
ring size when compared with Eschenauer and Gligor's. Fig. 7 illustrates the secu-
rity strength of the proposed q-composite scheme, where n = 10; 000, prequired = 0:5,
q = 2 and Rmax = 161. Again the proposed q-composite scheme o®ers a much better
resilience property as compared to that of Chan et. al.'s. To exactly illustrate how
much is the improvements gained by the proposed scheme, we now ¯x the key ring
size R for each scheme and other system settings remain the same. Fig. 8 shows the
security strength of the proposed basic scheme, when n = 10; 000, prequired = 0:5 and
key ring size R is ¯xed as 90. We can see that when the fraction of the compromised
communication has reached to 100% in Eschenauer, the proposed basic scheme only
has a value of 38% under the same settings. Fig. 9 shows the signi¯cant resilience
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Figure 6.8: Security strength of the proposed basic scheme with n = 10; 000,
prequired = 0:5 and R = 90
improvement of the proposed q-composite scheme when n = 10; 000, prequired = 0:5,
q = 2 and key ring size R is ¯xed as 90. To compromise 10% communications among
the remaining network nodes, only 25 compromised nodes are required; however, 50
nodes are required in the proposed scheme. The improvement is around 100%. More
importantly, the proposed q-composite scheme holds a much better security strength
under both small scale attack and large scale attack, which overcomes the shortcom-
ings presented in Chan et. al.'s scheme, that is, achieving better security strength
under small scale attack while trading o® increased vulnerability in the face of a large
scale attack on network nodes. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 10.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a new approach for random key pre-distribution
in WSNs. The novelty of this approach is that, instead of requiring the sensor nodes
store all the assigned keys, the majority of the keys are represented and stored in
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Figure 6.9: Security strength of the proposed q-composite scheme with n = 10; 000,
prequired = 0:5, q = 2 and R = 90.
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Figure 6.10: Security strength of the proposed q-composite scheme with n = 10; 000,
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terms of key generation key sets with a very small size by carefully designing the
key pool, which signi¯cantly reduces storage space while holding the same security
strength. The proposed scheme is hence, highly scalable to the larger network sizes.
The proposed scheme outperforms the previous random key pre-distribution schemes
under both small scale and large scale attacks, especially when the network size is
large (¸ 10; 000) as shown by our thorough analysis.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the contributions of the research presented in this disserta-
tion and suggests directions for future work.
7.1 Contributions
This dissertation studies communication security in WSNs with respect to three im-
portant aspects: broadcast/multicast security, data report security, and random key
pre-distribution.
² Multicast Security: We identi¯ed the problem of multiuser broadcast authenti-
cation in WSNs and pointed out a serious security vulnerability inherent to the
symmetric-key based ¹TESLA-like schemes [73, 54, 57, 58]. We then proposed
several PKC-based schemes to address the proposed problem with minimized
computational and communication costs. We achieved our goal by integrat-
ing several cryptographic building blocks, such as the Bloom ¯lter, the partial
message recovery signature scheme, and the Merkle hash tree, in an innovative
manner. We also analyzed both the performance and security resilience of the
proposed schemes. A quantitative energy consumption analysis was given in de-
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tail and demonstrated the e®ectiveness and e±ciency of the proposed schemes.
Our research on this topic appears in [85, 82, 92, 86].
To address multicast encryption problem, we ¯rst analyzed and classi¯ed the
multicast group semantics that are inherently demanded by WSNs. We then
proposed the GPLD scheme which, to our best knowledge, is the ¯rst multicast
encryption scheme of its kind that supports various multicast group seman-
tics and is tailored for WSNs. GPLD advances the current state-of-the-art by
enabling dynamic changing and simultaneous formation of multiple multicast
groups. We developed a novel multicast encryption technique called global-
partition, local-di®usion. This technique e®ectively minimizes global (sink-to-
sensor) group key distribution and re-keying tra±c, while maintaining its sup-
port to various multicast group semantics. The e±ciency and security properties
of GPLD were justi¯ed through both analysis and simulations. Our research
on this topic appears in [87].
² Data Report Security: To address data report security, we proposed a novel
location-aware multi-functional key management framework called LEDS [83].
LEDS e±ciently embeds the location (cell) information of each sensor into all
types of symmetric secret keys owned by that node, and thus provides end-
to-end security guarantee. Each legitimate event report in LEDS is endorsed
by multiple sensing nodes and is encrypted with a unique secret key shared
between the event sensing nodes and the sink. Furthermore, the authenticity of
the corresponding event sensing nodes can be individually veri¯ed by the sink.
This novel setting successfully eliminates the possibility that the compromise
of nodes other than the sensing nodes of an event report may result in security
compromise of that event report. LEDS possesses e±cient en-route false data
¯ltering capability to deal with the infamous bogus data injection attack, which
at the same time signi¯cantly reduces energy cost as unnecessary forwarding
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is eliminated. LEDS also provides high level assurance on data availability
by dealing with both report disruption attack and selective forwarding attack,
simultaneously. Our research on this topic appears in [83, 84].
For applications related to large-scale spatial phenomena monitoring, we further
studied the problem of securing event boundary detection in WSNs and showed
why existing boundary detection schemes fail in adversarial environments [91].
We presented a Secure Event Boundary Detection (SEBD) scheme [91], which
is to our best knowledge the ¯rst protocol of its kind to secure event boundary
detection in WSNs. SEBD withstands many types of attacks. We propose an
enhanced statistic model for localized event boundary detection with proactive
faulty measurements correction. Our model is more accurate and robust against
node compromise and random fault as compared to existing schemes [19, 48,
23]. Moreover, it is nonparametric without relying on any prior knowledge of
node compromise and fault probability, which, however, is required by existing
schemes to achieve optimal results [19, 23]. We used extensive simulations to
evaluate SEBD and show a very good performance and security strength. Our
research on this topic appears in [89, 91].
² Random Key Pre-distribution: We proposed a highly e±cient random key pre-
distribution scheme, which combines the random key pre-distribution technique
and the hash chain technique [88]. The novelty of our scheme lies in that, instead
of requiring each sensor node to store all the chosen keys, the majority of the
keys a node possesses are represented and stored in the form of a small number
of key-generation keys by carefully designing the key pool, and therefore, the
storage overhead is signi¯cantly reduced while the same security strength holds.
Compared with the existing schemes, the proposed scheme is more scalable and
more secure in the sense that 1) Under the given resilience requirement against
node capture, the proposed scheme requires a much smaller key ring size than
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the previous schemes; 2) Under the given maximum allowed key ring size, the
proposed scheme has a much better resilience property against node capture
than the previous schemes. Our research on this topic appears in [88, 90].
7.2 Future Direction
In this section, we brie°y mention areas of future work based on our thesis. We
outline three directions as follows.
² Secure Distributed Data Storage and Retrieval: In this dissertation, we have
focused on securing the information in communication; securing information in
storage are not adequately addressed. In the context of ubiquitous computing,
WSNs are envisioned to provide ubiquitous information sensing, storing, and
content delivering services. For the purpose of e±cient data management, an
increasing number of distributed in-network data storage and retrieval schemes
have been proposed recently [101]. This makes the absence of mechanisms for
securing stored information becoming a more and more severe issue. Hence,
more research e®orts should be put on this problem.
² Secure Data Aggregation: In many applications, the raw information sensed
by individual sensors should be aggregated for the purpose of reducing the
communication cost and energy expenditure in data collection [91, 110, 18].
In this dissertation, we studies a special form of data aggregation, i.e., event
boundary detection. However, data aggregation in WSNs can be of di®erent
forms as desired by the underlying applications. Each di®erent type of data
aggregation may require customized secure aggregation techniques. Moreover,
common techniques should also be developed to reduce the complexity of the
protocol stack. More research should be done along this direction.
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² Privacy-aware Security Services: Current security research in WSNs rarely con-
sider privacy problem. However, data and network communication privacy can
be a big concern in many applications [96, 79, 80, 78]. As WSNs are envisioned
to become more and more pervasive, privacy-aware security services should be
further developed.
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